765.00/4–854
No. 774
The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Under
Secretary of State (Smith)
top secret
Rome, April 8, 1954.
Dear Bedell: Enclosed is a copy of the memorandum of
conversation I had with Mr. Scelba, .… You will see that it reflects some of the old
De Gasperian approach to the Italian Communist
situation. I think it is plain from this conversation that Scelba is going to try to keep a
number of balls up in the air at once—E.D.C., Trieste, our Offshore policy, economic aid, etc—and
for that reason will not concentrate on the CP problem. Nevertheless, the fact remains that in this
field he has proposed—and is trying to do—far more to join the issue
with Togliatti than De
Gasperi did. At least, that is the Embassy’s point of
view at this time.
Meanwhile I know the Department is aware as we are that the ratification
of E.D.C. is Italy’s only carrot, and
that the Italian Government will most certainly try not to give it away
as long as there is a chance it can be effectively dangled for the
Trieste quid.
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We shall do
all we can here to keep them, in their own best interests, as well as
ours, from doing so, especially as to do so at this time would imperil
the outcome of the London talks.1
Secondly, as we told the Department in January, our attempt to put
through a firm Offshore policy has been met by the combined resistance
of the Government, industry, and the pro-Cominform press. I fear we shall also
soon be told that a combination of that policy will also endanger EDC.
Unless the “agonizing reappraisal” is soon begun in Washington which
might really scare the Italians back into line, I increasingly wonder
whether we will be able to hold it here.
Cordially,
[Enclosure]
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in
Italy (Luce)
secret
Rome, April 8, 1954.
On Monday, April 5 I had an hour’s interview with Prime Minister
Scelba during which
he made the following points:
Normalcy is returning to Italy. Scelba’s Center coalition government is now
reasonably stable. The parties are rapidly regaining the confidence
of the people.
There is now no reason to suppose the Government will fall, but if it
did elections would be necessary, as the attempt to reform a
government including the Monarchists at this time would signal the
collapse of Italian Democracy. Any opening to the Monarchist Right
continues to be both unnecessary and impossible politically,
although the door is being left open to the Monarchists at all times
to collaborate with the Center parties. The Monarchists are slowly
coming around anyway to the position of cooperating with the
coalition, especially on decisive issues. They are also offering
their help these days to the Prime Minister. He accepts it with
thanks, but doesn’t “act too eager.”
The great majority (70) the Government got on the vote on the Montesi
scandal2 proves that the anti-Communist elements
in
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Italy can always be
counted on to hold together when any vital issue faces Italian
Democracy. What is needed now is for the Government to proceed with
an effective program of economic action to better the living and
working conditions of the people. Action against the Communists has
been proposed, and is being undertaken, but it must be undertaken
with caution and prudence. Moreover, it will take time, owing to the
slowness of the judiciary processes in Italy. It is very difficult
to come to grips with the Communists in the courts. For example, Paese Sera, which is read by the bourgeoisie, and has a very great effect on
the public opinion, publishes outrageous libels daily. The only
recourse is to prosecute libel action in the courts, but the courts
move so slowly that such actions are not very effective. What is
necessary, first, is to form anti-Communist public opinion by means
of both Government and party action (more paid activists, capillary
action, etc., etc.) Especially there is needed a very large
propaganda effort to match the great propaganda effort of the
Communists. And all this takes a great deal of money. It is not
enough, for example, to control East-West trade (in order to deprive
the CP of its rake-off). Through
Switzerland, the Kremlin is pouring in vast sums that cannot be
“trapped” by the Government in any known way. The U.S.A. simply does
not understand that the parties and Government do not have the means
to match such sums. This is a very great danger. It would be a great
mistake to initiate forceful methods against the CP if public opinion had not been fully
formed.
The Prime Minister, having discussed at considerable length the great
danger of Communism, and the difficulties of combatting it, then
made the following somewhat contradictory points: America has
greatly exaggerated the danger of Communism, in view of the fact
that there are in reality only six million Communist voters in
Italy. But the U.S. press has told Americans “Italy is lost,” and
this has had very unfortunate results.
Here I entered a denial, saying that with a single exception, an
article by Henry Taylor, no American journalist
had ever proclaimed
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that
Italy was lost, but had merely emphasized the danger if proper steps
were not taken—which was exactly what the Prime Minister had himself
just been saying. I then said that the Italian non-Communist press
itself is far more alarmist than the U.S. press. Mr. Scelba replied that it is
important for the U.S. press to distinguish between the truth (that
the danger is not very great) and what the Italian press says (that
it is) in order to stir its own people to action. “The truth is,”
Mr. Scelba said, (and I
now quote exactly), “if Communism increases only at its present rate
in Italy, even though nothing more is done than has already been
done, it will be 25 years before the Communist Party can win enough
votes to take over the Government.”
. . . . . . .
Mr. Scelba then brought up
the question of Trieste. Here he became quite impassioned and
vehement. Italy’s minimum terms in the Trieste question were all
well known. Indeed, all the elements of the FIT question were known.
There is no need for Italy to explain her position any further.
Italy can not be expected to pay any more reparations, make any more
sacrifices, financial or territorial, than were envisaged by October
8th. Italian public opinion is growing increasingly anti-American
and anti-British because of our failure to keep our word on, first,
the 1948 Declaration and now, on the October 8th Decision. The
situation is growing hourly more dangerous in Trieste itself. He
described the unfortunate conditions there at some length. He then
launched into a bitter denunciation of the policies of General
Winterton which are continuing to aggravate this potentially
explosive atmosphere in Trieste. All this (he said) has given the
Communists a tremendous weapon against the Government. It is all but
impossible to ratify EDC until there
is a clarification of the Trieste question. If the U.S.A. wishes
Italy to make real progress against the CP, and on other U.S. programs (Facilities, and SOF), Trieste will have to be settled.
Meanwhile, Mr. Scelba and
his ministers were striving to make as much progress as they could
in all these matters, in the present difficult circumstances.
Conclusion:
- (1)
- I got the distinct impression that Mr. Scelba was either getting
set, or was being pressured to “ride” the Trieste issue
publicly, partly in order to gain popular support, and partly to
“squeeze” the U.S.A. for a rapid solution, in exchange for
ratification of EDC.
- (2)
- Mr. Scelba believes
that the introduction of EDC
plus his present anti-Communist program and the measures taken
so far to
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implement
it are sufficient warrant of the Government’s intentions in this
regard,.…
