740.5/9–1454: Telegram
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State
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757. Limit distribution. Regarding my 755.1 In conversation after dinner last night with Hallstein and Blankenhorn, it quickly became evident that Germans did not in fact expect French to accept NATO solution. Hallstein argued, however, that such solution must be tried out, since British had proposed it, most other powers favored it to greater or less degree, and only method by which it could be eliminated as alternative to EDC was through French rejection.
Hallstein then outlined “third solution” which he said he had discussed briefly with Chancellor, but to which latter had not yet given his approval (although he had reason to believe Adenauer had previously been thinking along same lines). On assumption that French would reject NATO solution, or as seemed more likely, attempt to delay decision on German rearmament, he thought only way out was security agreement between Germany and US and UK modeled on Balkan Pact, which would give Germany somewhat the same indirect relation to NATO as that enjoyed by Yugoslavia by reason of its association with Greece and Turkey. French and, of course, Benelux countries would be invited to join, and door would remain open for French participation at any time. Should French not accept to join in such an arrangement, their position would become all the more isolated and this in turn would bring internal changes which might in the end serve the cause of European unity. He added that it would help if the French got wind of the fact that something along this line was brewing.
At same time, Hallstein did not exclude possibility that, faced with decision of US and UK, to proceed without them, French might return to modified EDC as best solution. He quoted Spaak as saying that if the French were faced with a solution involving German membership in NATO they might well be willing to renegotiate EDC. Spaak had in mind at one time, he said, possibility of calling conference for this [Page 1187] purpose, if NATO solution were rejected by French Assembly, with understanding that agreement must be reached in ninety days, and new solution presented to French Assembly as soon as agreement concluded.
Hallstein expressed opinion that if French reject NATO solution, Benelux countries and Italy would favor arrangement which excluded France if necessary, and added it would be helpful if British “saw it that way.” He hopes, in fact, that Eden will give French hint of this possibility. Asked in an aside whether this “third solution” had been raised with British, Blankenhorn said it had been mentioned cautiously; Eden had confined himself to commenting on how terrible predicament would be if French reject NATO solution, but Roberts had intimated British would then be prepared to proceed without French.
Reverting to NATO solution as discussed with Chancellor, Murphy asked if Germans believed French would be willing to end occupation status merely on basis NATO conference agreement in principle. I reminded Hallstein that Mendes-France had given French Assembly commitment to consult it before restoration of German sovereignty. Hallstein admitted this was problematical, but professed to believe that if US and UK were prepared to act, French would come along. He then referred to disappointing election results in Schleswig Holstein, to fact elections in Hesse were scheduled for November, with possibility of further weakening of Chancellor’s position, and stressed urgent need for some sort of success for Chancellor. He said early end of occupation status (with Western troops, of course, retaining their present rights until forces convention concluded) was vital. In spite of considerable discussion on this point German proposal remained far from clear to me. Hallstein and Blankenhorn agreed Adenauer’s position was safe for some months, possibly six, if there were some encouraging developments in meantime, but both felt that situation was already deteriorating.
I led the conversation into discussion of possibility that Mendes-France’s rejection of reasonable NATO scheme might bring about his downfall. Hallstein and Blankenhorn agreed this would be most desirable. As subsequent French Government would undoubtedly take more moderate view German rearmament, but viewed it as improbable. It appears they are not counting on any change of government in France, which seems to be a reversal of Chancellor’s implied position of a week ago.
In conclusion Hallstein raised question of US policy in event present British initiative failed owing to intransigence of Mendes-France or [Page 1188] rejection by French Assembly. He argued that it seemed not unlikely French could be brought to take decision only if they were made aware of alternative which faced them by reason of their rejection or postponement of decision and urged that we find some way to let them know what cost would be of further inaction.