Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/8–2054: Telegram

The Ambassador in Belgium (Alger) to the Department of State ¹

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Brussels, August 20, 1954—4 p.m.

152. Eyes only from Tomlinson. Limit distribution strictly. Member of French delegation asked to see me urgently this morning. He said he had just come from stormy meeting of French delegation which had led him to fear that Mendes-France wished to have Brussels meeting end in failure with blame placed on other nations. He acknowledged his previous conviction that Brussels meeting would succeed. All this only made it more difficult for him to express his fear and uncertainty now.

My Informant said that Mendes last night and this morning was furious with French experts because of promising talks held between French experts and Belgian, German, and Dutch delegations yesterday on French initiative. Mendes refused solutions for compromise suggested to him by his experts on each point. Mendes said he had to demand that other EDC countries take action in parliaments. Mendes said solemn declaration and promises to issue Council directives had no political value to him at all. Other governments had to go back to parliaments to show that “they really want France to join”.

My Informant said Mendes had told De Seynes, Clermont-Tonnerre and Sauvagnargues that they were to stop all their contacts and to see no one. He rebuked them severely for taking action that he had not expressly requested.

My source said that if Mendes persists in efforts to defeat conference, Bourges-Maunoury will resign Monday in Paris. He asked if I thought US Government would wait for new government to be formed to act on EDC if Mendes were to be overthrown.

I tried to calm my Informant by telling him that Mendes might be resentful with his delegation because Mendes wished to make his own deal and had not been ready to indicate his willingness to compromise. My Informant agreed this would be in character of Mendes. On point of blame of other countries I told my Informant that my information was that President Spaak and his colleagues were doing everything they could to help Mendes short of any agreement which would require new action in other parliaments. Other EDC ministers had made it quite clear that this could be only solution at Brussels because delay and uncertainty of new negotiations and new ratifications were tantamount to certain defeat of EDC treaty. Hope of everyone had been that Mendes would realize this and return to Paris from Brussels with a solemn declaration which would in fact be great success and guarantees nearly certain approval by pro-European majority. Even if Mendes did not like EDC it appeared that this desire to stay in power would lead him to this course.

My Informant said he still had this hope but in view of attitude of Mendes this morning he and others feared Mendes would rather have failure of Brussels Conference and gamble on staying in power by putting EDC treaty before Assembly without vote of confidence or with crippling amendments. Mendes did not believe pro-European majority could be organized against his. Informant suggested that after defeat of EDC or after dropping EDC Mendes would try to talk on another basis about Germany with US and UK. My source said that Mendes announced he had sent letter to the Secretary through Andre Mayer about his problems and that reply had been satisfactory.²

We will not know whether fears of my Informant are well-founded until Mendes has taken position on acceptance of declaration to be put forward by Spaak.³

Alger

1. Repeated to Paris for the Ambassador and Bruce.
2. See telegram 632 to Paris, Aug. 19, p. 1049.
3. In telegram 155 from Brussels, Aug. 20, Tomlinson reported that “Bourges-Maunoury confirmed substance of my message of French delegation meeting to De Staercke, including his intention to submit his resignation. De Staercke insisted experts should continue meetings, arguing that ‘Ministers cannot fail where experts have succeeded’. Bourges, according to De Staercke, agreed but said that Mendes-France refused categorically to give them any mandate to continue. De Staercke said that during lunch Edgar Faure came out openly with remarks previously confined to French delegates such as let Brussels fail and let the Americans arm the Germans so we can forget this EDC nonsense’.” (740.5/8–2054)