Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

INR–NIE files

No. 622
National Intelligence Estimate¹

secret
NIE 63/1

Washington, November 24, 1953.

Probable Short-Term Developments in French Policy²

the problem

To estimate probable French domestic developments and foreign policies over the next 18 months.^*

conclusions

1. France, which is overextended in attempting to meet its internal and external commitments, will remain one of the problem areas of the Western coalition. However, no critical deterioration of the French situation is likely during the period of this estimate except possibly with respect to Indochina. On the other hand there is virtually no prospect of an early “revitalization” of France. Such a revitalization would require fundamental changes in French institutions and attitudes which, if realized, probably could not become really effective during the period of this estimate.

2. Right-center governments are still likely to predominate. The chances for a left-center government coming to power are still less than even. In any case no French government likely to come to power in the next 18 months will be able to achieve both economic growth and financial stability.

3. The next six months or so will probably be decisive for EDC. We believe that French failure to ratify EDC within this period would mean the virtual abandonment of the present treaty. However, we believe that France will ratify EDC within this period if (a) France’s remaining conditions, especially on the Saar, are largely satisfied; (b) it remains convinced no fruitful discussions with the Bloc on Germany are likely; and (c) it is under continued pressure from its allies to ratify.^†

4. However, certain types of allied pressure might delay rather than hasten ratification. For example, although we believe that any alternative method of permitting West German rearmament is more unpalatable to the French than EDC, if one of these alternatives were formally proposed by the US or the UK, the French might seize upon the allied proposal as a pretext for lengthy discussions which would further delay West German rearmament.

5. French ratification of EDC would remove the chief obstacle to its implementation, though France would still seek to limit any German military buildup and to prevent the emergence of West Germany as the dominant Western European power.

6. On the other hand, if France failed to ratify EDC, it would probably seek to gloss over failure to ratify by expressing willingness to discuss West German rearmament in association with NATO. Such negotiations would almost certainly prove long and difficult, with France insisting on detailed safeguards at least as effective as those contained in EDC, thus incurring the grave risk inherent in the prolonged delay in the realization of a German military contribution to the defense of Western Europe. In these circumstances, the cohesion and effectiveness of NATO itself would be endangered.

7. In Indochina, we believe that even if the Laniel–Navarre Plan is successful the French do not expect to achieve a complete military victory in Indochina and probably aim only at improving their position sufficiently to negotiate a political settlement.

8. If no negotiations take place within the next 18 months, France would probably continue its effort in Indochina, provided that: (a) the US assumed virtually the total financial burdens of the war; (b) the planned buildup of Vietnam forces permitted reduction of French forces; (c) the Indochina states remained in the French Union; and (d) France continued to receive US support for its position in Europe and North Africa.

9. If the above French conditions were not largely satisfied France would probably propose UN intervention or direct military participation by the US. Failing in this, France would probably seek in time to negotiate directly with the Communists for terms which would permit withdrawal with minimal loss.

10. In contrast, we believe that France is determined to retain control, by force if necessary, over French North Africa. It will probably make some concessions toward local autonomy, but these almost certainly will not satisfy the local nationalists. Nevertheless, French security capabilities probably will forestall the development of any serious threat to French control during the period of this estimate. However, widening differences between France on the one hand, and the North African Nationalists supported by the Arab-Asian countries on the other, will throw increasing strains on US relations with both sides.

[Here follow a six-page discussion which provided background information and a full-page chart of the alignments of the political parties in the French National Assembly as of October 9, 1953.]

1. National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) were high-level interdepartmental reports presenting authoritative appraisals of vital foreign policy problems. NIEs were drafted by officers from those agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), discussed and revised by interdepartmental working groups coordinated by the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), approved by IAC, and circulated under the aegis of the CIA to the President, appropriate officers of cabinet level, and the National Security Council. The Department of State provided all political and some economic sections of NIEs.
2. According to a note on the cover sheet, “The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 24 November 1953. The FBI abstained, the subject being outside of its jurisdiction. The following member organizations of the Intelligence Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff.”
3. Long-term developments in France are covered in NIE–63, “France’s Probable Future Role in the Western Security System,” 23 January 1953, the conclusions of which remain largely valid. The present estimate supplements NIE–63 and concentrates on probable short-term domestic and foreign policy developments, particularly in the light of developments since the publication of NIE–63. [Footnote in the source text. A copy of NIE–63 is in INR–NIE files.]
4. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, Department of the Army, and the Director of Intelligence, US Air Force, would have this paragraph read as follows: “The next six months or so will probably be decisive for EDC. We believe that French failure to ratify EDC within this period would mean the virtual abandonment of the present treaty. Since France is fundamentally opposed to German rearmament and is more apprehensive of the threat of a resurgent Germany than of Soviet Communist aggression, French ratification of EDC continues to be conjectural. Even though France’s present remaining conditions including a favorable settlement of the Saar question are satisfied, French ratification cannot be assured unless: (a) France is under continued powerful pressure from her Allies to ratify, and (b) France is convinced no fruitful discussions with the Bloc on Germany are likely.” [Footnote in the source text.]