Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/8–2154

The Secretary of State to Prime Minister Mendès-France ¹

top secret

Washington, August 21, 1954.

1. I am deeply disturbed at the report I have received of the difficulties being encountered at the Brussels meeting and I conceive it my solemn duty to address this appeal to you and your fellow conferees.

2. I need not recount the vicissitudes which we have faced in common during the post war [era] in our efforts to assure an enduring peace in Western Europe in the face of an external threat of formidable proportions; nor in our efforts to achieve stability with the memories still unfortunately vivid of the internecine strife which has threatened the survival of the cradle of our civilization twice in this century. Now all that we have worked for stands in a very real and immediate sense at the crossroads. The decision is between resolutely choosing the path of statesmanship or that leading toward disunity and chaos.

3. There is, I know, no question in our minds as to which road we must choose. Our problem is how we can all get on this road together.

4. The grave problems which are presently facing France and her partners at Brussels are primarily and in the first instance their own concern. We must therefore accept the judgment of the Brussels Conference on any points unanimously and willingly agreed. In achieving such a meeting of the minds, however, there are certain considerations which must be borne in mind:

a. Any changes in the EDC Treaty which would result in further unacceptable delay, such as would result from resubmission to parliaments, should be avoided.

b. Any changes in the EDC Treaty which seriously impair or indefinitely postpone its surpranational and integrative features strike at the basic concept of European unity, which in my judgment is the best and last hope of Europe, and should therefore be avoided.

c. Any changes in the EDC Treaty which discriminate against any of its participants sow the seeds of resentment and breed future peril and should likewise be avoided.

5. In addition, I must recall the various engagements which my Government stands ready to assume at such time as the EDC comes into effect. We must, of course, review, in the light of changes, whether these undertakings remain justified.

6. If the Brussels Conference breaks up with no agreement, we shall be faced with a great crisis. Our disposition would be, first, to consult immediately with the UK and those EDC countries which have ratified the Treaty to determine urgently what steps should be taken to associate Germany in sovereign equality with the West and to bring about German rearmament.

7. I have felt this message necessary in order that there be no doubt as to the vital importance we place on the EDC in its essential features and on the need, in all our interests, for its coming into force with the very minimum of further delay.

8. Since I believe that the other EDC powers and the British should know clearly where the U.S. stands on these problems, I am making the preceding paragraphs of this message available to them.

1. The source text was transmitted to Brussels in niact telegram 195 at 4:09 p.m. on Aug. 21 with instructions to Bruce to deliver it if he thought it would be helpful. Telegram 195 was repeated to London with the instruction that a copy of the source text be delivered to Churchill, together with the message to Spaak (supra) and Dulles’ message to the British Prime Minister (infra), only after Bruce had delivered it to Mendès-France. In telegram 170 from Brussels, Aug. 22, sent also to London, Bruce reported that he had delivered copies of both messages (740.5/8–2254).