Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 2

S/P–NSC files, lot 62 D 1, NSC 5433 series

Draft Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security Council¹

secret
NSC 5433

Washington, September 16, 1954.

Immediate U.S. Policy Toward Europe

scope of this paper

1. In view of the French rejection of EDC, the U.S. is faced with a choice between:

a. Continuing to pursue its present objectives in Europe by means other than EDC; or

b. On the assumption that continued pursuit of all these objectives is no longer feasible, determining what objectives should then be pursued.

2. It is recommended that the U.S. for the immediate future make further vigorous efforts to achieve the present objectives set forth below. Accordingly, this paper sets forth a program of action based on par. 1–a above. The paper also sets forth in par. 11 below certain questions the answers to which may assist in making the determination under 1–b above, if that proves necessary.

present objectives

3. Despite French rejection of EDC, the security of the U.S. continues to require the preservation and development of Western Europe (including the UK) as an area of strength allied to the U.S. Accordingly, the U.S. should continue to pursue the following objectives:

a. In the cold war, to prevent further extension of Soviet control in Europe and to retain the major Western European nations as allies.

b. To provide for the effective defense of Western Europe (even though in the event of general war retention of that area may not be indispensable to U.S. survival and ultimate victory), by maintaining and strengthening the NATO security system, inclusive of West Germany, as a deterrent to Soviet aggression designed to provide the most suitable defense of NATO territory.

c. To build the requisite strength and stability in Western Europe on the basis of (1) the combined efforts of the principal nations there and (2) steady progress toward integration on the continent.

d. To assure the orientation of the German Federal Republic (and ultimately a united Germany) to the West by all feasible means, including institutional ties as well as treaty arrangements.

program of action

4. Seek promptly to associate the German Federal Republic with the West by:

a. Restoration to the German Federal Republic of its sovereignty, including the right to participate in the defense of Western Europe without restrictions unacceptable to the Germans as discriminatory or arbitrarily imposed. This step would require agreements regarding allied rights respecting Berlin, the unification of Germany, stationing of allied forces in Germany, and other issues resulting from the war and occupation.

b. Admission of the German Federal Republic to full membership in NATO, without precluding German participation also in the Brussels Pact or other European defense arrangements.

c. Obtaining acceptable safeguards as to German rearmament. Such safeguards might include:

(1) Voluntary acceptance by Germany of limits on its initial build-up of forces;

(2) Regulations or restrictions on the production of certain types of weapons, possibly through designation of “exposed areas” or through a European arms pool;

(3) Agreement among NATO members to commit forces to NATO, under a non-discriminatory formula so designed as to include all German forces (except internal security forces);

(4) Further integration of the NATO command structure and logistics system, by protocol or administrative reform;

(5) Strengthening the authority of SACEUR regarding deployment of forces committed to him;

(6) German assurances against any attempt to modify existing frontiers by force.

d. Continuing to seek eventual German reunification on the basis of freedom and the maximum possibility of association with the West.

5. Seek to reverse divisive trends in Western Europe by developing political and economic strength and cohesion which will enhance the European capacity and will to resist Communist subversion and neutralism. Under present conditions, Soviet military aggression against Western Europe does not appear to be imminent and major Soviet efforts are devoted to dividing and weakening the Western alliance.

6. Foster all practical measures for a greater degree of integration of Western Europe, emphasizing political and economic aspects at this stage and encouraging European initiative and responsibility so far as consistent with U.S. objectives. Specifically, encourage closer ties between France and Germany and the greatest feasible degree of UK association with its continental allies.

7. Continue to seek the strengthening of NATO in a manner which places primary emphasis on its deterrent effect, with due regard for political and economic capabilities and for psychological factors. For this purpose we should seek the full exploitation of developing nuclear capabilities and a generally understood and accepted strategy for forward defense of the NATO area.

8. Be prepared, subject to consultation with legislative leaders of both parties and to appropriate legislative authority, to commit the U.S. to some or all of the following, only if necessary as a quid pro quo for commitments on the part of European nations (including the UK) necessary for the carrying out of the above program of action:

a. Maintain forces in Europe over a substantial period.

b. Accept increased NATO authority over such forces as it assigns to NATO, to the extent necessary to provide acceptable safeguards as to German rearmament.

c. Agree to an extension of the duration of NATO for a reasonable period.

d. Continue to aid NATO countries to improve their forces and share nuclear information with them.

e. [Transfer nuclear weapons to its NATO allies.]^*

f. Channel its military aid through any European arms pool in order to enhance the pool’s authority.

g. Continue efforts to obtain U.S. objectives for the development of a sound, expanding and increasingly integrated European economy through such measures as off-shore procurement, technical assistance, and adaptation of its foreign economic policies with respect to trade, convertibility, payments, etc.

Paragraph 9 has been deleted.

10. Seek to induce France to cooperate in achieving this program of action. For this purpose, attempt to convince France (e.g., by slowing down U.S. aid to France, by letting France become aware of joint U.S.–UK military review of the possibility of alternative strategic groupings excluding France) that her rejection of such a program will present her with alternatives far less attractive to France. As a tactical matter, we should act without French approval or cooperation (leaving to France opportunity later to cooperate) [if such action appears likely]^† [because such action is most likely]^‡ to induce ultimate French acceptance of the program and not to jeopardize attainment of our objectives. If it appears that French reactions will defeat one or more of our objectives, our policy should be governed by the results of the reappraisal contemplated in par. 11.

reappraisal of basic objectives

State Proposal

JCS Proposal

11. The Secretary of State should report to the Council not later than October 28, 1954, whether in his opinion the foregoing program of action can be carried through successfully. In the event that the Council at that time believes that the above program of action no longer appears attainable, the Council should then be prepared to determine what objectives the U.S. should pursue in the light of conditions then existing and the answers to the following questions:

11. If within a reasonable period (approximately 30 days) it becomes evident that the foregoing program of action cannot be carried through successfully, the U.S. should act nevertheless to obtain the following three goals required for U.S. security: German sovereignty, German rearmament, and retention of a West Germany oriented toward the West. If achievement of these goals must be accomplished without the cooperation of France and/or other major allies, due consideration must be given to the following questions in the development of U.S. action:

a. Assuming our continued purpose to maintain (1) an effective deterrent to Soviet aggression and (2) the means for effective defense of the United States and areas vital to it, could a feasible strategy be devised for the defense of Western Europe:

(a) Without German participation?

(b) Without French participation?

(c) Without the participation of both France and Germany?

What basic changes in U.S. military dispositions and commitment of resources would be required to carry out each strategy?

b. If the U.S., with or without the UK, should proceed with the rearming of Germany over a French veto, what would be the ultimate effect on (1) France, (2) Germany and (3) European stability and vulnerability in the cold war?

c. How would the political and economic integration of Europe be affected by French refusal to participate therein?

d. What is the likely course of UK policy over the next few years with respect to European integration and German rearmament?

e. What would be the political effect in the German Federal Republic and on the future orientation of Germany, if the raising of forces in a sovereign German Federal Republic were postponed for a substantial time with or without German admission to NATO?

f. If Germany were unified and neutralized with restricted armed forces, what would be the probable course of its policy, and the effect on its vulnerability in the cold war and on the stability of Western Europe?

g. To what extent should the U.S. require formal agreements permitting the immediate use of nuclear weapons by the NATO command in the event of aggression? To what extent would pressing for such formal agreements seriously impair allied cooperation or the prospects for successfully carrying out the agreed strategy?

1. According to a covering note by National Security Council Executive Secretary Lay, the source text was prepared by the NSC Planning Board and was circulated to NSC members for consideration by the Council at its meeting on Sept. 24. Attached to the source text and not printed here, in addition to Lay’s note, are a cover sheet, table of contents, and two annexes (extracts from the Brussels Pact of Mar. 17, 1948, and from the North Atlantic Treaty of Apr. 4, 1949).

   For a record of the NSC meeting of Sept. 24 at which the source text was considered, see p. 1263. For the text of the amended version of this statement of policy approved at the Council meeting on Sept. 24 and subsequently circulated as NSC 5433/1, see p. 1268.

2. Defense and JCS propose deletion. [Footnote and brackets in the source text.]
3. Proposed by Defense. [Footnote and brackets in the source text.]
4. Proposed by State. [Footnote and brackets in the source text.]