740.5/8–1954: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France 1
632. Eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary. FYI Following memo of conversation dictated by Secretary:
“Andre Mayer came to see me at 4:30 yesterday. He said that he had talked personally with Mendes-France the evening before. Mendes-France had been particularly upset because he inferred from the cabled message, which I had sent via Dillon, that I had lost confidence in his personal integrity and determination really to try to push EDC through.
Mayer then gave me a long letter from Mendes-France,2 addressed to me, explaining his reasons for acting as he was. This letter, in substance, covered the same ground as had been covered by his statements to Dillon.
Mayer also said that Mendes-France had pointed out the great difficulties under which he was laboring, that he was surrounded by people who were anti-EDC, that he himself did not have time to replace them, and this meant that he had to try to do much of the technical work personally. He was very critical of the prior government for having, on the one hand, pretended to espouse the EDC and, on the other hand, allowed to stay in the Foreign Office the strongest opponents of EDC. This confronted Mendes-France with a very difficult technical situation.
[Page 1050]I told Mayer that I had no doubt whatever of Mendes-France’s intellectual honesty and good intentions. However, I felt that he was ill-advised and did not appreciate the gravity of the situation.
Mayer indicated that Mendes-France had the impression that it was the United States which was instigating opposition to his plan on the part of the Low Countries and Germany. I denied that the United States had made any effort at all to create opposition and said that anything Mendes-France and Adenauer could agree on would almost automatically have our approval. It was, however, my impression that Mendes-France’s proposals could not be accepted by Adenauer, and if he tried to take them he would be defeated in his own parliamentary bodies, and that would mark the end of the last German with whom France could negotiate an organic unity which would prevent a repetition of the past.
I reviewed the past history and pointed out that what was going on was apparently nothing but the repetition of the old cycle. Over a year ago, there had been the ‘Protocols’, which France had insisted upon as essential to ratification. These had been agreed to by the other five. Then there had come the Soviet proposal and the French demand that there must be a meeting on Germany before they could act. That meeting had been held fruitlessly, but still there was no French action. Then Britain and France were told that they had to make firmer and more far-reaching engagements. These were given on the explicit understanding that the matter would at once be put to a vote but nothing had happened. Now we were starting again with new protocols, a new meeting with Soviet Russia about Germany and requests for further U.S.–U.K. guarantees. Mendes-France could hardly be surprised if the friends and allies of France felt that France had lost the capacity for effective action and they could not be reassured by Mendes-France’s mere words at a time when in fact what he was doing was merely a repetition of the futile past. Meanwhile, time was running out, particularly in Germany, and we were threatened with stark disaster.
Mayer asked what he should say to Mendes-France, and I told him that he could repeat in substance what I had said to him.”3
- Drafted by Dulles.↩
- Not printed (740.5/8–1754).↩
- In telegram 150 from Brussels, Aug. 20, Alger reported: “Mendes-France told [EDC conference] ministers this morning that he had just received message from Secretary Dulles stating that it was imperative conference reach agreement at once and that United States would accept any agreement they reached. … Delegations disbelieve statement but are very nervous”. (740.5/8–2054)↩