Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/1–3052

Foreign Minister Schuman to the Secretary of State ¹

secret

[Paris, January 29, 1952.]

On the eve of the conversations preliminary to the Lisbon Conference which we are to have in London on Mr. Eden’s initiative, I think it useful to tell you of my concern at the evolution of the Bonn negotiations for the contractual agreements which are to replace the occupation regime.

As you are aware, the French Government can envisage no solution of the problem of the German defense contribution other than that of a defense community excluding the reconstitution of a German national army. The progress of the Paris deliberations gives me the firm hope that the initiative of the French Government in this field will culminate in a positive conclusion. We will thus have passed another stage on the road of an European political organization. The Parliament and public opinion are, in my country, more and more behind these ideas. This attitude is a fact of great importance. We must all the more bear in mind that the creation of a European army, even though it is a French concept which meets with a large area of consent, does impose on France, because of its very nature, very heavy sacrifices of a moral kind; in addition it is a concept which cannot alone solve the problem of security in relation to Germany.

Granting that the European defense community is for us the acceptable form of a participation by the Federal Republic in the common defense, it does not contain and cannot contain because of the principle of non-discrimination involved therein, the precautions and barriers which the allies, at Brussels and then at Washington, have considered to be indispensable to guard against the latent danger which would result from a Germany freed from every restriction. It is therefore only in the agreements defining the future relations between the three allies and Germany that there can be included the special commitments of the Bonn Government.

If this were not to take place, it would be very difficult to get the French Parliament to accept a community treaty from the obligations of which Germany could any day withdraw with the help of a supremacy which she would have been permitted to reestablish at our expense.

From this point of view, the evolution of the Bonn negotiations is a source of much concern; the discussions looking to the drawing up of the annexed conventions which are precisely these which are to contain the guarantees considered indispensable for us, are marking time. The Bonn Government evidently intends to limit the arrangements under discussion to the general convention alone there being included therein the maximum of discriminatory measures which that government alleges it can accept. It is endeavoring therefore to settle in the European framework both the problem of arms manufacture and that of the cost of maintaining the allied troops. In order that its thesis may win out, it adopts a dilatory attitude as to the first point, the French Government has had to recognize the impossibility of reaching a conclusion since the German delegation does not accept in the draft treaty on the European army any article which could be interpreted as applying only to the Federal Republic. Under these conditions I do not see how we could solve in the European framework the problem posed by the maintenance of the prohibitions upon which the three governments are in agreement. Mr. Hallstein, Secretary of State of the Bonn Government, had appeared to recognize this. Besides, if we were to abandon a security agreement, in what framework would we set forth the German commitment re paramilitary formation and police forces—commitment to which the French Government, for obvious reasons, continues to attach an essential importance?

As to the second point, the German thesis which would lead to having the budget of the community bear the cost of upkeep of American and British troops could not even be defended before the Parliament by the French Government. The treaty on the European defense community, the general convention, the annexed conventions—these make up a whole. The rejection of one of the parts would be unacceptable and would compromise the whole.

I do not fail to recognize the difficulties of the Bonn Government. But we must not lose sight of the necessity of rallying French as well as German public opinion to the support of the vast plans being drawn up. The clamorous emphasis given by the Germans to their claims must not lead us to underestimate the depth of French reactions.

At the very moment when it is entering upon an enterprise without precedent in its history, the French Government cannot fail to take into consideration both these reactions and the fact that a serious problem of balance will arise within the future European community. France’s outside obligations, the demographic superiority of Western Germany, the rapid recovery of the Ruhr industries and of the German economy as a whole are in different degrees, elements of unbalance, to which we must apply correcting factors. That is why we agreed at Brussels in December 1950 on a clause limiting the German forces to one-fifth of the forces of the Atlantic Army.²

Worries of the same kind make it indispensable to maintain our policy regarding the Saar since the economic union of France and the Saar is, in our view, an essential element of economic balance inside the European community. You expressed some concern at our executing a decision reached publicly long ago by the government and recently confirmed by the French Parliament, the aim of which was to create a diplomatic mission in place of the former high commission in the Saar.³ This measure is not incompatible with the provisional character of the present status of this territory. It simply records an evolution parallel to that envisaged for Federal Germany itself where our high commissioners are to be replaced by ambassadors.

For the immediate present it is indispensable that the three allied governments, by means of a concerted action, should induce the Federal Government to sign, in whatever form may appear to it most expedient for its own public opinion, the commitments which must be set forth in the annexed conventions. This is an urgent matter and it would be highly desirable for the high commissioners to be as soon as possible in a position to present a common front vis-à-vis the German negotiators. I am convinced that, if the negotiations are carried on with the firmness that is desirable, they can be concluded in the very near future. We then will have met the necessary conditions of a satisfactory solution of the problem of German defense participation.

As for the long term problem of a possible secession of the Federal Republic, it is obvious that no supplementary text can give a sure solution. We are, I think, in agreement in believing that if the Federal Republic were at a later date to break the treaty to which it has agreed, and, freeing itself from the organization of Europe, were to set up its units as a German national army, it would, as a matter of law, lose the benefit of the advantages which have been granted to it as a counterpart in the general convention. It would further be necessary to avoid a situation in which fresh decisions taken on the basis of the principle of the equality of rights, and I refer particularly to the possible entry of Western Germany into the Atlantic Pact, would deprive this convention of its substance and would permit Germany, free from the limitations of the European community, to recover a complete freedom.

In this connection, Mr. Hallstein’s recent declarations⁴ make it my duty to remove any misunderstanding.

The relations to be established between the European defense community and NATO create a problem which is by no means insoluble, but which wld become so at the exact moment when the adherence of the Ger Federal rep to the North Atlantic Treaty was envisaged.

There is indeed no doubt that the entrance of Germany into NATO wld run the risk of appearing to a large part of public opinion as a radical alteration in the very character of the alliance. When the pact was signed, the statesmen of all the participating countries, beginning with those of the US, solemnly affirmed that the new alliance, brought about by a manifest threat, presented a strictly defensive character. Cld we renew this affirmation with the same persuasive force if there were to be included in the Atlantic Council a power which—in contrast with all the other members—would be led by its very structure to advance territorial claims?

Reasons of expediency are not the least imperative. It is clear that if the entrance of Ger into NATO were envisaged, the creation of the EDC and the sacrifices involved therein for several countries wld be much less easily accepted by public opinion and by Parliamentary opinion.

You are familiar especially with the feeling of the French Parliament as resolutely hostile to the accession of Germany to the NAT. There are no grounds for believing that this attitude may be changed in the foreseeable future.

In summary, we wld seriously and perhaps irremediably compromise an enterprise as essential as that of the EDC if, in order to decide a question such as that of the relations to be established between the two communities, a question which can be settled through technical and practical solutions, we were to permit the raising of an insurmountable difficulty.

I can only therefore say to you again what I wrote you on Aug 25, 1951 before that Washington conference: “our entire European policy and especially the integration of German forces wld be compromised by the prospect of direct Ger accession to the Atlantic community. I consider it my duty to point this out to you at this time. At a later date and when the European community, economic, military and political, has been established, we shall be called upon to examine how this community can be adapted to other international organizations.”⁵

I am sending a copy of this message to Mr. Eden.

1. The source text was transmitted as telegram 4583, Jan. 30, from Paris, with the following brief explanation: “Fol is free translation of ltr from Schuman to Secy dated Jan 29, copy of which Schuman has sent to Eden.”

   Telegram 4582, Jan. 30, from Paris, further explained the Schuman letter as follows:

   “Immed fol tel contains translation of letter addressed by Schuman to Secy covering Fr Govt’s position on EDF, contractual relations, relations between Fr and Saar, and question of FedRep’s relationship to NATO. This document was handed to us last night by Schuman’s Chef du Cabinet Bourbon-Busset. It is to [be] considered as secret communication.

   “Bourbon-Busset took occasion to state that Fr have not yet made up their minds as to desirability of having Adenauer come to Tripartite mtgs in London next month. Also, with respect to these mtgs, Fr note that Brit have not yet proposed definitive agenda.” (751.5/1–3052)

2. The reference here is to a decision reached at the Sixth Session of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, Dec. 18–19, 1950. For documentation on that session, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iii, pp. 582 ff.
3. On Jan. 25 the French Government announced the establishment of a French Diplomatic Mission in the Saar headed by Gilbert Grandval (with the personal rank of Ambassador) heretofore the French High Commissioner in the Saar. West German State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Hallstein declared on Jan. 29 that the appointment of Ambassador Grandval violated previous Franco-German agreements on the Saar and was prejudicial to a final agreement on the Saar problem. There were other statements and exchanges by French and West German authorities on the matter. For documentation on the attitude of the United States with respect to the Saar problem, see volume vii . For additional documentation on the Saar, see pp. 571 ff. and 1370 ff. herein.
4. Presumably the reference here is to Hallstein’s statements about the Saar made during the Six-Power Conference of Foreign Ministers at Paris, Jan. 26–27; regarding these statements, see telegram 4524, Jan. 28, p. 595 and the last two paragraphs of the background paper, p. 605.
5. Regarding Schuman’s message quoted here, see the editorial note, Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. iii, Part 1, p. 853.