In connection with all this, I would like to emphasize one point which
has been brought home to me repeatedly by friendly French people of
different walks of life with whom I have talked. The point is that the
French are increasingly coming to believe that the US Government and
Congress have no confidence in France, consider the French fumbling and
incompetent, and therefore believe the
[Page 1260]
US should start telling the French what to do in
all fields, foreign and domestic. I do not believe any of us could
quarrel with the French that there are certain elements in the US which
generally share this view. However, I think the important point in all
this is that we must give the French the impression that we are being
frank with them and that we are acting on a partnership basis. The fewer
legalistic presentations—based on the work of US slide-rule boys in an
ivory tower—we make to them, the less danger there is of a serious
deterioration of our relations, not only with France but with Europe. I
feel that in the development of US positions, we sometimes get so
involved in technicalities and details of our policy that we tend on
occasion to be both pedantic and intolerant. I also recognize that in
the majority of the cases this is not the fault of the Department, but
stems from the insistence of other Departments or agencies. This is
beside the point, however, if the finally agreed US approach is one
which creates damage. After all, our entire foreign policy is involved
in what we are trying to do over here.
I hope you will not think that in this letter I am trying to be pedantic
or to lecture anyone, for I certainly am not. It is just that I am
really more apprehensive than I have been for many months that unless we
show real leadership which involves, of course, firmness but also
patience and tact (with a capital T), we may over the coming period lose
much, if not all, of the ground we have gained.
I made a strong recommendation that the attached memo be sent back to the
Pentagon as an indication of M. Pleven’s frame of mind. Thus far, no action has been
taken, so I do not know whether the memo will in fact go back to the
five-sided building or not. I have not requested authority to send it on
to you, but am doing so on my own initiative, so I would hope that you
would hold this within the Department until such time as I can let you
know whether the memo did go back to Defense.
Every good wish and all the very best.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum for the Record, by General A. J. Drexel
Biddle
secret
Paris, October 10, 1952.
On October 10, 1952, the Minister of National Defense, M. René Pleven, telephoned me that
his Government, in general, and his Ministry, in particular, were
currently faced with a number of irksome
[Page 1261]
problems; that these had either a direct or
indirect bearing on General Ridgway’s mission. He would therefore welcome an
opportunity to discuss them informally, to impart the official
French thinking, and to clarify his Government’s position in
relation to these problems. He felt that this would serve a useful
purpose in the relationship between General Ridgway and, in particular,
the Ministry of National Defense. He did not wish to take General
Ridgway’s time to
listen to his discussion of these problems, and he therefore
suggested that I come to see him at 1730 hours that afternoon in his
office. Accordingly, I arrived at his office at the appointed hour
and the discussion which ensued was concluded at 1900 hours.
Main Points of Discussion
The following are the main points which the Minister discussed:
- 1.
- French official impression of US official attitude toward
France—Page 2.
- 2.
- Indochina—Page 2.
- 3.
- Financial Difficulties—Page 3–4.
- 4.
- Two-years’ national service—Page 4–5.
- 5.
- US–French negotiations: French concern—Page 4–5.
- 6.
- Conclusion—Page 5.
- 7.
- General Ridgway’s recent statement to Press—Page
6.
French Official Impression of US Official Attitude
Toward France
At the outset, M. Pleven
said that it was with a real sense of regret that he had to admit
that he and his Cabinet associates had gathered an impression,
particularly during the past four or five months, that the US had
manifested a lack of confidence in France. From the French point of
view, this had become evident in a number of instances.
For example, in cases where the US had, for reasons best-known to
themselves, found it necessary to cut down on French listed
requirements for end-items, there had been a marked absence of
explanation, on the part of US authorities concerned, to impart the
reasons for the reduction. In this connection, he felt there were
two ways for dealings between associates in a given project: either
(a) to treat each other as a partner, which necessarily involved
frank discussion of common problems, or (b) to resort to the
employment of lawyers in the handling of matters of common interest;
the latter procedure was more than apt to lack, on the part of both
parties, the useful knowledge of the background on each other’s
actions. In this connection, he had in mind a recent note,2 delivered to
his
[Page 1262]
Government,
regarding financial aid which had a very definite bearing upon
military requirements for France. Characterizing this note as having
been written by lawyers, M. Pleven said that, had the US authorities concerned
only discussed the whole matter in advance of writing the note, they
would have learned that the French Government had already gone very
far in its active consideration of the military problems
involved.
M. Pleven went on to say
that, with further regard to his Government’s impression of a lack
of confidence on the part of the US, he and his associates had
gained the impression that, prior to the intensification of the
political campaign in the US, both the President and the Department
of State had shown clear comprehension as to France’s position in
regard to NATO and SHAPE’s mission, but that, unlike the
President and the Department of State, the Pentagon had shown a
distinct inclination to be distrustful of France. It was furthermore
felt that the intensification of the political campaign had served
to divert the attention both of the President and the Department of
State during the past four or five months, with the result that the
Pentagon had been running things in Washington. He was apprehensive
lest France was suffering in American eyes as a result.
Indochina
It was, furthermore, the impression of his Government that the
Pentagon lacked comprehension as to France’s position vis-à-vis
Indochina, and the effect upon France’s military build-up in Western
Europe, of continued fighting in Indochina. He personally had gone
all-out in an effort to enlighten American opinion, and he had had
reason to believe that Washington, in general, and the Pentagon, in
particular, had been given a clear picture of France’s position in
the matter. For that purpose, he had encouraged the visit of the
late General de Lattre to the US; he had even gone to the US
Ambassador and had requested the French Ambassador and his staff to
follow up on the late General’s visit there, and his efforts at
clarification.3
The main purpose of these efforts had been to show that Indochina was
no longer a colonial consideration, but rather a strategic action
within the broad concept of containment; that whatever investment
had been made in Indochina had been wiped out by the cost of the
campaign there, during the past seven years. Indeed, the costliness
of this seven-year campaign had been so considerable as not only to
have wiped out the French investment in that country,
[Page 1263]
but also to have caused
serious drain on the manpower as well as the financial resources of
France. If France were to withdraw today, she could probably make
available the cadres of some sixteen to eighteen divisions to the
SHAPE military build-up.
Financial Difficulties
Another point upon which he did not feel that the Pentagon was
showing comprehension, was that of France’s financial capabilities.
In his post as Minister of Defense, he was in the position of one
whose friends were encouraging him to join a regiment which required
on the part of the candidates sufficient financial resources to
purchase special uniforms, to cover animal upkeep, entertainment,
etc. Under normal circumstances, knowing that it would be too rich
for his blood, he would have been frank to say that he could not
afford to join. However, conditions of the times were such as to
persuade him to abandon this fundamental consideration, and to go
along on the basis of “best efforts”. This was approximately
France’s position in relation to the over-all SHAPE effort. She was making every
effort to meet General Ridgway’s requirements, notwithstanding the fact
that she had made commitments, even aside from the military field,
which she was finding it extremely difficult to fulfill. His doubts
as to whether the Pentagon fully grasped this situation were, for
him, a matter of real concern.
He wondered whether the men of the Department of Defense really
understood the meager lot of the average Frenchmen—how difficult it
was for him to make both ends meet. He wondered, for example,
whether they understood what the Minister of Defense received, what
the wife of the Minister of Defense in France had to do to keep her
house going, and at the same time to make it possible for her
husband and herself to meet their official obligations. Many an
American in public life, who visited Paris, saw only the “bright
lights” and the brilliant atmosphere created for the benefit of
tourists. He only wished that those same individuals might see the
way the average Frenchman lived. The former would have a much
clearer idea of what France was up against.
Two Years’ National Service
As regards the question of 24 months’ national service, M. Pleven assured me that his
Government was determined to achieve this; that it took time to
accomplish it (he readily admitted), but he did want me to know that
there were a number of factors which contributed toward constant
resistance to the project. For example, the average Frenchman had
witnessed, during World War II, the vast amount of heavy equipment
used by the US forces, and its effective employment. They had been
impressed, moreover, by minimum loss of life among the American
troops, a fact which they attributed to the use and manner of
employment of this heavy equipment.
[Page 1264]
Hence, that same average Frenchman would
today be the more ready to have his son called up for national
service if he were aware of the availability of an adequate number
of tanks, heavy guns, etc. Furthermore, there was many an individual
in the National Assembly who fought in the Resistance forces in
World War II. In preparation he had received only three months of
training and, generally speaking, had acquitted himself creditably.
It was therefore difficult for him to understand why two years would
be necessary for training the youth of today. That same man, of
course, would be the more appreciative of the necessity of the two
years’ national service period, if he knew of the existence of the
heavy equipment and modern weapons which required a more lengthy
time of training than the light equipment with which he himself had
been trained in the Resistance forces. Hence, the lack of heavy
equipment today rendered the Government’s position a difficult one
in its efforts to forward the required two years’ national service
period, notwithstanding the fact that the Government was determined
to achieve this end.
In connection with the foregoing, M. Pleven added that the curve in the birthrate in
France showed a considerable dip in the years 1945–1952. He was
seriously concerned lest this might affect the national service
call-up in the course of the next several years. This was a problem
which his Government was currently studying.
US–French Negotiations: French Concern
At this point, M. Pleven
referred to certain US financial assistance discussed during the
Lisbon conference. He said that in talking to the US
representatives, the French representatives had discussed a
requirement for France amounting to $500 million for 1953, and a
requirement for Indochina amounting to $150 million also for 1953.
On 15 August 1952, the French Government had asked for a
confirmation. Not until 8 October 1952 had an answer been received.
Moreover, the US had cut down the French total requirements of $650
million to $525 million.
As regards end items, the French Government on 15 April 1952 had sent
an inquiry to the US Government regarding end items. Not until 8
October 1952 had M. Pleven been answered. Moreover, the answer bore the
date of 21 August 1952. From the French standpoint, the answer was
definitely unfavorable:
- a.
- In the case of electronics equipment, France had stated an
urgent requirements of approximately 11,000 sets, whereas
the answer showed none available.
- b.
- As regards tanks, France had stated a requirement of 918.
The answer had shown only 37 available.
[Page 1265]
In this connection, Mr. Pleven handed me the attached copy of the
aforementioned reply,4 for the information of General Ridgway.
Mr. Pleven went on to say
that, as he had previously mentioned to me, he was greatly
disappointed not to have been told the reasons for the reductions,
in response to his query. This had placed him in a position of not
being able to explain the matter to his associates. They were,
therefore, left to their own speculation, and characteristic of the
French mentality when not given the reasons for a certain action,
their imagination took the worse form. For example, the predominant
thought was that the US was saving for Germany the bulk of the
equipment required for France. As he had previously emphasized, it
was so important to treat the French with confidence as partners,
and to be completely frank in dealings with them. Otherwise, they
were apt to jump to conclusions based on speculation.
A further matter of concern in the above connection was the fact that
the US authorities had imposed upon him certain obligations
regarding the end items actually offered—such as keeping a check on
the condition of the equipment with a view to the US determining its
disposition upon obsolescence. These terms were impractical, and his
Government preliminarily had taken a dim view of them.
As regards ammunition and propellants, his Government had thus far
had no word from the US authorities concerned. He failed to
understand the US position in the matter, particularly after their
having expressed such urgency in the matter.
Conclusion
Summarizing the foregoing points, M. Pleven stated that, in view thereof, his Government
found itself, financially and production-wise, in a difficult spot.
Moreover, he was concerned over the possible effect thereof upon the
military build-up of the 1953 military commitment, which he and his
associates had been discussing.
General Ridgway’s Recent Statement to the Press
Prior to concluding the discussion, M. Pleven referred to General
Ridgway’s recent
interview with the US press correspondents5—the interview which had been garbled by the United
Press article. He stated that, as regards the points which General
Ridgway actually
did raise, there was no exception taken by the French Government. In
fact, the Government readily admitted that the General was
completely correct. But what did affect their sensibility was
[Page 1266]
the absence of some
reference to the British military commitment to NATO, for the French were very
critical of the British on this score, inasmuch as they felt that
the British had insufficient forces on the Continent.
