740.5/8–1554: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State 1
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Coled 19. As indicated in Coled 18,2 French proposals are unacceptable beyond our worst expectations. Development is in large part due to Parodi, Boris and Gros. Once “little NATO” proposal was rejected by Mendes, this trio devoted their energies to making French suggestions for Brussels meeting as “anti-EDC” as possible. In these endeavors they received great help in Cabinet discussions from Edgar Faure and Mitterand who, it is alleged, found their motivations in ill-concealed hopes to replace Mendes as Prime Minister.
Our informants, pro-European, insist that this anti-EDC group in Quai d’Orsay, helped by Sauvagnargues, who saw opportunity to push a few pet projects of his own about political community and security declarations, was left to do actual drafting. They claim that Mendes is still receiving a painful education and is only now becoming aware of how unacceptable and ill-advised final document really is. Our informants further insist that Mendes can and will accept complete abandonment of his proposals at Brussels if other EDC countries are firm and demonstrate that proposals do change EDC treaty or would require new Parliamentary consideration in other EDC countries. [Page 1040] Pro-Europeans persist in their optimism that Mendes will present to French Assembly solution acceptable to EDC countries, and will receive a surprisingly large majority vote for EDC treaty.
Mendes has drawn up his proposals for Brussels without any consultation with pro-European leaders outside his cabinet. In last days of the confrontation he even took specific action forbidding individuals working with him to see pro-European leaders and experts. Results of the confrontation, if accepted, would lose not only votes of pro-EDC socialists but also of pro-EDC factions in MRP, radical socialist and independent parties. At same time Mendes has no commitment for a favorable vote from rightist deputies opposed to EDC treaty. On contrary, they used his pathetic efforts to get their support by making changes in EDC treaty to help wreck document to be presented at Brussels; then they kept their hands completely free by continuing to oppose publicly treaty in any form. Number of anti-EDC deputies will vote for EDC treaty when day for decision arrives. However they will do so primarily because they cannot afford to be in opposition for domestic political reasons and not because of modifications in EDC treaty.
We are advised that Pinay at his request saw Mendes yesterday to inform him that Pinay and his friends would not support changes in treaty as proposed. Pinay apparently found Mendes deeply discouraged and confused. Mendes is said to have admitted that he now realized that changes he had proposed would not get EDC ratified. Pinay is said to have replied that this was true but that treaty could be ratified if Mendes would work out a solution at Brussels in framework of present text of treaty and acceptable to other EDC countries and to United States and United Kingdom. Pinay said French Assembly would vote such a solution if treaty were defended vigorously and vote of confidence used as necessary. We are informed that Mollet, who has not been consulted by Mendes, shortly will issue a warning statement to effect that new socialist party congress must be called if Brussels meeting should agree on any changes in present text contrary to agreed socialist conditions. In such an event it would be expected that entire socialist party would vote unanimously against such a proposal for German rearmament.
I believe Mendes has committed a perhaps irretrievable error even in terms of French domestic politics. There remains a possibility that situation might be saved by judicious firmness on part of other governments at Brussels, and by United States and United Kingdom not deviating from a resolute course.