611.41/1–1052

No. 330
Notes by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bradley) of a Dinner Meeting Aboard the S. S. “Williamsburg” on the Evening of January 5, 19521
top secret
eyes only

Present were:

  • The President, Mr. Churchill, Mr. Eden, Mr. Acheson, Mr. Lovett, Mr. Snyder, Mr. Harriman, Ambassador Franks, Ambassador Gifford, Lord Ismay, Lord Cherwell, and General Bradley.

The President opened the meeting by calling upon Mr. Churchill. Mr. Churchill stated he felt that Russia feared our friendship more than they did our enmity; that this might be changed if we grow strong enough so that they would fear our enmity more than they do at the present time. In fact, he felt that the danger was less now than it was at the time of the Berlin Airlift.2 He emphasized the importance of the decision which the President took in the Korean matter. Not only was this action a definite one toward stopping aggression, but the big thing was that it had led to a rearmament of the United States and, in fact, all the freedom-loving countries, and this rearmament, if continued and vigorously carried out, would place the Western Powers in such a position that Russia would hesitate to attack and thus it would increase the chances of peace. Mr. Churchill emphasized that on this occasion and on later occasions, great importance be placed on the decision made by Mr. Truman in interceding in Korea.

He next discussed the question of China and expressed the belief that China was not permanently communist. He felt that in a number of years (he did not express how many) China would not take all its orders from Russia.

As to the Middle East, Mr. Churchill stated that in his belief had this group sat around a table a year ago, the Iranian troubles could not have happened as they did, and neither could the Egyptian problem, which he called a “bastard child of the Iranian situation.” He felt that if the UK and the US had had the same policy toward the Iranian problem and could have worked together, Iran would not have dared take the action she did. He felt that when the two countries did not offer a unified front, it made it very difficult to deal with the Middle East countries.

[Page 741]

Mr. Churchill closed with the general statement that he hoped our two countries could work together, and, if we did, things would fall into place.

The President them turned to Mr. Acheson who started out by saying that he liked the views of the British on certain points but he agreed that one of the principal troubles is fear in the Kremlin.

Mr. Acheson then stated that in his opinion there were three very important problems which should be solved in the next 40 days. The first was a matter of the European Community. One way the UK could help would be by speaking to the Benelux countries and encourage them to participate. The second big problem was to determine the German participation in the defense of Western Europe and particularly to settle the question of German production of war materials without placing too many restrictions on such production. And third, action on the TCC Report. Mr. Acheson expressed the hope that while he realized the UK could not now join in a European Community, they encourage it the way we had done even though we could not participate actively either.

As to the Middle East, Mr. Acheson felt that the situation was made to order for the Kremlin. He thinks we must try to solve the question as to just what could be done to deflect the situation from what it is now; that is, being so favorable to the spread of communism. He felt it was not enough to stand firm in the matter, but that something is missing—that is, something new must be injected into the solution rather than just standing firm on the matter of staying there.

As to the Far East, Mr. Acheson felt that the future policy on China would have to depend on what China is going to do. She could not arrive at a decision yet. He felt that we were either going to have to decide that Southeast Asia is not worth fighting for, or decide how we are going to fight for it. He felt that this problem should receive great attention from both governments.

The President then called upon Mr. Eden. Mr. Eden stated the belief that the Benelux countries, Belgium in particular, were held back in joining the European Community because of their fear that this European Community and the European Defense Force would replace the NATO Organization. He felt that, if they could be assured that NATO would go on and that this was just a part of the NATO Organization, these countries would join the European Community.

Mr. Eden then expressed the view that we would never solve the Middle Eastern problem until we had solved the problem of Arab refugees. He, therefore, considered this was one of the first problems we must undertake to solve. He felt that the best way to solve it was to set up a Middle East Command so that we would have an [Page 742] organization to carry on the solution of the problem. In other words, this could best be solved under a unified command.

As to Southeast Asia, Mr. Eden expressed the idea that we must both decide what help, if any, could be given in the various areas. It was his opinion that the French could hold in Indo-China unless China comes into the conflict.

The President then called in turn upon the other persons present at the table. I did not make notes of their remarks.

Secretary Lovett discussed briefly the effort which we had been putting forth in Korea and its effect upon our rearmament program and on our Military Aid Program.

  1. For Secretary Acheson’s account of this meeting, see the memorandum, supra.
  2. For documentation on the diplomacy of the Berlin Airlift, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. ii, pp. 867 ff. and ibid., 1949, vol. iii, pp. 643 ff.