033.5111/9–2053

No. 615
President Eisenhower to President Laniel1

secret

Dear Mr. President: I appreciated very much your message conveyed to me through Ambassador Dillon,2 and while I was disappointed that it was not possible for you to visit the United States at this particular time, I fully understand and appreciate the reasons why you deemed it inadvisable.

I was most encouraged to hear through Ambassador Dillon that both you and M. Bidault believe the situation now propitious for the French Government to move ahead quickly toward ratification of the EDC and that both of you now are concentrating your efforts to bring this about this year. You should remain confident of the continuing wholehearted support of the United States for the EDC concept, which sprang from French vision. It has always been our hope that this great project, which holds the promise of such magnificent permanent benefits for Europe, would come into being at the earliest possible time.

I know that you were encouraged by the results of the September 6 elections in Germany. In all our efforts to consolidate the foundation for a new Europe, I believe that perhaps the most important element is the state of mind with which the three Western nations who played the greatest part in defeating Hitler’s Germany during the last war now approach their relations with the new Germany. Fortunately, the recent elections have demonstrated that contrary to the Weimar Republic, the Bonn regime has struck roots; in the [Page 1384] four years since the first Bundestag elections, the forces of democracy and common sense have grown considerably in strength, and the new voters have overwhelmingly supported the center forces dedicated to European cooperation, and rejected the extremes of right and left. It is our responsibility both to develop this situation for the common good and to strengthen it further. Therefore, it is most urgent that in all our relations with Germany we be guided by a new spirit of friendship and trust and that the last vestige of a spirit of occupation disappear.

We are not blind to history, and we know the difficulties this presents for the French people. But, we also know that the spectre of a Germany rapidly increasing its strength outside the ties of Western European unity would cause France even greater concern. Hence, we are confident that the leaders of France will not miss this historic opportunity for a Franco-German rapprochement which now offers itself, but which will certainly fade away if not seized resolutely and promptly.

Finally, Mr. President, I want to wish for you the utmost success in your approach toward the solution of France’s problems and the realization of the common aims of the Western nations, an approach which to me reflects statesmanship and courage in the highest degree and is in keeping with France’s traditions as a world leader.

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower
  1. This message was transmitted to Paris in telegram 1049 of Sept. 20 with instructions that Ambassador Dillon deliver it unless he had any objection. It was noted that this letter was not to be made public and that the purpose of the letter was to be helpful and to “nail down a bit the verbal statements to you by both Laniel and Bidault with respect to pushing forward with EDC and necessity for real Franco-German rapprochement.

    The decision to send a letter to Laniel originated during the Secretary’s staff meeting of Sept. 18 when the subject of securing French ratification of the EDC took place. Upon MacArthur’s suggestion, it was agreed to send such a letter and to “peg” it on the President’s reply to Laniel’s decision not to visit Washington in the immediate future. (Secretary’s Staff Meetings, lot 63 D 75, “September 1953”) According to a memorandum by MacArthur, a draft letter to Laniel was forwarded to the White House on Sept. 19 after Secretary Dulles approved the text by phone from New York. The President subsequently agreed to the text of the letter and it was transmitted to Paris the following day. (Secretary’s Letters, lot 56 D 459, “L”)

  2. Dillon called the Department of State in order to relay Laniel’s message by telephone on Sept. 16; he informed MacArthur that Laniel had decided that developments at home required that he not visit Washington at this time. (Memorandum by Walter K. Scott, Sept. 16, 1953; 033.5111/9–1653)