740.5/12–1052: Telegram
No. 557
The United States Special Representative
in Europe (Draper) to the Department of
State
Polto 969. For Battle from Martin. Ref: urtel 3203 to Paris Dec 5.1 Martin personal notes for a position on aid to France are as fols:
“Have waited dispatch this msg until opportunity to see msg country team preparing contained in Paris tel 3361, Dec 9.2 Have no comment on parts II and III reftel. Concur with para IV A and B but not clear to me that point in para IV B with respect to [garble] spend even larger amount than involved this year. Not aware that can be sure funds now not “fully committed” under impression on basis present plans they are fully committed.
“Recommendation V A (1) that French be informed of additl aid at earliest appropriate time not specific but assume implication it shld be done while Secy in Paris. Do not concur.
“Evidence as to whether or not a commitment to 650 wld satisfy French at this time is conflicting. Fr reps in NATO bodies, including MC, have inserted amendments clearly based on conception that aid from US much greater than is 650 possibility. They have envisaged aid might be recd to permit financing of armored div and of 375 aircraft envisaged by MRC–12 but which will not be provided by Pleven 1464 budget to which 650 aid is related.
[Page 1284]“Possibly with this in mind, there have been several hints in public statements that Fr did not expect aid question to be settled during Dec mtgs. Believe it clear that at least some leading Fr officials hope to make better deal than 650 with new admin.
“While apparently final agrmnt with Fr this month on some figure in addition to 525 might make it somewhat awkward for Fr to reopen query later with new admin, do not think it likely to prevent them from doing so. Wld appear to be to advantage of new admin to be able to deal with Fr on whole issue of aid in addition to 525 during windup of AR, however Fr may wish to present it at that time, rather than having their flexibility and their ability to make arrangement which will start off their relations with Fr Govt on at least moderately hopeful basis limited by fact large portion if not all of funds which cld be wisely committed to additional aid to Fr already committed in Dec.
“In addition, believe it will be difficult to decide clearly what funds can properly be made available for additl aid to France until AR has progressed further. Possible solution, which is consistent with present thinking in AR, is to reprogram end-item funds intended to finance equipment for armored div and additl aircraft units which will not be created under 1464 budget and use them to provide budgetary support which will permit Fr Govt to make existing units stronger and better supported, which is apparently Pleven plan for use of counterpart of additl 125. However, believe it is necessary we be in position on basis of further AR work to reach firm agrmnt with Fr as to exact nature of supporting strength to be created with these funds and that it be in accordance with new interim standards of readiness to be prepared by milit as result of decisions to be taken next week. Believe this decision can only be made firm one which Fr will accept as final, and as to certain degree logical, in final stages of AR when there can be gen balancing out of assets including those available to US against priority goals, and new admin speaking for US.
“An argument against postponement of action is that Fr have now indicated that their contribution to NATO infrastructure is dependent on additl 125 and, therefore, cost-sharing in Dec impossible without it. Must confess I am currently confused about Fr position with respect to use of counterpart of 125 as support of natl armies in Indochina is also currently being given as use to which funds will be put. Wld rather seem to appear that Fr intend to divide money among three objectives they believe wld have most appeal to US; infrastructure, buildup of natl units in Indochina and provision support units for existing front-line units in Eur. Clarification on this point seems essential to decision on importance of giving additl funds to Fr in relation other uses these funds. Issue is really whether we can accept Fr proposal to make these high priority requirements marginal requirements dependent on this increment of US aid. In these terms, doubt whether Fr contention infrastructure contribution dependent on this aid is one we shld accept. Rather we shld hold ourselves free to discuss with Fr in later stages of AR which of high priority deficiencies from NATO-wide standpoint funds might best be used for.
[Page 1285]“Conclusion from this is that Fr may not raise query this month but if they do we shld suggest that, in accordance with our earlier position, reinforced by our desire to permit new admin to review sitn and make further decisions in light of its views as to use of resources, we prefer not to make any further commitments until in final stages of AR process.
“If this view is not accepted, it wld be my recommendation that any negotiation this month with respect to additl aid shld be in accord with the fol principles:
- “(1) Total amount shld not exceed about 600 plus Moody.
- “(2) Pinay shld not be asked to increase the contribution from Fr resources to above 1250. He cannot do it.
- “(3) It shld be made clear this additl amount will be available only because of the possibility of reprogramming end-item funds originally scheduled for Fr MRC–12 goals which Fr cannot meet.
- “(4) Every effort shld be made secure precise argmnt as to increases in strength for which counterpart of additl amount will, in fact, create.
- “(5) Every effort shld be made to tie down fact this final decision for FY 53, to be made known publicly with great clearness by all parties. This seems particularly essential since seems likely EDC debate will not occur for several months and some Fr may feel that with passage of time, it will be possible to reopen query at time of debate when US presumably most vulnerable to pressure (this perhaps another reason why decision at this time unwise).”
- See footnote 1, supra.↩
- Supra.↩