765.00/6–1252

No. 727
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) 1

secret
  • Subject: Italian Parliamentary Elections

Participants:

  • The Italian Ambassador
  • Mr. Matthews, G
  • Mr. Byington, WE

The Italian Ambassador2 said that he had come to have a general discussion with me regarding the Italian elections now scheduled for 1953, probably in April.

He began by analyzing the results of the recent administrative elections in south Italy. He said that in many ways these results had been better than expected. The Government had recognized that there was going to be a strong protest vote in the south and was relieved that this vote had gone to the Nationalist Right rather than to the Communists. Only the Communists were strong in both south and north. Since the Right in the north was relatively very weak indeed, even these developments in the south if continued next year would not give the Right a percentage greater than 10 percent of the national total. On the other hand, the Government could not look with equanimity on the situation as it stood now and must realize that if a center government were to continue in Italy there must be an improvement in the general situation.

He, himself, was of the opinion that Prime Minister De Gasperi would not follow the advice of some of his followers that he try to form a coalition to the right with the Monarchists. Instead, he believed the Prime Minister would maintain the course followed so far of attempting to keep together a center coalition to include the Liberals, Republicans and Independent Socialists. In this connection, while these minor parties had a negligible strength in the south, they did amount to something in the north and would probably in the long run contribute more strength nationally to a coalition than could the Monarchist Party. It was in any event obvious that the Christian Democrats could not align themselves with the MSI and have any moral ground on which to continue their fight against Communism.

[Page 1579]

If the general situation were to improve a number of things would have to be done. Many of these measures depended on the present government itself. One of them was the necessity for further carrying out the fiscal reform. Another was the strengthening of the bureaucracy and the placing of more competent men in key positions. A third was a more active follow up of the land reform program which had not progressed sufficiently as yet to influence a substantial number of voters. The Ambassador said that he believed the Italian Government was fully aware of the need for these measures and intended to go ahead with them.

In addition to the foregoing there were some other matters in which we could be of help. First there was the question of Trieste which played into the hands of the extreme Nationalists. The Italian Government desperately wanted a solution and it felt keenly that no direct solution would be possible with Yugoslavia without the help of the United States to bring Tito around to a reasonable attitude regarding an ethnic solution within the framework of March 20.3 A solution of the Trieste question prior to the elections would be of utmost importance.

Next, there was the question of the United Nations which had caused widespread criticism of the government among patriotic citizens who objected to seeing Italy in the position of a supplicant knocking at the door and refused admission to an organization which already included even Ethiopia. The result was a general hue and cry that the government did not have sufficient influence with its friends to obtain their support and therefore the government should follow a more conciliatory policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Our failure to obtain Italy’s admission tended to overshadow the fact that it was the Soviet veto that kept Italy out. The issue also was clouded by the Soviet claim that it would vote in favor of Italy provided its satellites could be admitted. The Ambassador made a strong appeal for assistance in this direction, which he said would have a bearing on the forthcoming elections.

. . . . . . .

  1. Drafted by Byington.
  2. Alberto Tarchiani.
  3. The reference here is to the public statement by the Governments of France, Great Britain, and the United States on Mar. 20, 1948, that Italy should regain control of all of Trieste.