Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

611.51/7–1554

No. 648
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur)¹

secret

Paris, July 13, 1954.

Participants:

• The Secretary
• M. Pierre Mendès-France
• Mr. MacArthur

M. Mendès-France opened the conversation by expressing his deep appreciation to Secretary Dulles for having come to Paris to meet with him and Mr. Eden. The Secretary replied by saying that there is nothing that replaces personal contacts and exchanges of views, and that he had been very happy to have the opportunity to sit down with the French Prime Minister and talk things over on a basis of complete frankness and intimacy. In particular, he said that he had been concerned over the possibility that there were misunderstandings developing regarding the position of the U.S., and his trip would enable him to set forth at first hand the views of the U.S. Government, and at the same time obtain a clearer understanding of the position of the French Government. M. Mendès-France said that he would be very glad to hear the Secretary’s views. In the field of foreign affairs he, Mendès-France, was a complete neophyte. He had supposed that one day he might become Finance Minister, Minister of Economic Affairs, or even Prime Minister, but had not supposed he would ever be Foreign Minister since much of his background was in financial and economic matters.

The Secretary said he would like to begin by making three points before engaging in general exchanges of views. The first of these points was that the U.S. had confidence in M. Mendès-France and welcomed his fresh approach to some of France’s most pressing problems in which the U.S. also had a common interest. Speaking with complete frankness, the Secretary said that French indecision and inability to make difficult decisions had in the past created a real problem with respect to France’s relations not only with the U.S. but also with other allied countries. The U.S. wishes to work in closest harmony with France, and asked nothing better than to march step in step with her. This had been difficult because when French Governments had apparently agreed to certain decisions, they were not carried out. Traditionally there is a great sentimental attachment for France in the U.S., but there is growing concern in the U.S. over apparent French vacillation and backing out on commitments. M. Mendès-France’s forthright statement that he would press for decisions on urgent problems was therefore greatly welcomed.

The second point that the Secretary said he wished to make related to France being overextended. He said that he understood the Franch people and Government felt that France was overextended in Indo-China. He was inclined to agree. He earnestly hoped that there was not a feeling in France that we were pushing them to commitments which they culd not fulfill. This was not the case. On the contrary, we had recognized that France was overextended, and for this reason, had given billions of dollars of economic and military aid to France so that she could meet the commitments she had undertaken both in Europe and in Indo-China. In effect, the U.S. had done its utmost to bridge the gap between the responsibilities which France had undertaken and her capabilities to meet these responsibilities. In other words, far from pushing France to commitments that she could not meet, we had done our utmost to assist her in bridging the gap; and had extended to her very substantial aid which had in effect enabled her to increase her dollar reserves. Fundamental to U.S. policy with respect to France was the desire to assist France in reaching a situation where her responsibilities would be balanced by her resources.

The third point which the Secretary said he wished to mention was connected with Germany and the EDC. He believed that the basic Soviet objective was to keep France and Germany divided and to prevent all moves towards European unity whereby Germany would be solidly associated with the West and a viable and strong Europe created. The primary Soviet objective was to create disunity in Europe and ultimately obtain control over Germany. The Soviet Union had very important cards which it could play in this game, and if it played them, it might indeed neutralize and ultimately reach an agreement of some sort with Germany. Until there was some form of organic European unity involving France and Germany, the Soviet Union would continue to harass France in every possible field, concentrating on Europe but also in North Africa and elsewhere and would make life extremely difficult. If France and Germany joined together in some form of organic European unity as is provided in the EDC, the Soviet Union would not have the same incentive to continue its harassing tactics aimed at dividing Germany and France. The Soviet Union was realistic and recognized accomplished facts. However, as long as EDC was not ratified and the Soviets believed there was a chance of neutralizing and winning Germany over, France could expect no mercy from Soviet harassments, propaganda and pressure.

Referring to the meeting between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Churchill,² the Secretary mentioned the U.S.–U.K. group which has been meeting in London.³ He referred to the proposed protocol restoring sovereignty to Germany, and said that while this was a most difficult question, the U.S. felt strongly that German sovereignty must be restored. This involved the question of whether there should be a full or partial restoration of sovereignty. The Secretary said that he had been present during the work of the Versailles Treaty and felt that the results of that Treaty clearly demonstrated that it was folly to believe that permanent restrictions could be imposed on a great power.

Furthermore, if Germany were not permitted to participate in Western European defense, he believed that the next Congress would not appropriate a dollar for European military aid connected with NATO. From conversations which he had had with leading members of Congress—of both the Republican and Democrat parties—the Secretary could only say that there is a growing sentiment that it is illusory to believe that France will agree to Germany being included in European defense. Therefore, if this does not soon occur, it would be better to write off what we have tried to do to build up the defensive strength of Western Europe as a noble but unproductive experiment. There would be the strongest pressures for the U.S. to engage in a peripheral form of defense involving the U.K., Spain, Greece, Turkey and other peripheral countries. The situation is generally portrayed as follows: for two years the French Government has been promising that ratification of the EDC was just around the corner. After actually signing the Treaty, the French added protocols to the Treaty which they had insisted to be signed by the other European partners. They have received the most far-reaching kind of commitments from the U.S. and the U.K. on the basis that they would ratify the EDC. If now France again procrastinates, the damage would be incalculable. The Secretary concluded by saying that he had come to talk about the Geneva Conference and Indochina, but felt obliged to speak with complete frankness to M. Mendès-France about the German and EDC questions. As long as the decision on EDC is postponed, it is a direct invitation to the Soviets to increase their action to drive a wedge not only between France and Germany but also between the NATO powers. If this question were settled and Germany were brought into the Western family, we would then be in a position to really negotiate with the Soviet Union from a position of real strength.

M. Mendès-France said that he appreciated the Secretary’s very frank statement. In view of the time, he would like to comment first on the point the Secretary made regarding EDC. He said that he personally had long been a staunch advocate of European unity. He felt that the U.S. had been misled with respect to the possibilities of EDC ratification. He did not believe that there was at present a majority for EDC in the French Parliament. The French Parliament was at present divided into three groups:

1. A pro-EDC faction.

2. A group which was agreeable to German rearmament, but opposed to EDC.

3. A group which consisted of the Communists and a few others who were opposed to German rearmament under any form.

At present he felt that groups 2 and 3 above had a majority. However, if he could detach 60–80 members of group 2 above and join them with the pro-EDC group 1, he would have a majority. This was what he was endeavoring to do. What he did not wish was to put EDC to a vote and have it turned down. This would represent a Soviet victory of the first magnitude, and would be a disaster for France, NATO and Western unity. The EDC Treaty had been signed over two years ago and had not as yet been brought to a vote, because the French Government in power during this period which favored EDC did not believe that it had the strength to mar-shall a majority. M. Mendès-France said that he was working for an affirmative vote on a solution which would correspond as closely as possible with the present EDC Treaty. His efforts in this direction had not been helped by Spaak’s initiative in calling a meeting of the EDC Foreign Ministers,⁴ by Adenauer’s statement⁵ or by the publicity given the US–UK Working Group in London.

The Secretary then said that when he made his first trip to Europe after assuming office in January–February 1953,⁶ he had counselled other European countries subscribing to EDC not to agree to the French protocols until the French Government committed itself to act. Finally, on the basis of assurances of the French Government, the other EDC countries with U.S. urging had agreed to the protocols, and the French Government had postponed further action on ratification. The U.S. itself had made a commitment of the most far-reaching kind on the basis that the EDC would be brought to a vote. This had not happened. Mr. Mendès-France seemed to suggest modifying the existing Treaty. This, the Secretary felt, would lead to an unacceptable situation on the part of the four other countries which had ratified the Treaty or accepted it by the “contractuals.” In particular if France reopened the EDC Treaty, Germany could be expected to reopen the Bonn and Paris agreements.⁷ If any interpretations were envisaged, they must be strictly within four corners of the existing Treaty. Changes of a substantive nature would require all the countries to go back to their parliaments. Indeed, the U.S. and U.K. legislative bodies had taken action with respect to the Treaty, and if the French reopened the Treaty, we would have to consult further with the Congress.

M. Mendès-France said that he agreed with the Secretary about French procrastination and could not condone the action of past French Governments. He said that he must reiterate that his primary objective was to get a result which was not a negative result rejecting EDC. He implied that this could be achieved by agreed applications of the treaty rather than by formal amendments.

The Secretary said he wished to raise another point. He understood that M. Mendès-France believed that slender majority in the French Parliament would be unacceptable in that it would leave the country divided. The Secretary said that he wished to make quite clear that he believed that the essential thing was to have the EDC voted regardless of the size of the majority, and added laughingly “even if it is only one vote”. M. Mendès-France replied that he did not believe there was a majority at present. Fifty-eight Socialists were opposed to EDC, and while some might vote for it as a matter of party discipline, at present the majority of these 58 would certainly oppose it. He said that even if he were wrong in this and there were a slight majority, he would not favor putting it to a vote if the majority was only that of a few votes. He said that the Treaty would have to go to the Council of the Republic “where there is a tremendous majority against it.” Then it would have to be brought back to the Assembly where an absolute majority of 314 votes would be required to override the Council of the Republic. There was no hope of getting 314 votes. Therefore, his whole objective was to find an acceptable formula which would give a substantial majority in the Assembly. The Secretary said that he understood that the Constitution of the Third French Republic had been passed by only one vote. With respect to the U.S. Constitution, two of the key states, New York and Virginia, had ratified the Constitution by only one vote. He therefore felt that history proved that a very small majority in such matters did not indicate that the results would be disastrous. Mr. Mendès-France said that the issues with respect to the adoption of the Constitution of the Third Republic were oversimplified, and the Secretary said that he had only repeated what he had heard and was not an expert on this matter. However, he believed the reference he had made to the close votes connected with the adoption of the U.S. Constitution was approximately correct.

Mr. Mendès-France reiterated that the worst thing that could happen would be for the EDC to be rejected. Therefore, he would continue to strive for a formula which would enable its acceptance by a reasonable majority in the French Assembly. He recognized that this created difficulties for the European states which had ratified the Treaty, but felt that the long-term interests of all would be served by an arrangement which was acceptable to a reasonable majority in France.

Mr. Mendès-France concluded by saying that discussions relating to the Geneva Conference and Indo-China would take place at the dinner meeting with Mr. Eden.⁸

1. It was noted on the source text that this meeting took place at Ambassador Dillon’s residence from 7:30 to 8:30 p.m. on July 13. This memorandum was an enclosure to a memorandum by MacArthur to Gruenther, dated July 15, which included a complete set of “Paris papers” from Secretary Dulles’ visit to Paris. For information concerning this Paris trip, see the editorial note, supra.
2. For documentation concerning the Eisenhower–Churchill talks in Washington, June 25–29, see Documents 454 ff.
3. For documentation on the U.S.–U.K. Study Group on Germany, which met in London July 5–12, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 997 ff.
4. See footnote 2, Document 646.
5. See footnote 3, ibid.
6. For documentation concerning Secretary Dulles’ visit to Western Europe, Jan. 31–Feb. 8, 1953, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1548 ff.
7. For documentation concerning the agreements signed at Bonn on May 26, 1952, see vol. vii, Part 1, pp. 1 ff.; for documentation concerning the agreements signed at Paris on May 27, 1952, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 684 ff.
8. For a record of this meeting of July 13, see vol. xiii, Part 2, p. 1819.