Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/8–2154: Telegram

The United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community (Bruce) to the Department of State ¹

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Brussels, August 21, 1954—7 p.m.

165. Limit distribution strictly. Saw separately this morning Adenauer, Spaak, Bech and Mendes-France. Adenauer, Spaak and Bech still hopeful the five nation declaration will be finally accepted by Mendes. If not, and conference breaks down, they intend issue statement and also text rejected declaration. Possibility of such a statement is irritating and depressing to Mendes who repeatedly said it would arouse bitterness in France and reflect on his government against partners and so that to defend French prestige he would have to retort.

He has voiced this same objection, now almost become a plea, to Spaak but Spaak and the others are thus far adamant, esteeming their position would be false if impression were allowed to be created that conference might have failed because of their unreasonable intransigence rather than because totally unacceptable language French protocol requiring resubmission their parliaments.

Moreover they believe this resolution most effective one to date in attempt influence Mendes at least to moderate his insistence on their embracing his protocol.

In general my conversation with Mendes, consequent upon his invitation, too closely parallels report of Tomlinson’s visit to him late last night being reported separately² and Alger’s interview of yesterday (Embtel 158³) to warrant recounting. My general impression is he was thoroughly fatigued, cynical, pessimistic, but fully confident of his own judgment of French parlimentary situation. Robert Schuman’s article in Figaro had not seemingly convinced him there would be any French pro-EDC defections if the other five ministers would accept his proposal almost in its entirety. He said he thought under such circumstances even Robert Schuman would vote for the changes as would all the pro-EDC Socialists. (I feel he underestimates the depth of their convictions).

He described himself as the unlucky inheritor of his predecessors gross errors and lack of good faith in carrying out their EDC engagements. He was being abandoned by his Benelux allies, suspect by the United States, thrown unfairly on his own courage and resources when he sorely needed sympathy and aid, all because his foreign colleagues would not realize that [form] was nothing and the spirit of his proposal respondent to his political necessities was alone important. He asked for greater faith in him and in his intentions, and observed he was operating in a hostile atmosphere unjustified by his record.

Mendes did not know what action he would take next week in Paris. He might put original text to vote without government endorsement (saying ruefully that his prestige will have been so diminished by his lack of success at conference it will matter little if he sponsors bill). At any rate he will make no determination until he has consulted President Coty and his own Cabinet. Meanwhile he says his political enemies are licking their chops and organizing against him. He had heard this morning that certain members MRP were considering demanding from the floor vote on original text. (Additional color is lent to this by statement to me yesterday in Paris by intimate friend of Pinay that Pinay was seriously canvassing prospects of rallying or allying himself to movement to bring original text to vote).

Mendes expressed himself vigorously on the importance of orienting Germany to the west, of helping Adenauer remain dominant in Fed Rep, of his abiding belief in the supreme importance of unity amongst the allies. He only hoped if he fell from office he could be succeeded by a French statesman possessing and implementing similar convictions.

[

Bruce

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1. Sent also to Paris, eyes only for Dillon and Hughes. Repeated to London; Rome; The Hague, eyes only for the Ambassador; Bonn, eyes only for Conant; and Luxembourg, eyes only for the Minister.
2. The account of the Tomlinson–Mendès–France meeting late in the evening of Aug. 20 was transmitted to the Department in telegram 166 from Brussels, Aug. 21, not printed. It reported inter alia that Mendès-France appeared to be “very shaken” by the breakdown in communication and understanding between himself and Dulles (reported in telegram 185 to Paris, Aug. 20; summarized in footnote 3, p. 1058) (740.5/8–2154).
3. Dated Aug. 20, p. 1056.