740.5/3–452

Memorandum of Conversation, by Special Assistant Xanthaky 1
top secret

The Secretary of State called on Dr. Salazar on February 22nd at the Sao Bento Palace. He was accompanied by Ambassador MacVeagh and Theo. A. Xanthaky who acted as interpreter. Mr. Acheson expressed to Dr. Salazar the warm appreciation of President Truman, as well as his own, for the friendly cooperation and understanding which the Portuguese Government had shown in the recent Azores negotiations. The Secretary also thanked and congratulated the Prime Minister for the hospitality and splendid facilities which the Portuguese Government had made available to the NATO conference and which were contributing so much to the success of the meeting. Dr. Salazar replied that Portugal was anxious to do her full share in all matters pertaining to NATO and that the Azores represented an important link in our mutual defense system. He then inquired whether the Secretary thought that an attack on the West by Russia was imminent. The Secretary said he did not believe that the Soviets would precipitate an all-out assault as their governmental set-up was not conducive to such action. The Secretary added, however, he believed that such peripheral disturbances, always at the expense of others, as in Korea and Indo-China, would continue to be fostered by the U.S.S.R. The Secretary mentioned that as our strength increased we had to contend with certain sectors of American public opinion which [Page 130] are taking the line that if the Russians are going to attack us eventually, why not attack them first: the so-called preventive war philosophy. On the other hand, as far as the Government is concerned, for obvious reasons, it is important that the danger of a Russian attack should not be minimized. Concerning the possibility of eventually coming to an understanding with the U.S.S.R., Dr. Salazar stated that in his opinion difficulty lay, in negotiating even from strength, in our complete lack of confidence in them. He believed, for example, that the Soviets would give anything to make an arrangement at this juncture with the Germans, the only people in Europe they really fear, but that this is not possible because of complete lack of faith which all concerned have toward them.

Concerning Spain, the Prime Minister emphasized that the Portuguese Government has no particular love of, or ideological affinity for, Franco. Portuguese interest in Spain, he said, is purely a matter of geography; the defense of Western Europe and particularly the security of Portugal is incomplete without the active integration of Spain in the over-all defense system. The Prime Minister added, however, he realized that for practical political reasons (British, French, Dutch and Belgian socialist opposition) it may be a long time before it is possible to admit Spain into NATO and he expressed the hope that an adequate bilateral defense arrangement would be worked out between the United States and Spain to take care, in some measure, of the present lacuna. The Prime Minister also took occasion to express his regret at the transfer of Ambassador MacVeagh who he said had been so successful in his mission to Portugal. He realized, however, that there was an important job for Mr. MacVeagh to do in Spain which he was fully qualified to handle. Concerning the differences of opinion regarding the headquarters of NATO, Dr. Salazar said that in his opinion London or even Lisbon was a more appropriate site than Paris. However, he was not intransigent on this point and would of course go along with the British if they agreed to Paris. The Secretary explained the practical reasons for centering NATO in Paris but it was clear that Dr. Salazar’s approach to this problem is political rather than operational.

Mr. Acheson then told Dr. Salazar he would like to speak to him about uranium. The present arrangement between the British and Portuguese calls for the delivery of a hundred tons of ore a year. “We would like very much to see this amount increased to 200 tons,” said the Secretary, “as there is urgent need for this material.” Dr. Salazar replied that Mr. Eden had spoken to him the day before on this subject and had left a memorandum with him which he had not as yet had an opportunity to study. He inquired as to the interest of the United States, and the Secretary told him that the British and ourselves had a pooling arrangement covering this commodity. Dr. Salazar [Page 131] stated that a main difficulty with the British is the question of payment in sterling. Portugal was unable to purchase much-needed manufactured goods in Great Britain because of short supply there and was obliged to seek them in the United States with a consequent drain on their dollar resources. The Prime Minister said he also felt that once the present armament fever was over and it was possible to utilize fissionable materials for non-defense purposes he believed the price of uranium would go up and since Portugal’s resources of this mineral are limited, he desired to preserve them for a time when they could bring greater return. He said, however, that he would give immediate and sympathetic consideration to the Secretary’s request and would examine Mr. Eden’s memorandum in that spirit.2

  1. This memorandum was transmitted to the Department of State as an enclosure to despatch 627, Mar. 4, 1952, from Lisbon.
  2. For documentation on U.S. atomic energy policy, see volume ii .