Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

765.00/3–1354

No. 770
The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Under Secretary of State (Smith)¹

top secret
eyes only
official
personal

Rome, March 13, 1954.

Dear Bedell: Your personal top secret letter (Registry No. 486711), dated March 4th 1 was received by me March 11th.

There is no doubt that within the next year a civil war situation can develop in Italy.

On November 3, 1953, I sent the President and the Secretary a personal eyes only Estimate of the Italian Situation.² It said that any long delay in implementing the October 8th Decision would be followed by the fall of Pella. This, in turn, would lead to a chaotic political situation among the weakened, strife-torn anti-Communist parties, which the U.S. could only hope to retrieve with a vast overt and covert aid program. If neither of these programs, or a favorable Trieste solution were forthcoming, then the Communists would either continue to gain rapidly (which they have done in many administrative elections since October) or the situation would be marked by a swing to the Right. If the Right swing encountered Communist resistance, this would certainly revive dictatorship of some sort, and the consequent risk of civil war in Italy. As that Estimate is already available to you in Washington, there is no need to lengthen this letter by repeating its arguments.

Your source’s report can also be weighed against the following circumstances:

On March 3rd, the Prime Minister sent for me. I did not take anyone along to translate, as I was told Mr. Canali, Secretary at the Viminale would be there to do so. Mr. Canali is well known as a loyal “De Gasperi man.” But instantly upon my arrival Scelba insisted on talking to me quite alone, although I protested the inadequacy of my Italian.

He then spoke to me, almost without interruption, for a solid hour and a half. He talks rapidly, with a Sicilian accent, and my Italian while good enough to understand the sense of everything is not good enough to get fine shades of meaning or subtle points. Several times I suggested I would like to have Canali in to interpret, but he said no, and made an effort to speak more slowly.

. . . . . . .

At a certain point in the conversation he said, “But if we must have civil war, we need to prepare for it.” I interrupted to ask him if he meant by “needing to prepare” that the police and carabinieri were unable now to handle the situation if real trouble broke out— in short, did he fear the paramilitary strength of the CP. He replied that the Government had adequate force now, but what had to be prepared was the stage, or the psychological climate. He then wanted to know what the United States would do if such a situation did develop. I replied we hoped it would not come to any such tragic necessity (I have no instructions to take any other line), but that I personally believed that if it did, we would back the Government in our own interests. This seemed to satisfy him.

. . . . . . .

He then sent for Canali.

. . . . . . .

With Canali translating, our talk consisted of my reading to Scelba the Secretary’s letter of January 14th … of Italy’s signing of the Offshore bilateral and Facilities agreement,³ as giving concrete evidence that his Government was strong enough to take any kind of pro-West action; our hope that a Trieste solution could be found, which would certainly be easier to do if a strong and stable government to handle it could be maintained in Italy; and the urgency of passing EDC.

He said the government was ready to take action in all these fields—especially EDC.

Significantly enough, as I look back on it, he did not mention the urgency of a Trieste solution, either privately or when Canali was present. He was the first CD official who hasn’t done so in an official conversation.

Another curious circumstance is that he reported nothing of what I had said (or he had said) to the Italian Foreign Office until the very eve of his debate for the confidence vote in parliament a week later. I learned this from a Chigi official who complained to me that Scelba would make no report on what he had said in his private talk, athough the Foreign Minister, Piccioni, had pressured him hard for details.

. . . . . . .

On the same day Valletta had a luncheon with Harry⁴ (and Stanley Resor). Afterwards Harry scribbled me the following note:

“After an hour and a half discussion of Italian politics and economics, Valletta suddenly said: ‘Now, would you like to have me tell you what is going to happen?’ We were, of course, all ears.

“‘Well then’ said Valletta, ‘first, Scelba will be confirmed. Then, once he is confirmed three things will happen—First, we will pass EDC at any cost—at any cost.’

“I broke in to ask about the problem of filibuster—’parlare, parlare, parlare.’ He said that would be taken care of. ‘If the Communists get riotous in the Chamber, they will be thrown out.’

“‘We will pass EDC,’ he went on, ‘for every reason—for the position of Italy among the powers, for our self-respect, and to establish clearly that we are of the West.’

“‘Then, after EDC is passed, strong measures will be taken against the Communists. In taking these strong measures, we have to realize that we are risking civil disturbance.…

“‘Thirdly, along with strong measures against the Communists, we must move rapidly toward economic improvement. For this we need American economic aid.’

“He also said that ‘a Trieste solution will have to be found, but it doesn’t have to be a very perfect one.’”

These clues are important for the following reasons: Valletta is very close to Scelba; Valletta has great influence over the Confindustria—the Milan–Turin crowd who back the CD’s; Valletta is seriously alarmed by the firmness of the U.S. position on Offshore placement.… And Valletta sees that only government action can get the CP thing under control and safeguard the enormous financial stake Milan and Turin have in pro-West aid and cooperation. Presumably he has made many other industrialists also see this.

. . . . . . .

Cordially,

Clare

1. Not printed. (765.00/3–1354)
2. Document 753.
3. Documentation regarding the negotiations leading up to the signing in Rome on Mar. 31 of a memorandum of understanding concerning offshore procurement procedures is in Rome Embassy files, lot 63 F 62, “Offshore Procurement”. Documentation regarding the negotiations leading up to the signing in Rome on Oct. 20 of a Military Facilities Agreement is in file 711.56365.
4. Henry B. Luce.