Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

765.00/6–353: Telegram

No. 741
The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Department of State ¹

confidential

Rome , June 3, 1953—5 p.m.

4981. As campaign draws to close, over-all impression remains lack of sense crisis and excitement—notwithstanding thousands of speeches and walls plastered by posters. One reason is lack of novelty as voter has seen so many campaigns already in postwar era. Not only have posters familiar look, but even gadgets and “novelties” have largely been used before. Another reason is lack of new issues (see Embdes 2509²). Basic issue of Communism was debated in 1948 and again in 1951. Rightist issue dominated 1952 campaign in south. There is also lack of concrete domestic political program of government for future, largely because there is no general agreement on domestic politics within CD party or Center Coalition. Furthermore, changing method of vote-getting by all parties puts emphasis on house-to-house canvassing rather than “singing in piazza”. Communists particularly are concentrating on individual approach rather than great public splash. Inevitable tendency of individual deputies to fight colleagues in their own list for preference votes rather than fight opposing parties and personalism in general tend to obscure great issues. Campaign dampened by poor weather.

But not all of foregoing damages Center chances. Unspectacular campaign is due in part to earlier organization of Center this year which displaced some of usual last-minute panic and frenzy. Cumulative effect of educating public to vote and hammering at Communist issue have, besides wearing off their novelty, left impression and compulsion which is likely to send voters to polls in turnout of about 90 percent. In past few days Center campaign has perked up slightly with some seepage from politicians to mass voters of realization danger in Center defeat. Government’s accomplishments in recovery, stability, public works and reform are strongly before public. Church is helping all it can. Trieste issue has not “caught fire” as instrument Rightist propaganda and government has continuously maintained tactical offensive. MSI has largely failed to fire electorate with passion it needs to maintain its own momentum. If campaign lacks fire, it does for all parties and not just for Center Coalition.

Campaign has not greatly changed outlook for Chamber voting described in Embdes 1823.³ Of opposition parties Monarchists will probably make greatest gains, perhaps from 1 million in 1951–1952 to neighborhood of 2 million. MSI may gain in north, but lose to Monarchists in south. Leftist parties (including Corbino Front list) will probably not gain substantially. Nenni’s separated-list maneuver does not seem to have taken much hold on voters outside Leftist orbit. Parri–Codignola and Cucchi–Magnani splinters will together probably only poll 2 to 3 hundred thousand votes. As for Center, Social Democrats will probably poll about 2 million, notwithstanding Codignola defection. Liberals will probably gain, particularly in north. There will probably be mild CD recovery from 1951–1952 partly because of greater turnout, less blank ballots, fact these are political rather than local elections, and prestige De Gasperi as contrasted to lightweights and shabby alternatives offered by Right. Embassy continues to believe Center parties will out-poll opposition by rather slim margin and obtain premium in Chamber.

In Senate—notwithstanding strong Rightist candidates in south—Center will probably also win majority—at least with help six Senators-for-life and distortion of voting system which favors CD party. Center majority in Senate will probably be slim, necessitating cohesion, discipline and forbearance by all four Center parties and raising serious problems for domestic policy after elections. In foreign policy, particularly European unification, Center parties are in substantial agreement and problems will not be so difficult.

Luce

1. Also sent to Paris, Bonn, Belgrade, Moscow, London, and the Consulates in Italy.
2. This despatch, dated May 21, discussed the major issues in the election campaign. (765.00/5–2153)
3. This despatch, dated Mar. 6, was one of a series of analyses by the Embassy regarding the prospects for the June 7 elections. In it the Embassy stated its belief that the Center coalition could obtain over 50 percent of the vote but that the margin of victory would probably be much less than in 1948. (765.00/3–653)