Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 100

No. 340
United States Delegation Minutes of the Third Formal Meeting of President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill, The White House, January 8, 1952, 11 a.m. –1 p.m.¹

top secret
TCT MIN–3

Washington, January 8, 1952, 11 a.m. to 1 p.m.

Present:

• U.S.

  • The President
    • Mr. Short
    • Mr. Murphy
    • Mr. Lloyd
  • Secretary Acheson
    • Mr. Matthews
    • Mr. Perkins
    • Ambassador Gifford
    • Mr. Bohlen
    • Mr. Knight
    • Mr. Berry
    • Mr. Allison
  • Secretary Lovett
    • General Bradley
    • Admiral Fechteler
  • Secretary Snyder
    • Mr. Willis
  • Mr. Harriman

• U.K.

  • Prime Minister Churchill
  • Mr. Eden
  • Lord Cherwell
  • Lord Ismay
  • Ambassador Franks
  • Sir Norman Brook
  • Sir Roger Makins
  • Mr. Shuckburgh
  • Mr. Leishman
  • Mr. Colville
  • Mr. Pitblado
  • Mr. Gore-Booth
  • Mr. Mallaby
  • Field Marshal Sir William Slim
  • Admiral Sir Roderick McGrigor
  • Air Marshal Sir William Elliot
  • Sir Kenneth McLean
  • Mr. Burrows
  • Mr. Tomlinson

[Here follows a table of contents.]

1. Middle East Command

At the President’s invitation Mr. Churchill opened the discussion.

Mr. Churchill said that he wanted to make clear the current position of the UK in the Middle East. This position has been deeply altered by the disappearance of the Indian Army as a British military instrument as a result of Indian independence. Of course, UK communications with Australia and New Zealand remain always possible around the Cape but this is a long and inefficient route. The Prime Minister then briefly referred to the current difficulties in Iran; mentioned the unstable situation in the Near Eastern countries and referred to Israel over which the British have no control. Turning to Egypt, he said that the UK was there to perform solely an international duty by keeping the Canal open for international trade. More traffic is going through the Canal now than ever before. British forces are not in the area for promoting in any manner British imperialist interests. As the British are performing an international task in the Canal Zone, the burden cannot be left indefinitely on their shoulders alone. According to the Prime Minister the US proposal for a four-power pact (i.e., UK–US–French–Turkish sponsorship of the MEC²) is the best thought to date in relation to this area and the UK wishes to support it in every way. The sooner the four-power proposal is implemented, the better. Referring to the MEC, Mr. Churchill declared that the Turks would be more likely to participate wholeheartedly if they were directly under General Eisenhower’s command within NATO. He then referred to the importance of the US sending a symbolic brigade to the Suez Canal area and stressed the great importance of the four powers all sending token forces to this area. He thought that such a proof of solidarity should bring the difficulties with Egypt very quickly to an end. He said that the Egyptian situation was tying up British forces badly needed in Europe and elsewhere, that the UK was completely unprotected, and that he was most anxious to redeploy UK forces now in Egypt where they would be more useful. Hence the importance of the four powers sending token forces to Egypt which would quickly adopt a reasonable attitude when faced with such a common front. Concerning the Middle East Command itself, he said that, should the US so desire, the UK would be willing to appoint a British Commander for the MEC. Indeed, he thought that this would be natural in view of the size of the British forces in the area and of the task which they are now performing. Nevertheless, he wanted to make quite clear the UK did not desire or expect national benefits therefrom and reemphasized that the British are only discharging an international duty, and a most painful one, in the Canal Area. Mr. Churchill also stressed that a British commander of the MEC must not be considered as compensation for British “losses” elsewhere (i.e., the MEC is not part of any quid pro quo).

Mr. Eden then referred to the command set-up itself and to the talks thereon between France, the UK and the US in Rome.³

Mr. Acheson mentioned the political factors involved. He said that it is most important politically to move forward with the establishment of the MEC. Obviously, Greece and Turkey would have to be full members of NATO before this could be complete. However, the US is most eager to work closely with the British and French so that the MEC can be set up by March or April. With reference to NATO command arrangements for Greece and Turkey, they would have to be separate from the MEC. At one time the US had thought that the two-hat concept would be possible with the same officer commanding both the MEC and the Eastern Command of NATO. Now the US has come to the conclusion that such an arrangement could not work and that the NATO command must be quite separate and distinct from the MEC.

Mr. Lovett concurred in Mr. Acheson’s statement.

General Bradley then said the US Joint Chiefs of Staff thought that, all things considered, the best way of placing Greece and Turkey in the NATO Command framework would be through the extension of Admiral Carney’s command to include these two countries. From the military point of view it would be better to set up a fourth command under General Eisenhower but, in view of Greece’s and Turkey’s stand, for political reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought the easiest and most practical solution resided in extending Admiral Carney’s command. At a later date should it become apparent that Admiral Carney is over-extended, it ought to be possible to split his command.

Field Marshal Slim declared that the UK Chiefs agreed with General Bradley. The proposed arrangement would indeed place too large a military burden on Admiral Carney but there seemed to be no alternative to accepting General Bradley’s proposal in view of the position of Greece and Turkey. In case of war this command structure would have to be immediately changed. Field Marshal Slim then pointed out that, regardless of the intense interest of the Turks in being recognized as a European power, it was a fact which no one could change that they were geographically situated in the Middle East. Turkey is the only country in the Middle East which can make a real contribution to the MEC and a proper link between the MEC and Admiral Carney’s command must be established. Furthermore, a proper Turkish contribution to the MEC must be obtained. He did not think there would be any trouble on the latter score in view of the assurances received from the Prime Minister and Defense Minister of Turkey by General Bradley and himself when they visited Ankara last fall.⁴ He then proposed as the link between the MEC and Admiral Carney that the “Commander of the Turkish Front” also be the deputy to the MEC Commander or, he added “something of that nature”.

General Bradley declared that he agreed with everything Field Marshal Slim said excepting that he did not agree with the NATO Commander in Turkey holding any position in the MEC. The US could not accept this suggestion as it saw nothing but trouble in the two-hat concept. He proposed that we should see later what can be worked out. For the time being the two commands should be kept entirely distinct as otherwise there would be objections not only from Greece and Turkey but also “on the Northern flank”.

2. Coordination of US–UK Policies in the Middle East: Egypt and Iran

After saying that it was vital that the UK and the US understand each other on all these matters, the President asked Mr. Acheson to speak.

Referring to Egypt, the Secretary of State said that he and Mr. Eden had discussed this situation at some length Saturday night on the Williamsburg and that he expected to have other talks with Mr. Eden while he was here.⁵ The prime purpose of these talks would be to work out a new four-power approach to Egypt. In view of the importance which the King of Egypt places on the matter this new approach should include his recognition as King of the Sudan. However, before granting this recognition to the King of Egypt, it would be necessary to assure ourselves of certain conditions beforehand. The King would have to agree to self-determination of the Sudan and to refrain from upsetting any Sudanese regime. He also would have to agree beforehand to accept the four-power proposal concerning the MEC. Although not mentioned as a pre-condition, Mr. Acheson said that the King of Egypt should cooperate in dispelling the existing misconceptions in Egypt concerning the nature of the original four-power proposal. He expressed confidence that he could reach agreement with Mr. Eden as to the course of action to be followed by [but?] that it was not clear as to the best moment for breaking the present deadlock.

Mr. Eden stated that he agreed with much that Mr. Acheson had said. However, the King of Egypt does not want the four powers to move now. He thought it was very important to make it quite clear that there had been full agreement at this meeting on the line which should be pursued by the US and UK in relation to Egypt and that this might so influence the Egyptian Government that it might advance the date when a new four-power proposal could advantageously be made. According to the British Foreign Secretary, the main complication for the UK in recognizing King Farouk as King of the Sudan lay in the fact that such recognition would be generally interpreted throughout Egypt as British acceptance of the abrogation of the Treaty of 1899 and of the resulting condominium over the Sudan. To make possible British recognition of King Farouk as King of the Sudan it would first be necessary for the Egyptians to return to the terms of the Treaty of 1899 and abide thereby.

Mr. Churchill then stressed the importance of making fully clear in the communiqué UK–US agreement as to the policy to be followed in relation to Egypt.

Mr. Eden added that it would also be helpful if the communiqué made it crystal clear that the US and the UK had made up their minds to proceed vigorously with the establishment of the MEC. This should have many beneficial effects throughout the Middle East area.

Mr. Truman requested Mr. Acheson to pursue his talks with Mr. Eden concerning Egypt and then referred to his grave worries over the Iranian situation.⁶

Mr. Eden spoke about the current negotiations between the International Bank and the Iranian Government and questioned the recent unfavorable answer from Mosadeq.⁷ However, he understands that the bank intends to continue negotiations and will answer Mosadeq’s questions. Mr. Eden had seen the bank’s representatives and the UK is entirely willing to have the bank continue to play the hand which has been started. For the time being at least, there is no doubt that the right thing to do is to carry on with the procedure which has been initiated. However, Mr. Eden expressed doubts as to the chances of success. He added that the UK was fully ready to examine anything else which might bring the US and the UK in closer harmony with regard to Iran. In his opinion, the price of oil was the essence of current negotiations and US–UK agreement on this subject would be necessary before these negotiations could succeed.

Secretary Acheson said it would be very helpful if Mr. Eden would work on this subject with US officials while he was in Washington. He thought that the bank needed help both on procedure and on substance. He then commented on the conspiratorial manner in which it was necessary to deal with Mosadeq and to the latter’s idiosyncrasies which seem to center largely around his fear that he would be considered in Iran as “having sold out to the West”. Referring to the Iranian situation as a whole, Mr. Acheson expressed the conviction that it was necessary to introduce a new element of substance without delay as the old proposals were now worn out and were discarded automatically by Mosadeq as soon as mentioned.

Mr. Snyder raised the point of how the International Bank would be able to withdraw from its position as a trustee for oil funds under the scheme now being discussed between the bank and the Iranian Government. He said that, while it would be a simple matter for the Bank to accept this responsibility, it might be very difficult for the Bank to withdraw from it.

Mr. Eden made the point that, while the Labor Government had taken the position that it refused to negotiate further with the Iranian Government, the New British Government, on the contrary, has expressed its desire to negotiate. However, if the Iranian Government remains obdurate, there will have to be some change in our approach to the Iranians as has been the case for Egypt.

Mr. Churchill stressed that close US–UK cooperation in the Middle East should “divide the difficulties by ten”.

The President declared that US–UK agreement was necessary for any settlement of Middle Eastern problems.

Mr. Churchill said that the cards had now been laid on the table, that Mr. Eden and Mr. Acheson could proceed privately and perhaps he and the President might discuss the Middle East again, and in particular, the Iranian situation when he returned from Canada next week.

3. Korea

The President opened the discussion by saying that he feared that there had not always been complete understanding on the part of the UK of US policy in Korea and particularly of the US desire to localize the conflict to Korea. He referred to the 1930’s when the US was accused of shirking its responsibilities in the Far East but added that this could not be said now. Thereupon he asked General Bradley to present a picture of the Korean war from the original North Korean attack on June 25, 1950 to the present.

After General Bradley’s briefing Mr. Churchill asked if the armistice talks had had any effect on the conduct of military operations.

General Bradley answered that we were not anxious to proceed beyond the present line and that, in his opinion, the armistice talks had had no effect, either favorable or unfavorable, on the military situation in Korea.

President Truman then referred to South East Asia as a whole. The French were extremely worried about the possibility of a Chinese attack against Indochina after a Korean armistice. They were also worried about Communist moves in the direction of Siam and Burma. The President said that US information generally tended to confirm French fears. Therefore, he was especially anxious that the mutual policies of the US and the UK be in full accord. He said that we could not give up the Far East without a struggle in view of the importance of the area, and assumed the UK felt likewise in view of their interests and those of the Commonwealth in that part of the world. He was sure the UK was just as interested as the US to avoid the over-running of the area by the Communists. While he did not expect that agreement would be reached around this conference table, he thought that the US position should be set forth. He then turned to Secretary Acheson.

Secretary Acheson started by referring to the Vishinsky maneuver which has been going on in the UN in Paris during the past 10 days with a view to transferring the Korean talks to Paris.⁸ That and other things, he said, permits us to guess the next Russian move. Communist stalling in armistice negotiations is obvious. He mentioned a detail which struck the Prime Minister and Mr. Eden: the manner in which the Communist negotiators read newspapers and magazines during the meetings with the UN representatives. (Mr. Eden later urged that these tactics be widely publicized to make it quite clear who is responsible for the lack of progress.) Mr. Acheson then referred to the recently stepped up enemy air activity. There had been heavier fighting, and in particular, not far from the site of the armistice talks. All these things had brought him to believe that the Communists consider that they have obtained all the benefits which they can expect to derive from the current talks with their current terms of reference. Now, before concluding these talks, the Communists want to broaden their scope.

The Soviets doubtless want to extend the talks to the Far East as a whole so as to obtain more out of the current negotiations. Secretary Acheson said the US position was strongly opposed to any such Soviet maneuver and hoped that the US and the UK would “stick together”. The US concept calls for conclusion of the armistice negotiations strictly on a military plane. Only thereafter would a UN group discuss a Korean political settlement with the other side. At such a time the US would have no objection to the inclusion of Communist China or of the USSR. The United States is not optimistic concerning the outcome of such eventual political talks. Both sides would want a Korea unified in their favor and consequently a deadlock was probable. However, even though these talks might only be a formal affair it was most important for us to reaffirm our policy of Korean unity and adhere thereto. He pointed to the sometimes unwelcome statements of President Syngman Rhee on this subject which reflected Korean popular feelings. The Secretary added that the United States was convinced that this popular sentiment in Korea was both deep and widespread.

Mr. Acheson referred to the course of action in Korea should an armistice be breached or should there be no armistice. He prefaced his remark by referring to the conversation on this subject Saturday evening on the Williamsburg, stating that he well knew that the United Kingdom was not in a position to agree now. The matter pertained to the lack of agreement as to what should be the consequences of a breach in the armistice by the Communists. The agreed statement which indicates the grave dangers of the extension of hostilities outside of Korea in this case, as well as if there is no armistice, does not mention the form which this extension of the war could take. The Secretary wanted to reaffirm the United States proposal: bombing operations should be extended beyond Korea but the targets would be military and there was no intention on the part of the United States to bomb Chinese populations; furthermore, the United States would urge that all Chinese imports be cut off and that a UN interdiction be placed on all trade with China. While Chinese rail imports from the USSR are more important to her war effort than her imports by sea, it should however be remembered that the volume of Chinese seaport imports is as great as that of its imports by rail. The Secretary closed by again recognizing that Mr. Churchill and the British representatives would have to discuss the above matter with the British Cabinet.

Mr. Churchill said that while he had always been opposed to deploying UN ground forces beyond the waist of Korea, he would from a military point of view, favor the extension of air force activities beyond Korea “were it not for the political boundary involved.”

Turning to United States policy in regard to China, Secretary Acheson said that around January 1950 the United States had thought it possible to play on Chinese-Russian differences with a view to fomenting a split between these two Communist powers. Now, however, the United States no longer holds this view, this being especially true since the Chinese intervention in the Korean war. This had been discussed with Prime Minister Attlee during his visit to Washington;⁹ likewise with Mr. Morrison in September¹⁰ when it was ascertained that the British Government maintained its earlier viewpoint. This disagreement had led to the mention in the September Communiqué¹¹ of certain differences between the United States and the United Kingdom. Mr. Acheson said that in the view of the United States we must proceed in our relations with China on the basis of specific situations. For example, what should we do in the case of a breach of the armistice? Our actions should be based on such concrete considerations and not on the tenuous and moot consideration of the possibility of splitting China away from the USSR. We must act as we think best in specific cases even at the risk of pushing Communist China towards the Soviets.

Turning to Formosa, Secretary Acheson said that there can be no question of returning Formosa to the Chinese as Formosa is now in the hands of the Chinese. Furthermore, the United States can neither help nor permit the Chinese Communists to seize Formosa and pointed to the difficulties which this would cause throughout the entire Far East. In particular, he mentioned the worry and even the terror which this would cause in the Philippines and in Japan. Mr. Acheson declared the heart of the matter in the Far East was to build up sufficient strength so as to hold Japan on the side of the West. He pointed to the great shift in the world power situation if Japan with its military virtues and industrial capacity went over to the Communist side. While the chances of keeping Japan on the side of the West were not overwhelming, everything had to be done towards this end. That is why the United States had felt as strongly as it had concerning the type of Peace Treaty which was to be signed with Japan.

Referring to the general question of Pacific security, Secretary Acheson said that we would have to continue working closely with Australia and New Zealand on the basis of the treaty signed with these countries.

Turning to Indochina, Secretary Acheson stated that the United States Government had not decided upon its course of action in the case of new developments in the area, such as a Chinese invasion. However, the United States Government was currently giving fullest consideration to this matter and its views would shortly be presented to the President for his consideration. In the meanwhile we had agreed to staff talks with the UK and France concerning the military problems in that part of the world. The West is indeed faced with a dilemma: if we do nothing it would be most unfortunate yet it is most difficult to see how we can do something effective. In any event the western powers must work closely together.

Mr. Acheson added that there was one more thing in relation to China which he wanted to say. He had found in his talks with Messrs. Morrison, Bevin and Attlee that they treated the present fiction of diplomatic relations between Communist China and the United Kingdom as if they were a reality. These diplomatic relations are simply not a fact as the Chinese Government has not recognized the United Kingdom. It would be helpful in our approach to the Far East if the United States and United Kingdom could view such specific matters in the same manner.

Mr. Churchill expressed his admiration for the manner in which the United States was carrying virtually the entire load of the West in the Far East. He paid special tribute to American fortitude in the Korean war which had resulted in 100,000 United States casualties. He recognized the peculiar difficulty of prosecuting such a war when the nation as a whole does not consider itself to be directly threatened. He emphasized the United Kingdom’s desire to help the United States in every way possible and recognized that in the Far East there could be no UK priority or equality of leadership. The role of leader squarely belonged to the United States and the UK will do its utmost to meet US views and requests in relation to that area. In the Prime Minister’s opinion, the President’s decision to resist in Korea had done more than anything else to reverse the tide in our relations with the Soviets in the postwar period. Indeed, he felt that June 25, 1950 marked the turning point in the danger to the free world of Communist aggression, and the United Kingdom was profoundly grateful to the United States for its action. Several times Mr. Churchill asked that the United States tell the United Kingdom what the latter could do in order to be of assistance. He admitted that British diplomatic relations with Communist China were essentially a fiction, as the latter had not recognized Great Britain. He added that had he been in power he would have broken relations with China when the Chinese attacked the UN forces in Korea. However, when he was returned to power the phase of armistice talks had been initiated and he did not think that such a British action would be desirable now because of its possible effect on the negotiations. Referring to Formosa, Mr. Churchill said that it would be “shameful” for the UN to leave the 3–400,000 anti-Communist Chinese to the tender mercy of the Communists. These Nationalist forces on Formosa had been on our side in the Second World War and had fought on our side afterwards. He expressed the most cordial support for the United States in this matter. Referring to a Peace Treaty between Japan and the Nationalist Government in Formosa, he thought this should be discussed by Messrs. Acheson and Eden. However, he personally did not want to see Chiang Kai-shek’s Government recognized as the legitimate government of mainland China. Before closing the Prime Minister again repeated his request that the United States not hesitate to ask the UK for anything which might be of help to the United States in the Far East and reiterated his gratitude for all that the United States had done in that part of the world.

Mr. Eden said that he did not agree with the late British Government’s position concerning China and, in particular, with its belief that a Chinese brand of Titoism could be fostered. He thought it unwise to base a national policy on such a tenuous possibility. He referred to the Vishinsky maneuver in Paris for a four-power conference in order to reach a Korean settlement. Personally, he fully agreed with the United States position set forth at the meeting which he summarized as follows:

1. Armistice talks must be concluded on a strictly military plane;

2. Thereafter, political talks concerning Korea with no exclusives against any country;

3. Only thereafter, could political talks be expanded to cover other Far Eastern matters.

He referred to the current Vishinsky maneuver as important as it appears to be gaining ground and obtaining support from other countries. He thought therefore it was very important to expose with the utmost clarity to the people of the West the Communist stalling tactics in the current armistice talks.

With reference to Southeast Asia, Mr. Eden said he was grateful for the imminent staff talks with the United States and France even though he himself “could not see daylight”.

Mr. Churchill then made the point that an armistice in Korea would doubtless increase the threat against Malaya.

Mr. Eden pointed out that unlike Korea the burden in Southeast Asia fell essentially on the shoulders of the French and the British. He said that he knew the French Government was deeply worried and that while it felt it could hold out indefinitely against the present communist forces in Indochina they could not do so if these were reinforced by Chinese troops.

Mr. Churchill then related the Indochinese and the European situations, pointing out that the French were losing the flower of their army in Indochina and that under these conditions it would be all too easy for the French to fail in producing a good French army in Europe. On the other hand, if the Indochinese drain on France were stopped it should be relatively easy for the French to develop a strong army which in part would of course be within the Europe Army. Likewise with a strong army, the French would be less fearful of permitting the Germans to develop their strength.

Mr. Eden then pointed to the direct relationship between the Southeast Asian situation and the UK’s own situation and made special reference to the impact on the UK’s economy should Malaya be lost.

Secretary Acheson then assured Mr. Churchill that it was not the intention of the United States to press the Japanese Government to sign a treaty with the Chinese Government on Formosa which would recognize the latter’s authority over mainland China.

Mr. Eden raised the question of how it was possible to deal with the Formosan Government without by implication recognizing it as the legal government for all of China.

Mr. Churchill suggested that maybe a temporary arrangement—say for three years—would carry with it fewer such implications.

The President requested Mr. Acheson to have further talks with Mr. Eden on these subjects and said he thought that the positions of both the United Kingdom and the United States were mutually well understood.

The President then suggested the meeting adjourn.

1. The minutes were drafted by Knight on Jan. 9. They are the same in substance as those dictated by David D. Lloyd, Administrative Assistant to the President, which are at the Truman Library, David D. Lloyd files.
2. For documentation on four-power sponsorship of a Middle East Command (MEC), see vol. ix, Part 1, pp. 168 ff.
3. See the memorandum of discussion, Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. iii, Part 1, p. 725.
4. See the record of discussion, Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. v, p. 212.
5. For records of the conversation on the S.S. Williamsburg, Jan. 5, see Documents 329 and 330.
6. Regarding the further discussion of Egypt by Secretary Acheson and Foreign Secretary Eden, see Document 347.
7. Documentation on the correspondence between Prime Minister Mosadeq and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development concerning the settlement of the Anglo-Iranian oil controversy is scheduled for publication in volume x.
8. Reference is to the efforts of the Soviet Union to move the Korean Armistice talks to Paris.
9. For documentation on the Truman–Attlee conversations, held in Washington Dec. 4–8, 1950, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iii, pp. 1698 ff.
10. For documentation on the meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, held at Washington, Sept. 10–14, 1951, see ibid., 1951, vol. iii, pp. 1163 ff.
11. For the text of this communiqué, see ibid., p. 1306.