740.5/2–2152: Telegram
Secto 34. Fourteen FonMins met in restricted session this morning to discuss agenda item IV on report on Soviet fon policy and exchange [Page 121] of views on polit matters.2 Mins agreed that in keeping with informal and frank discussion they hoped achieve only record of decision would be maintained.
De Gasperi opened discussion by saying he would have liked see Sov paper supplemented with discussion of methods of meeting problems of Sov policy and mentioned in particular difficulty individual countries had in determining how best counter Sov propaganda attacks. In this connection, he said we needed develop closer cooperation between milit and polit, citing as example current press reports from “Allied milit sources” about Ital milit plans which De Gasperi said was most harmful in view of the forthcoming municipal elections.
Pearson pointed out that Rome directive was to produce paper on “aims and means” of Sov policy and not to discuss countermeasures. He felt present job was good and perhaps reps could now do further task recommended by De Gasperi. Eden agreed that CD might well undertake further step proposed by De Gasperi. In this connection, he referred back to Acheson’s address at opening meeting re broad objectives of NATO, stressing that this was concept which needed be reiterated and which would help counter Sov propaganda.
Under exchange of views Schuman pointed out applicability of Sov paper to situation in Indochina where French resistance was contributing to common def against common danger. France had undertaken this action as purely defensive measure and intended continue it as essential operation in support of free world. However, he pointed out Viet Minh were being reinforced, trained and equipped more and more with Commie support and danger to French force was becoming greater and greater. France he said could not alone handle situation if there were “official” invasion from Commie China. Nor would France be able indefinitely maintain defensive action in Indochina and build necessary defensive organization in Europe.
Schuman paid tribute to strong US–UK support Indochina, and Acheson and Eden both agreed with importance of job which French were doing in that area. Acheson referred to both polit and mil gain through increased strength of native force, and Eden mentioned similar problem UK faced in Malaya against local Chinese elements.
Acheson then took up problem of recent Sov restrictions on fon natls, mentioning current US proposal presented in Deps,3 and expressing hope other countries would support our line of action. He said that while we had agreed delay presentation of note, US Govt found it impossible withhold action longer than end of month.
Schuman said France would support any measures jointly agreed upon but said his govt on basis Albanian experience increasingly dubious as to whether maintenance diplomatic relations in Sov area [Page 122] worthwhile. Lange said present situation unsatisfactory but Norway doubted whether retaliation served useful purpose. In fact his security people believed there was positive advantage in having Sov diplomats freely move about as means of determining Sov contacts. In contrast Stikker said that in Netherlands with dense population they did not desire free movement but were not even sure restrictions would work. He preferred proposal to limit total movement of personnel and proposed more time for fuller study of all possible steps.
Pearson said Canadian Govt had already approved policy similar US proposal but suspended implementation pending discussion in NATO. He agreed with Schuman that democracy could not equal totalitarian control measures but still thought this was right action. However, he did not believe agrmt on this point should appear flow directly from Lisbon meeting and he therefore hoped implementation of final decision could be postponed for 10 days or two weeks. Van Zeeland seconded request for delay, expressing hope that those govts who wished take similar action could do so jointly. De Gasperi said Italy has taken similar measures with respect to satellites and would be glad join in action vis-à-vis USSR. He also hoped there could be delay in implementation and suggested need for study other related problems.
Greece and Turkey supported US proposal. Venizelos pointed out that Greek Govt has already gone even further in outlawing Commie Party. Cunha said Portugal did not face this problem since it had no relations with USSR or satellites, while Eden suggested need for delay in order give more time to study possible effect of US proposal on diplomats in Moscow. Mr. Acheson concluded on this topic by saying he would report to Washington general desire for delay in proposed action but said he was not in position make any promise that US would be able accede to this wish.4
Eden then referred briefly to recent developments in Egypt. He [Page 123] said that while discussions had not started, HMG was ready at any time and hopeful of reaching agrmt. UK willing commence talks on any basis Egypt desired—either 2 or 5 power basis. Eden thought this might be worked out with Amr Pasha on latter’s return London after Lisbon meeting. On Sudan, Eden said he had encouraged Egypt undertake direct discussions with Sudanese. To him essential element was agrmt on use of Nile water, since some day there would be independent Sudan and Future of Egypt would depend on satisfactory agrmt. Venizelos raised problem of credentials for new Amb, stating that while unwilling accept proposed form, prolonged lack of Amb to Cairo was matter of concern. Eden thanked Venizelos and others with similar problem and promised UK would try reach agrmt as soon as possible.
- This telegram was repeated for information to all NATO capitals.↩
- The reference here is to document C9–D/1, Feb. 6, p. 280.↩
- Regarding the proposal under reference here, see Spofford’s memorandum of Feb. 20 to Secretary Acheson, p. 288.↩
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On the afternoon of Feb. 21, the Council Deputies met to continue the discussion of the possible restriction of the travel of Soviet officials. In his telegram Secto 40, Feb. 22, 3 p.m., to Acting Secretary Webb, Secretary Acheson gave the following account of the meeting and his views on the problem:
↩“Deps restated natl position outlined by Mins previously. All Deps agreed matter should be dealt with through concerted action of NAT govts all of which with exception of Norway, Iceland, Portugal, and probably Denmark are disposed take restrictive measures at an early date. They could not however make necessary arrangements by end of this month and, while appreciating US position, urged that US postpone action at least until March 10 in order permit necessary decision be taken by other NATO Govts, All Deps expressed hope that agrmt could be reached shortly on measures to be taken and stressed importance of acting jointly even though US Govt may not be able agree to further postponement.
“In view of response of NATO Govts to this proposal and fact that there seems excellent prospect of concerted action by most NATO Govts by March 10, I believe it would be wise to agree to delay presentation of note.
“Furthermore since US public was already aware of our intention to propose concerted action in NATO, isolated action by US now might be misinterpreted as failure of our efforts vis-à-vis other NATO powers.
“Please let me know tomorrow.” (740.5/2–2252)