752.5/1–2152
No. 835
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of
State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Deputy Under Secretary of
State (Matthews)1
top secret
[Washington,] January 29, 1952.
Attached is the promised additional memorandum on the Defense
Department’s papers on Spain.2 I take it these are the papers we were
told about in the JCS3 which had been sent to the Secretary of Defense’s
office. From Mr. Foster’s
covering letter4 it
appears that they have not had Defense approval, fortunately. I think
the main problem is how we get this matter down to earth again. I am
inclined to think that before going back to the Joint Chiefs we should
talk to someone in the office of the Secretary of Defense. Whether it
should be Bill Foster or
Frank Nash I do not know
but would suggest that we should approach the matter from that angle. I
believe this should be done promptly before we freeze on approving such
items as “Development, equipping, manning and utilization of facilities
as required for any projected US Army
operations.”5
[Attachment]
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State
for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Deputy Under
Secretary of State (Matthews)6
top secret
[Washington,] January 28,
1952.
- Subject: Comments on Defense Department Recommendations
regarding Spain.
Following are EUR’s comments on the
Defense Department recommendations regarding Spain which were
summarized in my memorandum of January 24.7 (All references herein are to
the
[Page 1789]
numbered paragraphs
of that memo.) If approved, I suggest these points be discussed with
the JCS.
- 1.
- We agree that negotiations for US use of Spanish air, naval
and supporting logistic facilities should be undertaken as soon
as possible with the Spanish Government.
- 2.
- Before negotiations are begun and prior to the departure of
the proposed Joint US Military Group, the agencies concerned
should agree on all aspects of program to be covered by the
negotiations. This will include not only the refinement of the
military requirements to be sought and the necessary
preparations by the State and Defense Departments for those
negotiations, but also the development of such economic and
military aid (in addition to construction work) as is to be
undertaken in support of the US military program in Spain. Once
we have Defense Department views regarding the utilization of
the $100 million,8 we are prepared to
work out with Defense and MSA an
agreed program covering this aspect of the negotiations.
- 3.
- Although we had planned to date that the first stage of our
new policy toward Spain would be limited to approaching the
Spanish Government for the use of air, naval and related
logistic facilities, the program proposed by the JCS in their memorandum and in the
terms of reference for the JUSMG is much more far-reaching. This full program
appears to have two major additional elements: a) the eventual
commitments to be sought from Spain, which are included in the
terms of reference (paragraph 6, previous memo); and b) three
new requirements of a broad and general nature, apparently
primarily Army requirements (paragraphs 2h, i and k).
- 4.
- The eventual commitments the JCS suggests be sought from Spain have long-range
policy implications which will require further thought and
study. We will submit our views and recommendations concerning
them later.
- 5.
-
a) Of the three new broad requirements, the first
(paragraph 2h) refers to projected US Army operations. We
judge it is also related to the first of the five proposed
eventual commitments to be sought from Spain (paragraph 6a).
Although we would appreciate information indicating more
precisely what is envisaged by this requirement, it seems to
us that it, and perhaps the suggested commitment, exceed the
limitations which it was agreed by the President, Secretary
Acheson,
Secretary Marshall and Admiral Sherman
would govern the US approach to the Spanish Government on
[Page 1790]
this
matter.9 A copy of Mr. Lovett’s letter
confirming the position agreed with the President is
attached.10 In our opinion the political
considerations which underlay this decision have not changed
to such an extent that we should now agree to remove this
limitation, for this particular purpose, as the JCS suggest (paragraph 3b).
b) The second new requirement (paragraph 2i) appears to be
consistent with and to support the balance of the four
eventual commitments desired by the JCS from Spain (paragraph 6b, c, d, and e). It
is likewise questionable whether this requirement, and the
suggested commitments, are consistent with the limitations
approved by the President. We would suggest, therefore, that
consideration of this requirement be postponed until the
presentation of EUR’s views
in accordance with paragraph 4. Meanwhile, you may wish to
ask the JCS to provide more
precise information regarding this requirement.
c) The third new requirement (paragraph 2k) is broad and
general and it is not clear to us what the JCS have in mind. It is
recommended that you ask for clarification of this point
during the discussions with them.
- 6.
- We concur with terms of reference for the JUSMG (paragraph 3c) with the
following three exceptions:
- a)
- The eventual commitments to be sought from Spain,
which we are now studying.
- b)
- Paragraph 1(e) of the terms of reference. In order
that the Service-to-Service negotiations may be fully
and clearly tied to the governmental negotiations, we
recommend that this sentence be revised to read:
“The Chief JUSMG will, when requested, render
assistance to the Ambassador in Governmental
negotiations including the development of a
bilateral governmental agreement, and in
connection therewith will conduct
Service-to-Service negotiations as may be required
with a view to implementing those recommendations
in the Joint Military Survey Team (Spain) report
which may be approved by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.”
- c)
- In our opinion a survey of Spanish requirements for
military aid by the JUSMG, concurrently with negotiations for
military facilities, could adversely affect those
negotiations. We believe such a survey would raise
Spanish hopes and expectations of receiving military
end-item aid, thus making our negotiating position more
difficult. However, the Spaniards are expecting to
receive some military aid and we should consequently be
prepared, if necessary, to offer some aid in the form of
training equipment. We recommend, therefore, that the
reports of the Service attachés be
[Page 1791]
checked and, if they do
not provide adequate information on this subject, that
we agree to a survey expressly limited to training
equipment. General dollar and item limitations of such a
program should be agreed between our Departments before
the survey is commenced. A survey of Spanish
requirements for military end-item aid should not be
made, we believe, before the negotiations have been
completed and decisions have been made regarding such a
program and its relation to the broader military
cooperation which is implicit in the long-range
commitments discussed in paragraph 5 above.
- 7.
- In view of frequent references by Franco and other high
Spanish officials to their desire for assistance in improving
the Spanish munitions industry, both General Spry and Ambassador
Griffis reported
that the Spanish Government has a major interest in this type of
aid. Since there are important policy questions and supply
problems involved in extending military end-item aid to Spain,
the possibility of providing assistance to the Spanish munitions
industry may conceivably constitute a feasible alternative, at
least in the first instance. However, there may also be supply
difficulties in this regard. We believe, therefore, that the
Defense Department should be asked to prepare an estimate of the
type of assistance which could appropriately be extended to the
Spanish munitions industry.
- 8.
- You may wish to remind the JCS
that the British and French, according to our agreement with
them, should be informed of our plans before negotiations are
undertaken with the Spanish Government.
- 9.
- Although the estimated cost of the tentative military
requirements set forth by the JCS totals approximately $405 million, none of the
three Services have funds for use in Spain during FY 1952 or programmed in their
budgets for FY 1953. Unless funds
in their budgets can be diverted from other uses, therefore, the
only source of funds during FY
1952 and 1953 will be the presently available $100 million, or a
supplemental appropriation. Although we do not yet know over how
many years the $405 million military program is intended to
stretch, MSA has suggested that
the $100 million could be used to cover part of the cost. This
could be accomplished by extending economic aid to Spain on a
grant basis and using the required counterpart for US military
expenses in Spain. It is recommended that you ask the JCS how they plan to finance their
proposed program.
- 10.
- As a result of preliminary discussions, the Defense Department
has agreed to provide as quickly as possible a breakdown of the
cost estimates including estimates of expenditures in and
outside Spain and time phasing of the expenditures; Defense
Department recommendations regarding the use of the $100
million; and
[Page 1792]
estimates of the peacetime and wartime US military complement in
Spain. This information, which is promised within a few
days,11 is required in
order to prepare a complete evaluation of the political impact
and significance of the proposed military program both in Spain
and in Western Europe, as well as upon our relations with those
countries.
- 11.
- Following are our preliminary comments regarding the program
suggested by the JCS:
- a)
- The air base program proposed for Spain would
constitute one of the largest SAC bomber complexes in any country outside
the US. Only the bomber bases in the UK and French
Morocco approach in magnitude the bomber bases proposed
for Spain.
- b)
- In view of the existing political, economic and social
circumstances in Spain, we believe an immediate and full
implementation of a program of this magnitude would
entail an undue risk of creating an impact greater than
present-day conditions in Spain could readily
assimilate, with resulting dislocations—social as well
as economic—which would prejudice the attainment of our
objectives.
- c)
- The proposed JCS
program exceeds in size and scope the requirements
understood by the British and French during their
consultations with Admiral
Sherman.
- 12.
- In our opinion there are two basic considerations in
developing the military program in Spain:
- a)
- The program should include all minimum necessary
requirements so that we avoid the necessity of
approaching the Spanish Government a second time with
new and more extensive requirements. In view of the
considerations mentioned in paragraph 11b above
regarding the impact in Spain of the proposed program,
we would suggest that the JCS review their recommendations in order
to determine the minimum necessary requirements. We
would hope that the resulting program would be on a more
modest scale than the air, naval and related logistic
facilities, Army requirements and eventual commitments
from the Spanish Government which are envisaged in the
present JCS
proposal.
- b)
- The military program should be implemented gradually
in Spain. In our view it would be unwise to embark
immediately on the full implementation of a program of
the magnitude represented by the military facilities
tentatively proposed by the Defense Department. Rather,
we believe it would be in the interest of the US to
proceed gradually in establishing the military
facilities we may be granted in Spain in order to
escape, to the greatest extent possible, the
difficulties mentioned in paragraph 11b above.
