740.5/9–1654: Telegram
The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Department of State 1
1071. Following is composite report on Eden visit to Rome including substance my talk with Piccioni September 16:
Italian position on post-EDC situation which was agreed on by Scelba and Piccioni September 13 was as follows:
- 1.
- Italy faithfully and strongly adhered to principle of European integration which is keystone Italian European policy and it was highly important to find adequate alternative to EDC in integration framework.
- 2.
- German rearmament should be brought about with adequate safeguards and controls and this could probably best be handled by German admission to NATO.
- 3.
- Concrete means must be found to eliminate fear which French, and to lesser extent British, have regarding prospect of being dragged into another world war over German unification question. Italy did not believe French feared German rearmament as such, but linked question with possibility another world war.
- 4.
- Italy believed existing European bodies such as CSC OEEC and Council of Europe should be strengthened as part of eventual process leading to political integration.
Eden believes that interested European countries should agree on three substantive and procedural points:
- 1.
- Termination of occupation regime but with special provision for Berlin situation and immediate restoration of German sovereignty. Italians expressed full agreement with this point which they believed has great merit.
- 2.
- German contribution to Western defense must be provided within framework of such limitations and conditions as Germany might accept along line of those foreseen in EDC treaty. Important that limitations should be freely given by Germany and should not be discriminatory measures.
- 3.
- Necessary find formula to remove vacuum created by EDC failure. Eden thought best way would be revive 1948 Brussels Treaty, to provide for entry Germany and Italy, to modify it in such way as to give new direction to a Western European unity and to remove present obvious contradictions. Eden indicated that Benelux countries and [Page 1204] Adenauer had expressed general agreement this idea and considered that Brussels Treaty would provide way toward new undertakings between UK and six former EDC countries. Regarding military aspect Eden thought that NATO offered best means to provide close military association herewith Western Europe and to make possible adequate controls and limitations on German rearmament. Eden said he envisaged simultaneous German entry into Brussels Treaty and NATO, but was evasive in answering Italian questions as to what he meant by simultaneous. Italians consequently wonder whether Brussels Treaty device might in fact lead to long delays in connection with German rearmament. On other hand, Piccioni told me that Italy had accepted idea of Brussels Treaty as uninitiative which “did no harm”.
Eden said that key to situation lay in Paris and he hoped that if Paris would agree with his plan other countries such as Norway and Denmark might give their adherence to Brussels Treaty. Eden indicated he was not as optimistic as Adenauer regarding French attitude since unfortunately French Parliament was too ready to find negative rather than positive majority. In reply to Piccioni’s questions as to what would happen if French did not agree to building up of Brussels Treaty as EDC substitute and providing for German admission into NATO, Eden said that best way perhaps would be for five former EDC countries and UK to proceed on their own but leaving door open for possible future French participation. Eden indicated that Adenauer shared his view.
Eden told Piccioni he was in close touch with Washington and was keeping Secretary Dulles advised of his soundings on this trip. He emphasized that Europe must not make mistake of believing US patience is endless and must not fall into trap of thinking that Europe is indispensable to US. Eden stressed that every effort must be made to avert possible American abandonment of Europe. Eden said he hoped that his talks in Paris would make it possible to call eight or nine power conference in London before end of September. Piccioni made point that it would be serious error to repeat Brussels conference mistake and hoped adequate advance preparations could be made to establish basis for discussions. Eden replied that he hoped French attitude would make conference possible and said he thought such conference would be useful to examine Brussels Treaty modifications and revisions. He emphasized that London conference would be only prelude to important future NAC meeting.
Italians appeared to be particularly impressed by British stress on their intention to participate fully with other Western European nations in any alternatives to EDC. In final communiqué (Embdes 516, September 162) British had insisted on use stronger Italian language to emphasize their sharing in European situation.
[Page 1205]Piccioni asked me what US attitude was regarding present post-EDC situation. I told Piccioni that US position not yet definitive and referred him to Secretary Dulles statement of August 31 as representing basic US position.
Comment:
I believe that the Italians are genuinely pleased by Eden visit to Rome since it is useful public expression of important Italian role in continental developments. Italians are also willing to agree to almost anything which will bring about German contribution to Western defense. They frankly do not believe Eden will get very far in Paris with his plan but certainly wish him well and have authorized him to tell Mendes that British and Italian positions are in effect identical. Privately Italians are suspicious of British moves and one senior Foreign Office official has even gone so far as to suggest British are purposely procrastinating on German rearmament in effort to regain initiative in European politics. It is clear that Italians do not know what Mendes-France wants and they do not see how Brussels Treaty–NATO solution can offer acceptable way out to French. However, Italians have no proposals of their own to offer.