751.5 MSP/7–252: Telegram

No. 525
The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State

secret
priority

61. Cotel

1.
As Deptel 7694 June 281 recd Paris June 30 in garbled form it was not distributed until July 2. We are urgently preparing comments which we hope forward tomorrow.
2.
As Wash aware, report CM 52/43 by international staff team for additional aircraft production discussed NAC July 1.2 Shortly [Page 1219] before mtg, Pleven sent me letter inclosing text of comments on report Alphand instructed to make to NAC.3
3.
Alphand statement takes strong exception to staff report and Pleven letter requests mtg with me to discuss matter. At dinner with Pleven last night I said that text his letter and Alphand statement wld be promptly brought to Wash’s attn for consideration in connection with May 6 proposal and intl staff report. I told Pleven that I felt it wld be preferable to defer proposed mtg for a few days to give Wash an opportunity to study intl report and Alphand comments.

Text of Pleven letter and Alphand statement as follows:

Begin translation of texts Paris, July 1, 1952. Mr. Ambassador,

I wish to communicate to you herewith the text of a declaration which will be made this afternoon to the permanent council of reps of the NAT by the Fr del, M. Alphand.

The report CM 52/43, concerning the additional production of aircraft financed by offshore purchases, does not correspond in any way with the principles which we discussed with Mr. Acheson during his recent visit to Paris.

I wld very much like to have a discussion with you as soon as possible, because it is certain that the Fr parliamentary comites wld not permit the Fr Govt, even if we so wished, to agree to the proposals made in this report.

Please accept, etc. (signed) R. Pleven.

The Fr Govt took note with the greatest satis of the declaration made by the US del, according to which the Amer Govt proposed to place orders with the Eur aircraft industry.

The Fr Govt wishes in the first place to extend again its thanks to the US Govt for this initiative. Although, in the spirit of the Lisbon agmt, the Fr Govt had reason to expect that offshore purchases, intended to avoid cancellations, shld be the object of a special negotiation within a bilateral Franco-Amer framework, it consented to the procedure whereby a program was to be established by the Secy General of the NATO, in the hope that when an integrated production program emerged, the latter wld be in conformity with the wishes constantly expressed by the Fr del.

But the Fr Govt must state that the method of approach which has been applied has not taken account of all the mil, econ, social and pol elements of the problem which must be resolved; consequently the Fr Govt must make the most express reservations re document CM 52/43. It will later indicate the criticisms to which this document gives rise on the part of the Fr Govt.

The Fr del emphasizes that acceptance of the recommendations of document CM 52/43 wld have as an immed consequence the closing-down of seven Fr aircraft plants working on mil orders and the laying-off of 9,700 specialists in the airframe and engine industry [Page 1220] alone, that is, 22.5 per cent of the personnel now employed in this industry; corresponding measures wld have to be taken with respect to plants making equipment.

These consequences are naturally unacceptable to the Fr Govt, all the more so since they wld coincide with the restarting of mil production in West Ger.

With respect to the broader aspects of Atlantic Def, it appears paradoxical that at the time the need for as rapid as possible an increase in the number of aircraft placed at the disposition of the NATO forces is recognized, at that same time work in progress which is indispensable to place Fr units in operational status is sacrificed for the benefit of programs which wld only give much later results, in 1955. With respect to the aircraft potential, the layoff of 9,700 specialists wld have the effect of reducing by one quarter the Fr potential. Factories in operation and whose geographical situation is favorable from the strategic point of view, such as Marignane or Anglets, wld be closed, while new assembly lines wld be set up in zones which wld be extremely exposed in case of aggression.

From the more general standpoint, the Fr Govt must recall the fol considerations:

France is the only member Govt in NATO which has agreed to make a financial effort higher than that recommended by the TCC.

Considering the recommendations of the mil comite, the Fr Govt agreed to undertake in 1952 twelve ground divisions.

Considering the conversations which it had at Lisbon with reps of the US Govt, and the recommendations made by the TCC, approved by the Council, under the terms of which large offshore orders wld be placed in Europe and particularly in France, the Fr Govt included in its budget as a priority expenditure personnel and infra-structure costs.

The decision was justified by the conviction that the offshore purchase procedure wld at least avoid the cancellation in France of contracts already placed and the closing down of factories already in production.

As the authors of the report did not understand these considerations, they reached conclusions which the Fr Govt cannot accept. End translation of texts.

Cleared with Labouisse and Timmons.

Dunn
  1. Telegram 7694 informed the Embassy of the thinking of various departments concerning the French proposals of May 6. It also noted that the major problem was the availability of funds in view of budget cuts and the already high level of conditional commitments to France. (751.5 MSP/6–2852)
  2. NATO document CM (52) 43, an International Staff Aircraft Report, was discussed at a special meeting of the North Atlantic Council on July 1; a summary of this meeting was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Polto 8 from Paris, July 2. (740.5/7–252)
  3. Alphand’s statement during the North Atlantic Council meeting of July 1 was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Polto 14 from Paris, July 2. (740.5/7–252)