Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 2

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 359

Foreign Secretary Eden to the Secretary of State

secret

[London, September 13, 1954.]

[Dear Foster:] I have been much encouraged by meetings in Brussels and Bonn. The Benelux Ministers and the Chancellor warmly welcomed our ideas. They considered that they provided the right basis for solving the double problem of German association with the West and of a German defence contribution.

2. I explained that our thought was to solve the latter problem by bringing Germany into NATO with such safeguards as could be agreed on a non-discriminatory basis. I found the Chancellor ready to do his best to provide as effective safeguards as possible. Our Benelux friends also have some useful ideas to supplement our own. I think we now have the foundation for a practical plan which our experts in NATO could work out quickly with German participation.

3. I found that the Chancellor agreed with us in attaching even greater importance to the political problem of ensuring German association with the West through the maintenance in another form of the European conception. We have tried to work out a formula which would enable the United Kingdom to participate equally with France and Germany. We hope we have found it in the extension and adaptation of the Brussels Treaty Organisation with its automatic guarantees of assistance and machinery for political consultation to include Germany and Italy. All this should be within NATO and avoid dangerous duplication of our NATO defence system. Adenauer, Spaak, Beyen and Bech were delighted with this idea and think it should appeal to the French as well as to the Italians.

4. I also had useful talks with the Chancellor on the best way to restore German sovereignty quickly without leaving a legal vacuum, in regard to the many important issues covered by the Bonn Conventions, while preserving the essential Allied rights over Berlin and all-German questions and ensuring that the vital interests of Allied troops in Germany are met. I made it clear, however, that all this would have to be discussed in a wider circle with you and the French.

5. The upshot was that Adenauer is now fully satisfied that basis exists for a successful conference at an early date preparatory to a NATO ministerial meeting in October. We both thought that the smaller group is essential to discuss the Brussels Treaty idea, but all these questions are so interlocked that we cannot hope to make real progress without you. If all goes well in Rome and Paris, a nine power meeting might be held in London next week—say about Sept. 22nd. The Benelux ministers would I know welcome this and I hope very much that you will also agree. I think it would be very helpful if you could come to London a day or two sooner so that we can clear our own thinking together before going into the wider meeting.

6. While all has so far gone better than I could have hoped, Paris may well prove very difficult, although the Chancellor himself was surprisingly optimistic about probable French reactions. We can make no firm timetable until I have seen Mendes-France and I am sure you will realize the importance of keeping this message within a very small circle until I can send you a further message after seeing Mendes-France. I shall also be seeing the NATO permanent representatives in Paris and will I hope be able to remove any misconception that we are short-circuiting NATO. I am sure we must proceed with vigour and a sense of urgency and I look to your good counsel and powerful help.

Kindest regards,

Anthony