740.5/2–152: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Department of State 1
priority
4645. Eyes only for the Secretary. I believe it would be better to postpone a formal reply to letter from Schuman to you forwarded in Embtel 4583, Jan 30.2 An acknowledgment telling Schuman you would prefer to discuss questions with Eden and himself privately in London wld seem to be safest course to follow.
Schuman’s unfortunate ltr was approved by French Cabinet and thus represents an official statement. As we disagree with parts of French position and reasoning a reply at this time might provoke a postponement of French debate on EDC or provide an excuse for certain parliamentary leaders to oppose EDC. A reply might also freeze French position. French and German Govts will both need considerable flexibility to reach agreement on major polit differences relating to FedRep’s new status and defense contribution. In this regard the political behavior in Paris and Bonn on the Saar and NATO issues in past week has been most unfortunate. EDF conference steering comite is reconvening today3 and may give us indication of reaction of both govts to recent developments.
Underlying Schuman letter is complex of French fears of resurgence of Germany that continues to dominate French foreign policy and deeply influences domestic politics. This complex is composed of many elements including: Uncertainty as to impact on European community of peace treaty and Ger unity. Apprehension that Germany will dominate even formative state of European community because US pressure and aid will go for rapid build-up of German contingents for defense on continent while best French contingents are kept engaged in commitments outside Europe especially in Indochina; possibility that US will play less active role in Europe as relative strength of our forces stationed on continent declines; and in particular fear that, regardless of incorporation of armed forces in EDC, German irredentism may, when it suits national designs, cause secession from EDC and a German national force may drag France and other nations into war in the East.
These French fears are nothing new; they have their roots deep in the nation’s consciousness; they lead to recurring second thoughts [Page 13] on policy of integrating Germany into Europe on basis of equality; they force French political leaders, if only to provide answers to opposition in Parliament, to advocate continuance of restrictions in Germany.
Devices proposed in Schuman letter represent a combined effort both by those who believe basically that EDC policy is only realistic one but want assurances to give French Parliament, and by those who do not believe in EDC, the latter having more influence than previously because of recent flap over Saar,4 etc.
I believe we should consider what further action US and UK might take to meet the legitimate concern for the future held by France and Benelux countries. A step in this direction might be to offer not only for French but other EDC member states, some of whom are fearful of German strength, others of French weakness or of both, an assurance that the US and UK wld restrain an attempt by any EDC states to secede and will not permit Germany without specifically mentioning her to obtain right and powers to engage in a national warlike enterprise. Perhaps this might be done through an engagement by NATO in connection with the NATO-EDC relationship to counter with force, if necessary, any such move. No doubt there are other ways in which such assurances might be given without discrimination against Germany. I believe present FedRep govt might also welcome something of this sort. If we cld consider such action, there should be an immediate effort to bring all the related questions together. US and UK guarantees against unilateral military ventures. Saar, EDC-NATO, Germany-NATO, security controls, German financial contribution, French defense budget and program and possibly Dutch apprehensions about end-item deliveries for review and settlement first among ourselves and then with UK, France and Germany.
- Repeated for information to London (eyes only Gilford and Spofford) and Bonn (eyes only McCloy). The source text indicates that 11 copies were made of this message in the Department of State, including at least one copy for S/S.↩
- Reference is to Schuman’s message of Jan. 29 to Acheson, p. 7.↩
- The Steering Committee of the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community had suspended meetings during the time the Foreign Ministers of the six powers participating in the Conference held meetings in Paris, Jan. 26 and 27. For documentation on these meetings and the resumed sessions of the Steering Committee, see pp. 579 ff.↩
- Regarding the “Saar flap” referred to here, see footnote 3, p. 9.↩