740.5/8–1754
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Elbrick)
Subject:
- British Views on French Proposals on EDC.
Participants:
- Mr. Adam Watson—Counselor, British Embassy
- Mr. C. Burke Elbrick—Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR
Mr. Watson called at his request this afternoon to inform me of the British Government’s thinking with respect to the new French proposals for amending the European Defense Community Treaty. He left with me a copy of a telegram from the Foreign Office to the Embassy in Washington1 setting forth the British Government’s views in some detail. While recognizing that the new French proposals would disappoint many proponents of closer European union and raise problems for the countries which have already ratified the EDC Treaty, the British Government places emphasis upon the need for all concerned to go as far as possible to meet the French proposals and above all not to reject the proposals “out of hand”. While there are certain aspects of the proposals which affect the UK (and the U.S.) the British Government feels it is primarily for the EDC members to decide whether or not the proposals are acceptable. The British apparently agree with us that the proposals should meet certain criteria viz. (1) the ratification process should not be further delayed by the necessity for resubmissions to parliaments; (2) there should not be further open discriminations which Germany could not now accept. The Foreign Office has pointed out to the Embassy that the proposals amount to very substantial amendments which will considerably weaken the force of the Treaty. On the other hand, the British feel that it is more realistic to recognize that EDC will not work in any event unless the major decisions are accepted by all members of the Community. The fact that one proposal provides a veto on future decisions of the commissariat does not, in the British view, give undesirable liberty of action to Germany. The proposals which weaken the whole “European” idea seem to the British to be [Page 1046] based on a realistic assessment of the limits to which the powers can go in abandoning national sovereignty.
Mr. Watson said he hoped the U.S. would agree with the UK view that we should not intervene with the EDC powers at the present time but that we should leave it up to them to make their decisions at the Brussels meeting where, the British Government hopes an agreement can be reached which will permit Mendes-France to go back to Paris “not entirely empty-handed”. I told Mr. Watson that the State Department is disturbed by the implications of the French proposals and that we felt that the acceptance of any of the amendments which would require reference to parliaments would result in an unacceptable delay in ratification. I told him that we are also disturbed by the fact that the proposals contain discriminatory features which it is doubtful that Chancellor Adenauer could accept. In addition, the supra-national features of the Treaty seem to be watered down to the point of non-existence.
While we do not expect to make any public statement along these lines, at least prior to the meeting of the EDC powers in Brussels, we feel that we should express these preliminary views to the EDC governments privately in any discussion of the French proposals.
Mr. Watson said that he felt that his Government is not at all sanguine about the results of the Brussels meeting but that the Foreign Office felt that we should not “rock the boat” at this time. He felt that anything that might come out of Brussels that would be acceptable to the EDC powers should be acceptable to us. I reminded him that the U.S. and the UK, as well as NATO, will have a direct interest in the results of the Brussels meeting and that we will have to take a very serious look at the proposals that may come from that meeting.
- Not printed. (740.5/8–1754)↩