Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

765.00/9–1852

No. 732
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in Italy (Bunker) ¹

secret

Sella Valsugano , September 5, 1952.

Participants:

• Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi
• Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker

Political

The Prime Minister expressed the opinion that the three minor parties were falling into line on reform of the electoral law. He thought there would be a hard fight in Parliament when the new proposal was brought up, and was seeking a formula which involved as little as possible in the way of amendment of the present law. If this could be done in a few short paragraphs it would be far easier to handle than the presentation of an entirely new law.

To my question about the prospect for a coalition government, the Prime Minister replied that he believed it would not be possible to form a coalition (four party) government before the elections. If it could be achieved in four or five days of negotiation it would be practical, but any long drawn out discussions would be dangerous. Since he felt that a coalition government could not be formed quickly, the practical and wise solution was to form a grouping or alliance of the four parties in a linked system, as in the administrative elections, giving a premium of seats to the majority. He appeared confident that such an alliance could be achieved and felt that reform of the electoral law along the lines indicated was essential. Under a proportional system a paralysis was possible, for should the extremes of left and right together receive a majority, they would be unable, nevertheless, to function as a government.

To my query as to whether he believed the PSDI would be able to compose their differences at the forthcoming convention and would go along in this alliance, he replied in the affirmative. He said that Romita was very anxious to join the government, but he had told him he would have to do penance for having stayed with Nenni for over two years. Parenthetically, he said that Nenni told the Italian Ambassador in Moscow that he (Nenni) had told Stalin that he thought Italy should occupy a neutral position between the east and west. When Stalin asked him how he proposed to achieve this, Nenni replied “by entering into non-aggression pacts with Russia and the U.S.”. Stalin answered “that is not a position worthy of a great nation”.²

The Prime Minister told me that after two weeks’ complete rest after first coming to Sella, he had had many conferences with members of the four center parties. I got the distinct impression that he had now decided definitely on his course, i.e., to get agreement of the four parties, to reform the electoral law providing for linked lists and a premium of seats for the majority, and the formation of a coalition government after the election (barring the probable formation of one before). He seemed confident that he could put through this program.

The Prime Minister said that he had overtures from the Monarchists who wanted to join with the CD, but that he had rejected these. He had told them that while a monarchy could be democratic, it was now unconstitutional in Italy, and that a plebiscite would be unthinkable in the present state of Italian and world affairs. However, he did not rule out the possiblity of support from individual monarchists. He said that Prince Alliata and others of the Sicilian branch of the party were coming to see him to talk about an alliance. He proposed to tell them that would be impossible in the name of the monarchist party, but that they could support him and the coalition as individuals.

In further stressing the need for the center coalition, the Prime Minister said there were some in the CD party who felt that the party should be more closely allied with the Church. “But”, he said, “that is impossible. In the moral life of the country the Church can occupy a chief role, but not in politics. It can say that it approves of a party, but it cannot do more than that. There is too strong a feeling in too large a part of the population which is opposed to the Church in politics to permit it to play more of a role than that.”

Trieste

The Prime Minister then asked whether we had had any reply from Tito.³ I told him that as of then we had not. He expressed some disappointment and again emphasized the desirability of a satisfactory solution before the elections and before attempting ratification of the EDC treaty. I said that I thought that the fact that no reply had been received as yet from Tito might be considered not unfavorable, for our proposal had not been rejected and we might assume it was being given careful consideration.

The Prime Minister said he had been giving thought to a way around disagreements which might arise over an ethnic line. He thought there could be no differences over the greater part of the line but that in some specific cases disagreement might arise, and he wondered whether these could not be solved through a plebiscite. He said that he meant only a local plebiscite of the specific town or community in dispute; a plebiscite for the whole area he thought would not be possible because of the insurmountable difficulty of agreeing on conditions. He felt, on the other hand, that agreement for plebiscites on the community level, should it become necessary, ought not to be too difficult, and might eliminate protacted arguments or a stalemate of the negotiations. He said that he thought he might suggest this procedure to Eden if he saw him at Strasbourg, before Eden left for Yugoslavia.

Unemployment and Investment

I referred to the several talks we had had with Minister of the Treasury Pella and other members of the Cabinet including Ministers Campilla, La Malfa and Under-Secretary Dominedo. I repeated in substance what I had said to Minister Pella before his departure for Washington⁴ about the necessity for acceleration of the investment program in a broad attack on the unemployment and underemployment problem (Embtel 821, August 25⁵). I said that it seemed to me that their government finances were sound, and in the absence of inflationary factors, there was little or no risk in running a substantial deficit. This is particularly true since the deficit is all accounted for by investment (the current budget being in balance) which will increase both the GNP and the tax take. I said that I had sensed a certain reluctance on Minister Pella’s part to take as bold action as seemed to me to be necessary. I realized fully the need for a stable currency and appreciated the justifiable pride the Minister took in his achievements in this respect, but felt there were now overriding considerations which made it necessary to accelerate their investment programs with the greatest energy. I said that I thought the new Law against Unemployment (No. 949) was excellent; the problem now was to get the money authorized for these and other projects spent with the least delay.

The Prime Minister said that he agreed fully with this point of view. He said he thought that Pella also agreed, but that he (the Prime Minister) was afraid that the money was not being spent as rapidly as necessary, which he ascribed to the cumbersome functioning of the bureaucracy. He said that as soon as Pella returned from the International Monetary Fund Conference, he would take the matter up with him again and impress on him the necessity for cutting through the red tape and speeding up the whole program.

The Prime Minister referred to the talk which Ambassador Draper, Kenney and I had had with Under-Secretary Dominedo on the emigration problem. As he had formerly, he said this was a matter of the greatest importance. I replied that Ambassador Draper had sent a message to my government outlining our suggestions for an approach to the problem, and that we had had a favorable preliminary reaction from Washington.⁶

. . . . . . .

The Prime Minister seemed vigorous and in good health and spirits in contrast to the last time I had seen him just before he left on his vacation, when he looked tired and careworn. I got the impression that he had probably resolved a good many things in his mind while on vacation, and had reached decisions on policies, particularly in regard to the political parties. He seemed calm and confident and said that he planned to take up all these various matters actively on his return from Luxembourg and Strasbourg.

1. This memorandum of conversation was an enclosure to a letter of Sept. 18 from Bunker to Byington. In the letter Bunker mentioned that he considered inadequate the figure of $80 million of economic aid for Italy for FY 1953 which MSA/W and SRE had been using for illustrative purposes. His opinion was that the figure should be between $110 and $130 million because that amount was “cheap insurance for all that we have put in here and all that we have at stake in this crucial year.” In his reply of Oct. 1 Byington stated that Bunker’s views on economic aid to Italy for FY 1953 seemed most sound to him and entirely in accord with thinking in the Department of State. He noted, however, that DMS and MSA, unlike the Department of State, were not convinced that the U.S. aid figure, as such, was of great importance in internal Italian politics. (765.00/10–152)
2. For a fuller version of the conversation between Nenni and Stalin, see Document 730.
3. Documentation on the U.S. approach to Tito on the Trieste issue is scheduled for publication in volume viii .
4. Pella and Minister of Foreign Trade La Malfa spent Aug. 28–29 in Washington en route to a meeting of the International Monetary Fund in Mexico City. A memorandum of their conversation on Aug. 29 with Under Secretary Bruce and other Department of State officials is in Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 120. A memorandum of their conversation on Aug. 29 with MSA officials is in file 865.00/8–2952.
5. Telegram 821 described the substance of an informal discussion Bunker and Parker had with Pella on Aug. 22. (398.13/8–2552)
6. In Repto 496 from Paris, Aug. 11, Draper described the conversation which he, Kenney, and Bunker had with Dominedo in Rome on Aug. 7 and submitted their recommendations to alleviate the Italian population problem. These included giving vigorous diplomatic support through various U.S. Embassies and through several international bodies to Italian efforts to increase emigration quotas by at least 100,000 in 1953; the extension by the United States of all possible financial assistance for transportation, initial subsistence, settlement, and other costs for Italian emigration; and a renewed effort by the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government to increase the present Italian quotas for emigration to the United States. (MSA telegram files, lot W 130, “Paris Repto”) In airgram 562 to Paris, repeated to Rome, Aug. 30, the Department of State indicated that in view of the seriousness of the forthcoming Italian elections Washington agencies had agreed that the United States should use diplomatic influence behind the scenes to try to secure favorable consideration by the French, Belgian, and U.K. Governments for a more liberalized emigration policy within the OEEC. It also presented specific points to be taken up in this regard in the Embassy’s approach to the French Government. (765.00/8–3052)