740.5/3–1953: Telegram
No. 572
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the
Department of State1
5128. Limit distribution. In after-dinner conversation last night, Bidault spoke at length about Washington visit and EDC along following line:
[Page 1305]It was unfortunate from every point of view that Mayer visit was to take place at this time. It had become merely one of series, following Eden and Van Zeeland and preceding Adenauer and De Gasperi, and results would not be good for France. It would be better for Mayer to stay home and “let me go and get my nose bloodied.” (There is, of course, no serious thought of Mayer’s not going.) Adenauer was cocky and would have great success in America because of Bundestag ratification but court might very well subsequently trip him up.
He spoke slightingly of “Schuman myth” and commented that Schuman had acquired great reputation as European whereas he (Bidault) had originated these ideas and would be able to carry them out in way which Schuman could never do. He was prepared at right time to lead aggressive fight for ratification but that time was not yet. At that time he would have both Mollet and Pinay and their respective supporters in favor of ratification.
He hoped that in Washington conversations and elsewhere United States would show great patience and “surtout pas de zele.” Bidault obviously wishes to minimize United States pressure for EDC ratification and to convince us that he is playing shrewd political game to obtain ratification. He may be, but whether in fact he will or can carry it through depends on many factors other than merits of EDC.
I would recommend that in private talks with him and Mayer, President and Secretary make very clear both vital importance and urgency of ratification.
- Repeated to London and Bonn.↩