Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

No. 750
Memorandum of Discussion at the 157th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, July 30, 19531

top secret
eyes only

The following were present at the 157th meeting of the National Security Council: The President of the United States, presiding (except for the first part of Item 1, which was presided over by the Vice President); the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director for Mutual Security; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Secretary of Commerce (for Item 1); the Assistant Secretary of Commerce (for Item 1); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Item 5); the Federal Civil Defense Administrator (for Item 5); Robert R. Bowie, Department of State (for Item 5): Walter S. DeLany, Office of the Director for Mutual Security (for Item 1); Kenneth R. Hansen, Economic Defense Advisory Committee (for Item 1); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; Col. Paul T. Carroll, Acting White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; Marion W. Boggs, Coordinator, NSC Planning Board Assistants.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.

[Here follows discussion of item 1, economic defense.]

2. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

The Director of Central Intelligence first briefed the Council on the political situation in Italy. He noted that as a result of the recent elections, a bloc based on the Right Center, mostly Christian Democrats, have a narrow majority in the Italian Chamber of Deputies. The following were important reasons for De Gasperi’s fall: (1) The failure of the Christian Democrats to meet the needs of the lower income groups; (2) the Italian electoral law, which had received the name “swindle law” during the campaign; (3) disorganization of the small parties which had formerly supported De Gasperi; (4) increasing discontent among many classes of the population; (5) the Russian peace offensive, which Mr. Churchill unintentionally [Page 1624] aided by his speech on Tito; (6) the basic anti-clericalism of the Italian people; and (7) uncertainty over American policy.

As to the future, Mr. Dulles thought new elections might be called, as a result of which the Right Center might have a majority, but a very uneasy one.

. . . . . .

The President interposed to say that few people in this country could understand the importance of Trieste to the Italians. The Trieste question aroused emotions in Italy quite out of proportion to our estimate of its importance. It would have helped greatly in the Italian elections if we could have made a firm commitment on Trieste, but this was impossible because of Yugoslavia.

[Here follows discussion of other items.]

  1. Drafted by Deputy Executive Secretary Gleason on July 31.