No. 835
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)1

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Attached is the promised additional memorandum on the Defense Department’s papers on Spain.2 I take it these are the papers we were told about in the JCS3 which had been sent to the Secretary of Defense’s office. From Mr. Foster’s covering letter4 it appears that they have not had Defense approval, fortunately. I think the main problem is how we get this matter down to earth again. I am inclined to think that before going back to the Joint Chiefs we should talk to someone in the office of the Secretary of Defense. Whether it should be Bill Foster or Frank Nash I do not know but would suggest that we should approach the matter from that angle. I believe this should be done promptly before we freeze on approving such items as “Development, equipping, manning and utilization of facilities as required for any projected US Army operations.”5


Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)6

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  • Subject: Comments on Defense Department Recommendations regarding Spain.

Following are EUR’s comments on the Defense Department recommendations regarding Spain which were summarized in my memorandum of January 24.7 (All references herein are to the [Page 1789] numbered paragraphs of that memo.) If approved, I suggest these points be discussed with the JCS.

We agree that negotiations for US use of Spanish air, naval and supporting logistic facilities should be undertaken as soon as possible with the Spanish Government.
Before negotiations are begun and prior to the departure of the proposed Joint US Military Group, the agencies concerned should agree on all aspects of program to be covered by the negotiations. This will include not only the refinement of the military requirements to be sought and the necessary preparations by the State and Defense Departments for those negotiations, but also the development of such economic and military aid (in addition to construction work) as is to be undertaken in support of the US military program in Spain. Once we have Defense Department views regarding the utilization of the $100 million,8 we are prepared to work out with Defense and MSA an agreed program covering this aspect of the negotiations.
Although we had planned to date that the first stage of our new policy toward Spain would be limited to approaching the Spanish Government for the use of air, naval and related logistic facilities, the program proposed by the JCS in their memorandum and in the terms of reference for the JUSMG is much more far-reaching. This full program appears to have two major additional elements: a) the eventual commitments to be sought from Spain, which are included in the terms of reference (paragraph 6, previous memo); and b) three new requirements of a broad and general nature, apparently primarily Army requirements (paragraphs 2h, i and k).
The eventual commitments the JCS suggests be sought from Spain have long-range policy implications which will require further thought and study. We will submit our views and recommendations concerning them later.

a) Of the three new broad requirements, the first (paragraph 2h) refers to projected US Army operations. We judge it is also related to the first of the five proposed eventual commitments to be sought from Spain (paragraph 6a). Although we would appreciate information indicating more precisely what is envisaged by this requirement, it seems to us that it, and perhaps the suggested commitment, exceed the limitations which it was agreed by the President, Secretary Acheson, Secretary Marshall and Admiral Sherman would govern the US approach to the Spanish Government on [Page 1790] this matter.9 A copy of Mr. Lovett’s letter confirming the position agreed with the President is attached.10 In our opinion the political considerations which underlay this decision have not changed to such an extent that we should now agree to remove this limitation, for this particular purpose, as the JCS suggest (paragraph 3b).

b) The second new requirement (paragraph 2i) appears to be consistent with and to support the balance of the four eventual commitments desired by the JCS from Spain (paragraph 6b, c, d, and e). It is likewise questionable whether this requirement, and the suggested commitments, are consistent with the limitations approved by the President. We would suggest, therefore, that consideration of this requirement be postponed until the presentation of EUR’s views in accordance with paragraph 4. Meanwhile, you may wish to ask the JCS to provide more precise information regarding this requirement.

c) The third new requirement (paragraph 2k) is broad and general and it is not clear to us what the JCS have in mind. It is recommended that you ask for clarification of this point during the discussions with them.

We concur with terms of reference for the JUSMG (paragraph 3c) with the following three exceptions:
The eventual commitments to be sought from Spain, which we are now studying.
Paragraph 1(e) of the terms of reference. In order that the Service-to-Service negotiations may be fully and clearly tied to the governmental negotiations, we recommend that this sentence be revised to read:

“The Chief JUSMG will, when requested, render assistance to the Ambassador in Governmental negotiations including the development of a bilateral governmental agreement, and in connection therewith will conduct Service-to-Service negotiations as may be required with a view to implementing those recommendations in the Joint Military Survey Team (Spain) report which may be approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”

In our opinion a survey of Spanish requirements for military aid by the JUSMG, concurrently with negotiations for military facilities, could adversely affect those negotiations. We believe such a survey would raise Spanish hopes and expectations of receiving military end-item aid, thus making our negotiating position more difficult. However, the Spaniards are expecting to receive some military aid and we should consequently be prepared, if necessary, to offer some aid in the form of training equipment. We recommend, therefore, that the reports of the Service attachés be [Page 1791] checked and, if they do not provide adequate information on this subject, that we agree to a survey expressly limited to training equipment. General dollar and item limitations of such a program should be agreed between our Departments before the survey is commenced. A survey of Spanish requirements for military end-item aid should not be made, we believe, before the negotiations have been completed and decisions have been made regarding such a program and its relation to the broader military cooperation which is implicit in the long-range commitments discussed in paragraph 5 above.
In view of frequent references by Franco and other high Spanish officials to their desire for assistance in improving the Spanish munitions industry, both General Spry and Ambassador Griffis reported that the Spanish Government has a major interest in this type of aid. Since there are important policy questions and supply problems involved in extending military end-item aid to Spain, the possibility of providing assistance to the Spanish munitions industry may conceivably constitute a feasible alternative, at least in the first instance. However, there may also be supply difficulties in this regard. We believe, therefore, that the Defense Department should be asked to prepare an estimate of the type of assistance which could appropriately be extended to the Spanish munitions industry.
You may wish to remind the JCS that the British and French, according to our agreement with them, should be informed of our plans before negotiations are undertaken with the Spanish Government.
Although the estimated cost of the tentative military requirements set forth by the JCS totals approximately $405 million, none of the three Services have funds for use in Spain during FY 1952 or programmed in their budgets for FY 1953. Unless funds in their budgets can be diverted from other uses, therefore, the only source of funds during FY 1952 and 1953 will be the presently available $100 million, or a supplemental appropriation. Although we do not yet know over how many years the $405 million military program is intended to stretch, MSA has suggested that the $100 million could be used to cover part of the cost. This could be accomplished by extending economic aid to Spain on a grant basis and using the required counterpart for US military expenses in Spain. It is recommended that you ask the JCS how they plan to finance their proposed program.
As a result of preliminary discussions, the Defense Department has agreed to provide as quickly as possible a breakdown of the cost estimates including estimates of expenditures in and outside Spain and time phasing of the expenditures; Defense Department recommendations regarding the use of the $100 million; and [Page 1792] estimates of the peacetime and wartime US military complement in Spain. This information, which is promised within a few days,11 is required in order to prepare a complete evaluation of the political impact and significance of the proposed military program both in Spain and in Western Europe, as well as upon our relations with those countries.
Following are our preliminary comments regarding the program suggested by the JCS:
The air base program proposed for Spain would constitute one of the largest SAC bomber complexes in any country outside the US. Only the bomber bases in the UK and French Morocco approach in magnitude the bomber bases proposed for Spain.
In view of the existing political, economic and social circumstances in Spain, we believe an immediate and full implementation of a program of this magnitude would entail an undue risk of creating an impact greater than present-day conditions in Spain could readily assimilate, with resulting dislocations—social as well as economic—which would prejudice the attainment of our objectives.
The proposed JCS program exceeds in size and scope the requirements understood by the British and French during their consultations with Admiral Sherman.
In our opinion there are two basic considerations in developing the military program in Spain:
The program should include all minimum necessary requirements so that we avoid the necessity of approaching the Spanish Government a second time with new and more extensive requirements. In view of the considerations mentioned in paragraph 11b above regarding the impact in Spain of the proposed program, we would suggest that the JCS review their recommendations in order to determine the minimum necessary requirements. We would hope that the resulting program would be on a more modest scale than the air, naval and related logistic facilities, Army requirements and eventual commitments from the Spanish Government which are envisaged in the present JCS proposal.
The military program should be implemented gradually in Spain. In our view it would be unwise to embark immediately on the full implementation of a program of the magnitude represented by the military facilities tentatively proposed by the Defense Department. Rather, we believe it would be in the interest of the US to proceed gradually in establishing the military facilities we may be granted in Spain in order to escape, to the greatest extent possible, the difficulties mentioned in paragraph 11b above.
  1. A copy of this memorandum was sent to Nitze.
  2. See footnote 2, supra.
  3. This information was imparted at a meeting of officials of the Department of State and the JCS on Jan. 16. A record of the meeting is in State–JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417, “III”.
  4. See footnote 2, supra.
  5. This passage was quoted from the memorandum by Perkins, Jan. 24, paragraph 2 (h), supra.
  6. Drafted by Dunham; a copy was sent to Nitze.
  7. Supra.
  8. The views of the Department of Defense on this matter were received by way of a letter of Mar. 4, from Secretary of Defense Lovett to the Secretary of State. (752.5/3–452)
  9. For documentation concerning these limitations, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. iv, Part 1, pp. 825 ff.
  10. The letter, dated July 13, 1951, has not been found in Department of State files.
  11. This information was transmitted in a letter of Mar. 4, from Secretary of Defense Lovett to the Secretary of State. (752.5/3–452)