Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

DMS files, lot W–1444, “France”

No. 582
The Consultant to the Director for Mutual Security (Bissell) to the Director for Mutual Security (Stassen)

secret

Paris, March 25, 1953.

Dear Harold: I had a long and most satisfactory talk with David Bruce, which I followed up in a second conversation with his assistant, W. M. Tomlinson. In these conversations they expressed a general attitude toward our relations and negotiations with the French which seemed to me eminently sensible and worthy of your personal attention.

I asked Tomlinson to summarize Mr. Bruce’s and his views, which he has done in a brief memorandum enclosed herewith. After Tomlinson had left for Washington, David Bruce personally called me to say (a) that he did not concur in the third of Tomlinson’s recommendations (which I have bracketed on the enclosed memorandum), but (b) that with this exception Tomlinson’s memorandum did correctly represent his (Bruce’s) views. I have described these conversations in some detail to Dr. FitzGerald who can expand on this note if you wish. I might add that Tomlinson is also in Washington and, if you are closely concerned with the French negotiations, you might find it profitable to talk to him.

I am quite aware that this is somewhat outside of my territory but assume you are interested in whatever intelligence we can send forward to you.

Sincerely yours,

Richard Bissel

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Deputy United States Representative to the European Coal and Steel Community (Tomlinson) to the Consultant to the Director for Mutual Security (Bissell)

secret

[Paris,] March 24, 1953.

• Subject: Negotiations with French

I have summarized below the conclusions of discussions between Mr. Bruce and myself on this subject. I did not get a chance to clear this with him but he said you could present this general line in Washington as his point of view.

“The statements by Secretary Dulles and the Standing Group on the need to adopt a strategy of peripheral defense if a defense contribution from Germany is not obtained have not convinced the French Foreign Office and the French Military. These groups are the center of opposition to EDC in France. They still believe that the delay and even the prevention of the EDC will force the United States to equip a larger French Army and in general to fall back on France in Europe. The United States should begin to act like a nation which questions whether a defense buildup in the Continental countries will be possible without a French-German agreement. We should consider the following steps:

(1) Slow up deliveries of end-item equipment to French forces.

(2) Ease the pressure for construction of airfields and lines of communications.

(3) Delay the signature of offshore procurement contracts.

(4) Shift approach of French MAAG from a national army to a European army basis.

(5) Avoid discussions for an Export-Import Bank loan against contracts.

(6) Slow up defense support aid allocations to extent possible.

In conversations with Mayer and Bidault we might explain that our military assistance has been provided in support of a ‘forward strategy’ plan. Once the means for accomplishing that plan are no longer forthcoming, it no longer serves the interests of the common defense for us to continue to spend funds for the equipment of forces and the construction of infrastructure facilities in Continental Europe, for we would not be justified in assuming that such forces and facilities can and will be defended. U.S. military assistance will continue but the emphasis must shift to the creation of forces and defense installations in different areas. Once the French military understands that there may be no French continental forces unless there is an EDC, their attitude and the prospects of EDC ratification in France will improve considerably. This is also the judgment of a number of sympathetic French officials.”