Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 2

740.5/9–2254: Telegram

The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Hughes) to the Department of State ¹

secret
priority

Paris, September 22, 1954—10 p.m.

Polto 483. Reftel Topol 325, September 19.²

A. General Considerations

1. Question assigned to USRO in reftel has been discussed with Gruenther, Norstad and Schuyler of SHAPE, Freeman of EUCOM, Dillon and Achilles of Embassy, Bruce, Wood and Martin in USRO. This telegram and one which follows it on French proposals are largely based on these discussions. It has not been possible in time available to seek concurrence of all parties to specific language of this message. However, most of them have read and commented on it in draft and do not have major objections to broad lines of position taken though they might question individual details or emphasis.

2. It seems hardly fruitful exercise to attempt to forecast with any precision what Mendes will buy, how vigorously, if bought, he will try to sell Parliament, or what French Parliament will buy. Consequently, should relegate to strictly secondary place in development of US position, particularly initial position, nose-counting of French Parliamentarians. While not disregarding saleability in France, primary considerations should be:

a. Clarity and simplicity;

b. Positive contribution to short-term and long-term effectiveness of NATO, particularly in its military aspects;

c. Acceptability to OSR allies, particularly Britain, Germany, Benelux and Italy;

d. Keeping door wide open to and encouraging as rapid development as Europeans can agree to make toward closer unity among them, and in particular toward France-German rapprochement, taking into account set-back caused by failure of France to ratify EDC.

3. Given fact that further sponsorship of EDC is not currently practical, program sketched in broad outline in Polto 35, September 3,³ and spelled out in documents dated September 10,⁴ referred to in Topol 325, seems to us in general to meet most adequately these requirements. Believe should adopt position which can be enthusiastically defended on its own merits and which can appeal to real supporters of Atlantic alliance and what it stands for, rather than to risk failure on behalf of some compromise which few really like. Believe this program has valid selling points if there is will to use them.

B. Procedural

4. Consider it important that US be in position to present at least broad outlines of its proposed solution to countries invited to nine-power meeting as soon as possible, preferably before Foreign Ministers leave for London so can discuss alternatives which will be on table with other Cabinet members. Foresee serious difficulties in securing successful conclusion of what is already difficult operation if at least some of this kind of preliminary discussion cannot take place.

5. Permanent representatives of NATO countries not to be represented in London feel strongly importance their countries being informed London developments. Statements this subject made at closed session this morning contained separate message.⁵ Recommend that should agree at nine-power meeting to full briefing of Permanent Council immediately at close of meeting. Urge also that comments be invited on programs for working groups and that working groups themselves function in Paris, utilizing services of NATO IS.

C. Substance

6. Remainder this message will comment on position proposed in document of September 10, especially paras 2, 3, and 4 of Appendix C. Assume Bonn handling para 1. Do not suggest that details discussed this message would be acted upon or even discussed formally at forthcoming London meeting. However, believe it important in making final decision as to principles of US position as well as to insure that in negotiations at London there is real understanding of what agreed principles mean in practice. That US know in some detail how each specific proposal could be carried out.

7. See no special problems directly related para 2 of proposed resolution as German membership in NATO can clearly be handled through regular procedure provided in Article 10 of Treaty. However, problem does arise of situation in case of German unification, particularly in light statements made by Western Powers at recent Berlin conference. Separate message will be sent on this point.⁶

8. Specific proposals for carrying out those parts of para 3 which deal with extension of NATO authority over logistics and supply and further integration of NATO forces will be contained in response to Todef [ Defto?] 96.⁷ Would suggest, however, that should be some help to French in accepting NATO rather than Brussels solution to many of their problems if US prepared to participate on equal basis with Europeans in steps to be taken along these lines in Europe. Believe sufficient possibility exists that we could do so without real damage to US interest that this should receive careful study. Such steps by US would also be welcomed by NATO countries generally as important recognition by US of role as equal partner.

9. Response to Defto 96 will also deal in some detail with strengthening controls over deployment, assignment and level of forces. In general, believe protocol to treaty requiring forces be assigned NATO, with certain exceptions, based on items of UK document 6, is appropriate and essential to effectiveness other measures. Should be supplemented by ministerial resolution providing that cutbacks in assignments or agreed force goals be made only after opportunity for formal council discussion of AR character and that proposed increases in assignments not previously provided by agreed force goals or proposed increases in force goals outside AR procedure be submitted to council and implemented only if no objections raised. Believe deployment of forces assigned SACEUR should be made subject to his concurrence approval, redeployments within his area be made only with his concurrence, and, if militarily significant, approval of Council. Such redeployments might bear on possible need for invocation Articles 4 and 5 of treaty and justify political discussion temporary redeployment outside his territory, presumably to meet emergency situations, should be notified to him but because of possible covert character such operations, reported to and discussed in Council only at time agreed between NATO military authorities and country concerned. Believe these arrangements would protect US freedom to reduce force commitments in Europe or to redeploy temporarily forces located in Europe without impairing effective control sought by France over German buildup and use of forces. Moreover they represent a strengthening of NATO which is desirable per se. (In addition to above on assigned forces, there is special problem of earmarked forces.)

10. As indicated earlier, believe actions taken at this time in connection with alternatives to EDC should not be of such character as to foreclose or hamper early and significant development among Europeans of further supranational institutions along lines designed particularly to improve France-German relations. Believe essential that nine-power meeting and NATO ministerial meeting encourage moves in this direction. However, do not believe US should expect positive decisions as to specific steps to be agreed immediately as part of general arrangements now being worked out. Believe it will take longer for participating countries to develop and sell steps which would have real long-range significance and should not delay agreement on other matters for this purpose. As tactical matter, urge that US maintain position of supporting European initiative in this field along lines para 4 of app C but not take lead at London.

11. While see no basic objection to efforts by continent to develop arms pool idea, and therefore to US support of any initiative they may wish to take in this connection, consider IL represents exceedingly difficult negotiating and operational problem, particularly outside EDC framework, with not much prospect of positive benefits in near future and some chance of causing serious delay in German ability to initiate arms production for her forces. Therefore would not press for it.

12. As additional point to program in ref document, believe original UK proposal, as we understood it, that Germany and Italy be brought into Brussels Pact and thereby realize benefit of UK automatic guarantee to come to their aid in case of attack, is unobjectionable and may be useful to France as symbol of greater UK participation on continent. Therefore, believe it might be added to program described above.

13. Do not gather that question of extension of NATO to 50 years is particularly lively issue at present.

14. Assume we may wish do something about new US statement on maintenance of forces in Europe, but doubt if anything we can in fact say at this point, with rejection of EDC behind us could have important impact on informed opinion.

15. Have no strong feelings about proposal which understand both British and French endorse for establishment strategic zones in which certain types armaments would not be produced. Consider it somewhat unrealistic from military standpoint and may raise enforcement problems. However, anything Germans could accept we should probably accept. If done would be feasible and would think better from German standpoint to do it in NATO rather than Brussels Pact.

16. There has been much talk recently of need to provide control and inspection mechanisms to insure that decisions provided for in various proposed programs are in fact carried out in detail by individual countries. Believe that analogy drawn to situation in Germany in 20’s is essentially false. In terms of arrangement which includes German participation in NATO and integration of German forces into NATO forces with multiplicity of channels for exchange of information, filling out of questionnaires, etc., with the stationing of Allied forces on German soil, with close scrutiny of German economic activities through OEEC and other current mechanisms and with current status of military technology, it seems to us that danger of covert German violation is negligible one. This result, however, only if all German forces are required to be assigned to NATO. No doubt does represent political factor which above explanation cannot fully deal with. Perhaps could be dealt with as political factor by NATO ministerial resolution directing international staff in cooperation with NATO military authorities to take necessary steps to enable it to report to Council on actions being taken by countries in carrying out NATO decisions in these fields. Extent to which this would be implemented by special administrative arrangements would be left for future decision. Particularly important that NATO military not be given inspection functions in production field. Should point out that it now has inspection role in connection with infrastructure, with both inspection teams visiting construction sites and board of auditors making detailed review of national infrastructure financial operations.

Hughes

1. Transmitted to the Department of State in two sections and repeated to Bonn for Conant and London for Aldrich.
2. Not printed; it instructed USRO that it had the major responsibility for coordinating U.S. preparations for the London Conference on those matters relating to German membership in NATO (740.5/9–1954).
3. Not printed; it contained the views of USRO concerning Document 6 of the London Study Group as it had been reexamined in light of the present situation. (740.5/9–354) For the text of Document 6, which was attached to the Report of the London Study Group, July 12, see p. 1013.
4. Presumably this is a reference to an early draft of document NPT D–8 of Sept. 27 entitled “Outline of Actions Required to Accomplish Immediate U.S. Objectives in Europe”; a copy of NPT D–8 is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 363. The drafts of Sept. 10 were not found in Department of State files.
5. This is a reference to telegram Polto 475 from Paris, Sept. 22, supra.
6. The editors were unable to further identify this message.
7. Not found in Department of State files.