751.00/12–1953: Telegram
No. 624
The Chargé in France (Achilles)1 to the Department of State2
2352. Presidential election3 has captured spotlight which Secretary’s December 14 statement on EDC4 had held for several days but latter nevertheless remains major topic of interest. EDC has itself played major role in election although welter of political cross-currents and usual attempts of Laniel and others to conciliate everybody make outcome as indecisive a test of EDC prospects as was the Assembly debate.
Reaction of press, members of Parliament and private individuals to Secretary’s statement has been both emotional and largely determined by their already held views. Opponents, who control most of press, raised uproar with primary emphasis on US pressure. Many friends of US have expressed concern at violence of reaction but most of them, although differing as to timing and manner, agree as to need of some such clear warning. Proponents have on the whole walked softly, waiting for initial clamor to subside.
While nearly everything Secretary said had been said before, extent of reaction proved clearly that realities of US situation had not previously been recognized even by French parliamentary leaders, let alone public. His statement has made these realities sharply clear and very violence of reaction stimulated by opponents has driven his points home more widely and effectively than could have been achieved by any milder approach.
Curve of ratification prospects has dropped sharply since November foreign affairs debate, and it is not yet possible to say whether trend has been reversed. In any event, no decision can be expected until after government has been formed (with EDC again playing an important role in a murky situation) and Soviet intentions have been clearly revealed at four-power conference or by refusal to attend. While Secretary’s statement increased fears of US adoption of peripheral strategy, it reduced fears of direct US–German understanding [Page 1398] and punctured much wishful thinking that US would continue to support France even if latter reverted to nationalism, sought reinsurance through more independently friendly relations with Russia or continued to evade decision. Effects of this new awareness of realities should long outlast initial emotional reactions.
- Due to illness, Ambassador Dillon left Paris on Nov. 16 and returned to New York where he was hospitalized for an extended period of time. He did not return to his post in Paris until Mar. 6, 1954. (Telegram 1888 from Paris, Nov. 13, 1953, and telegram 3041 from Paris, Mar. 5, 1954; 123 Dillon, Clarence Douglas)↩
- Repeated to London, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, Brussels, and Luxembourg.↩
- See the editorial note, infra.↩
- Regarding Secretary Dulles’ statement before the North Atlantic Council on Dec. 14, see telegram Secto 4, Dec. 15, vol. v, Part 1, pp. 458.↩