Eisenhower Library, C. D. Jackson papers
No. 627
Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the President (Jackson)1
France and EDC
In the hectic daily give and take of preparing for Conference meetings, rolling with the punches during the meetings themselves, working at night to prepare for the next day, it is difficult to pause for perspective.
Mr. Molotov’s extraordinarily frank toughness during the last 72 hours with respect to German unification and free elections have actually furnished us, at the end of two Conference weeks, with our first real pause and it is now possible for me, at least, to try to sort out a few ideas.
I have chosen as top priority “France and EDC”.
I believe that we have been given a most powerful assist by Mr. Molotov in our problem of persuading France that she should get going on EDC. At the same time, I believe that the ingredients of the Molotov assist, scattered as they are through several Conference sessions, may not be immediately apparent to the French. It will, therefore, be necessary for us to sort them out and make them apparent. If we handle ourselves with intelligence and energy we may be able to do more within the next few weeks regarding EDC than has been possible in the past several months for the simple reason that this time it is not America telling France but Mr. Molotov telling her. If you subscribe to the thesis outlined below I think these should be turned over to OCB for well-orchestrated followup action.
Out of the thousands of words spoken by Mr. Molotov in the past two weeks four statements are of particular significance.
- 1.
“The Soviet Delegation realizes that parliamentarism and all the aspects of it was an advantage for the previous age.…2
“The conclusion to be drawn from that is that the parliamentary system cannot guarantee us against new events arising, which [Page 1400] have arisen in the past and which led to the second World War.” (Feb. 5)
- 2.
“… we are prepared to do everything possible to secure friendship between France and Germany, between France and the Soviet Union and also between the three of them as three great powers of Europe—between France, Germany and the Soviet Union.
“Of course, it is a difficult task to secure firm friendship between these main principal continental powers—France, Germany and the Soviet Union—but it is a noble task and a task worthwhile trying.” (Jan. 26)
- 3.
- “In order to prevent pressure being put during elections by the Occupation Authorities, it necessary to carry out the withdrawal of occupation forces from the Territory of Eastern and Western Germany before elections.” (Feb. 4)
- 4.
- “Germany shall be banned from entering into any coalition or military alliance directed against any Power whose armed forces took part in the war against Germany.” (Soviet draft proposal for Peace Treaty with Germany)
What was Molotov conveying by his statement on parliamentarism. He was saying that as far as free elections and unification of Germany were concerned, the only way this could be brought about was through the operation of Soviet type elections.
Futhermore, his statements all through the second week of negotiation indicate that the only kind of united Germany acceptable to Molotov would be one governed by a group of men “elected” under the Soviet system. On this point there is no give at all in the Soviet position.
Therefore, what he is saying with virtually no double talk is that the only kind of united Germany, which the Soviets could consider, would be a united Sovietized Germany. Thus, creating a solid Soviet bloc from Vladivostok to the Rhine—where it meets France.
The implications of statement no. 2 are even more sinister as far as France is concerned.
What Mr. Molotov is saying “Europe for the Continental Europeans” and since there are only three great powers on the Continent, Russia, Germany and France, the three should get together and should forget the US and UK. But the alliance proposed by the Soviets is not an alliance between equals or even near equals. Taken in conjunction with his first quotation, the alliance proposed is between France and a Sovietized Germany, an integrated part of the USSR bloc, militarily, economically, and politically.
If that were to come about there would be little use in France looking over her shoulder for help. Her neighbors would be Italy, Spain, the Low Countries, and the English Channel. In no time at all France also would be Sovietized. What help we could give would have to be mostly US based because North Africa would have gone [Page 1401] down the drain in the process, and England would probably be too close even if the British consented to our remaining as a source of provocation to the Soviets.
Quotation 3 ties in directly with quotation 1. In order to make absolutely sure that nothing would upset their plans for the Sovietization of Germany in the event of all German elections, foreign troops must be withdrawn. Of course, the Russians withdraw either to Poland or conceivably to Russia itself—no more than a stone’s throw in modern military terms.
The US would have to withdraw, in large part, to the US, as there would be no other accommodation for these troops.
This troop withdrawal would leave some 250,000 armed men plus in the Russian Zone of Germany, whereas in Western Germany there are only 150,000 police and no para-military formations. So the matter of who would be able to impose force in the supervision of the elections is quite evident.
Finally, Germany is to be forbidden forever to make an alliance with the West. Of course, she would not have to make an alliance with the East since she would be completely Sovietized thereby solving that problem.
Thus, we have as clear a picture of Soviet European intentions, in Soviet words, as we have ever had since the Cold War began—a united Sovietized Germany, part of the Soviet bloc which reaches all the way to the Pacific—forbidden to be part of any Western defense system, a neighbor of France whose allies, the US and UK, have had to remove most of their armed forces from the Continent leaving France utterly defenseless in the combined German, USSR embrace, an embrace which would inevitably include military and economic pressure as well as political pressure.
It seems to me that even to “LeMonde” this should be a Q.E.D. proposition with only one alternative to France for survival. The use of the word survival is deliberate because Mr. Molotov’s words these last two weeks have cut through all the neutralist theorizing and the imaginary neutralist choices. He has put the proposition in such a way that for France we are indeed talking about survival.
The only alternative is EDC, including West Germany and quickly.
The Soviets, both publicly and privately, have given every indication that EDC, including West Germany, would be the kind of defense grouping they would respect.
If France wants to avoid annihilation or World War III, the answer both in terms of French logic and in terms of French emotions, is EDC.
[Page 1402]If we subscribe to this presentation of the case, it will be necessary as quickly as possible to start getting this idea into the minds of the French at many levels.
. . . . . . .
We have talked about this kind of activity in France for months, and have done very little, largely because we did not have a theme that was new and gripping. We have it now, out of Molotov’s mouth.
I feel that this is so important and so apparent that a small OCB task force of high caliber should be put to work immediately to solve this problem.
It will have to operate on a crash basis because there are probably not more that 30 to 60 days in which to achieve success.
The US has been accused of rigidity in its stand over the past year, “EDC or else”. Thank goodness we were rigid because the events of Berlin now permit Frenchmen patriotically to speak the same phrase.