Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/8–2754: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France ¹

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Washington, August 27, 1954—1:32 p.m.

1139. For Bruce and Dillon. Tell Eden we are pleased note Foreign Office guidance on EDC (London’s 1013).² We hope this helpful line will counter impression Mendes-France appears to be trying to create that UK will support Little NATO with discriminatory provisions toward Germany, but we are disturbed at continued reports such as those contained Paris’ 808 to Department³ (repeated unnumbered to London) that impression British support still remains.

It seems important both in situation we now face and that which we may face after French Assembly vote that we make clear now:

1. There is no prospect for any solution involving discrimination against Germany and that this was made clear to Mendes-France at Chartwell.

2. There is complete accord between US and UK in support of EDC as best solution.

We strongly hope that if impression persists that British would support solution in conflict with foregoing, Churchill or Eden will consider issuing first-person statement before or during debate making clear two points enumerated above.⁴

Smith

1. Drafted by Palmer, initialed for the Acting Secretary by Merchant. Repeated to Paris and Bonn.
2. Not printed; it reported that, as a result of a suggestion made in a conversation on Aug. 26 with Roberts of the Foreign Office, the Aug. 27 morning edition of the London Times contained an article by its diplomatic correspondent which read, in part, “Official circles in London were insistent yesterday that no British proposals for an alternative to the European Defense Community were discussed with the French Prime Minister during the Chartwell talks on Monday.” (740.5/8–2754)
3. Not printed; it reported that certain French and British officials believed a plan set forth by Antoine Pinay for a probationary period for the EDC was receiving favorable reaction among other Europeans, but that Pinay was concerned that Mendès-France’s planned strategy was to allow the Assembly to vote down the EDC Treaty, to then work for implementation of the 1952 Bonn agreements regarding Contractual Relations between the Federal Republic and other Western Powers, while simultaneously proposing an alternate solution to EDC. (740.5/8–2654)
4. In telegram 708 to Paris, Aug. 26, Acting Secretary Smith conveyed the text of a statement released that day by the Foreign Office in London to counteract press speculation regarding the position of the United Kingdom on the EDC The statement categorically denied that U.K. proposals for an alternative to EDC were discussed with Mendès-France at the Chartwell meeting on Aug. 23, and added: “Her Majesty’s Government remains firmly convinced that the EDC Treaty with the accompanying treaties and agreements pledging the support and intimate cooperation of the UK and the US provide much the best method for securing a German defense contribution and give France greater assurances and stronger guarantees than she could obtain under any other arrangement” (740.5/8–2654). In telegram 813 from Paris, Aug. 27, Dillon reported that the official French news agency, AFP, appeared to have suppressed the Foreign Office statement, and added that Paul Reynaud asserted that this represented positive proof of the intention of Mendès-France “to kill what little hope remains at this point for EDC” (740.5/8–2754).