740.5/8–2254: Telegram
The Chargé in Belgium (Sprouse) to the Department of State 1
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169. Limit distribution strictly. From Tomlinson. Re Embtel 166.2 After Mendes-France had finished with his comments on the Secretary’s memorandum,3 Mendes asked me to stay to discuss situation on personal basis even though the hour was then two O’clock in the morning and his delegation, including Faure and Bourges-Maunoury, were waiting for him in next room. Mendes said that as a friend he wished my full and frank views. He said he was thinking more of future than of present because Brussels Conference had already failed. Meeting would be held tomorrow but continued discussions seemed pointless. Mendes insisted over and over again that fault was not his, listing examples in effort to show that other Ministers had not given him “one single” concession.
I said that I did not believe that attitude of other delegations justified writing off conference as failure. Each of EDC partners and US and UK as well seemed to be prepared to do best they could in answer to French appeal for help with French Assembly. They were asking only that French Government recognize that there was a limit to their possible help. Other Ministers could not risk creating political difficulties in their own countries. In some cases, even their personal careers would be placed in jeopardy by this questionable gamble. It seemed clear to me that, if EDC governments agreed to reopen parliamentary debates on EDC, it would be 18 months or 2 years before West would have answer on European unity and German rearmament. No one could say these Parliaments were to be limited to purely rubber stamp action taking not more than 3 months. In my opinion, it was a contradiction to argue that countries should go back to Parliaments to help get quick action in France when resulting delay and doubt of new parliamentary consideration made defeat of EDC a near certainty.
Mendes repeated argument that his jurists did not believe parliamentary action in other countries was necessary on protocol, but observed this was not his responsibility and was matter for other EDC countries to decide. He insisted that some way could be found to minimize any parliamentary action if other Ministers would only appreciate magnitude of his problem and his efforts to overcome it.
Mendes said facts of political difficulties in France had to be faced. He had to have essentials of protocol for passage in French [Page 1065] Assembly. He had to try to obtain 80 anti-EDC votes on right because Socialist Deputies would not follow discipline. He explained his “pointage” on basis of signature by 49 Socialist Deputies in last 2 weeks or a promise to vote against EDC. Perhaps he had been wrong, he had received some promises from anti-EDC Deputies but not enough, although he expected others to change position if there were a success in Brussels. Mendes admitted he had not consulted Mollet on his “pointage”.
I said it could be expected that Mollet would hold back his real disciplinary campaign until EDC debate was in true progress. Socialist Deputies might act quite differently at that time. I pointed out that his “pointage” could not be expected to overcome skepticism of other governments. Everyone seemed to have a “pointage” and they differed widely depending upon assumptions used in preparing them. Pro-EDC Deputies had always urged immediate debate and tactics of anti-EDC Deputies had been to postpone it. I continued that a “pointage” prepared by pro-Europeans might promise more favorable results.
Mendes insisted that we could count on all pro-European votes despite statements made by Schuman, Pinay, Mollet, Phillip and their followers. With astonishing cynicism he said they had no alternative but to vote for EDC treaty even if protocol left nothing but a skeleton of EDC treaty. Mendes stated that Bourges-Maunoury and Rene Mayer agreed with his gloomy analysis of prospects for EDC treaty and with his conviction that EDC could not be ratified unless protocol was obtained at Brussels.
I said that I did not wish to speak for these gentlemen but understood their position to be that EDC treaty could be ratified if it were presented vigorously to Assembly along with government endorsement of maximum that was acceptable to other EDC countries at Brussels. I said that I also understood their views on vote-catching possibilities of protocol in its present form to be quite different from his.
Mendes repeatedly stated that time was too short to work out anything useful to him in Brussels. Spaak’s proposed declaration would be interpreted as merely empty promises. I replied that a formal signature of 6 governments to act in common in future should have real value. French Government should extend same confidence to other governments that it was asking for itself. I continued that, if it was too late to act, I thought it fair to attribute situation to excessive unreasonableness of French protocol and to continued French insistence that other parliaments must take new action on EDC treaty. There was still real hope, in my opinion, for a settlement very useful for French Government before its Parliament if these unreasonable positions could be quickly changed. Problem as I saw it was to undo damage done by anti-EDC advisers who had been asked to help on protocol.
[Page 1066]Mendes replied that he had inherited anti-EDC advisers in Quai d’Orsay from Bidault. He then argued that Bourges-Maunoury was pro-European, had helped draft the protocol, and was in full agreement with it except for veto provision. I replied that I was under a different impression as to position of Bourges-Maunoury on protocol, and assumed that Bourges would make his position clear if it were necessary to do so next week.
Mendes said he had two immediate points for the future. First, he thought a common 5-nation declaration trying to put blame for failure of Brussels Conference and EDC on France would only cause disunity and bitterness between western nations. Such divisions could only help Russians.
Second, he was going to visit Churchill and he hoped US would be represented so that three nations could map new plans for European policy and limit damage for failure of EDC.
I replied that Western Nations were not divided. They were all firmly united in fulfilling agreed objectives except France. Failure of Brussels Conference could only reflect this situation of isolation of France and of inability of France to deal with her own problem. On second point, I said I thought it inconceivable that Germany and other EDC nations could be left to stand aside and have France pretend to leadership on continent after history of past three years on fulfillment of commitments on European policy.
Mendes said he had not decided on course to take next week. He had to consult his Cabinet Tuesday. One possibility was to present EDC treaty with whatever he could get at Brussels; second possibility was to present treaty without vote of confidence; third possibility was to take responsibility himself as head of government and turn down EDC treaty; fourth was to agree with US and UK and try to obtain Assembly approval to put Bonn conventions in effect; and there were others. Mendes said he was so concerned with damage to Atlantic solidarity by rejection of EDC treaty by French Assembly that he was seriously considering taking responsibility for rejection himself as head of government.
I pointed out that, if French Assembly did not vote on EDC treaty after asking and receiving maximum help other EDC countries could give at Brussels, it could certainly be said that Mendes-France government had added to “futile history of past”. I said that France had taken international commitment to present EDC treaty to Assembly. France could not expect to be excused from this commitment just because Mendes-France had come to power any more than other countries could expect to be excused from their commitments to France because of this event. If answer in French Assembly had to be no, then it seemed better to obtain that answer clearly so that Atlantic [Page 1067] policy could be built on some other basis even if it were far less acceptable.
This morning Bourges-Maunoury asked me to call on him. He said he had just finished long talk with Mendes-France on above conversation. Bourges said he was sorry that conversation had not taken place night before. It had helped him clear up an equivocal situation. Mendes had told him that I had suggested he would resign. Bourges said he replied that his intentions were to resign but that he was surprised that I was aware of it. Mendes appealed to him not to do so, urging that they must continue to work together and that resignation of Bourges might lead to his own. Bourges said Mendes still had not made definite decision on Brussels Conference and there was still some hope. In any case he was now not bound by delegation loyalty and could work more effectively. He urged that Chancellor agree to see Mendes as soon as possible.