Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/8–1354: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) and the United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community (Bruce) to the Department of State ¹

top secret
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Paris, August 13, 1954—5 p.m.

620. Limit distribution. From Dillon and Bruce. Re Embtel 548, August 9.²

“Little NATO” proposal of Parodi group was flatly rejected by Mendes-France. Document prepared by De Seynes was adopted as basis for Cabinet negotiations. After two days’ discussions, draft working document before French Cabinet this morning included suggestions for “improving” the present text of EDC treaty summarized below. Summary is prepared from memory. No notes could be taken. Parentheses are ours.

1. French Government would unilaterally give an undertaking to consult the Parliament before taking any decisions on a wide variety of subjects which require the unanimous consent of the Council of Ministers, i.e., decisions on recruitment, mobilization, weighted voting, etc.

2. General directive would be issued by Council requiring commissariat to carry out administration through decentralized services. Services would be European and not national.

3. Agreement would be reached promising unanimous concurrence of Council to extend 18-month period for interim territorial organization along national lines if commissariat recommends extension as feasible.

4. General directive would be issued by Council, noting statements of the US and UK Governments regarding the unlimited duration of NAT and maintenance of forces on the Continent of Europe, and stating that if there is a change in these policies, an immediate re-examination of the situation by the EDC participants would be held under Article 128 of the treaty with each participant free to determine whether it can continue to participate in EDC treaty. (Change in treaty as presently drafted but acceptable presentation possible.)

5. General directive would be issued by Council requiring an immediate re-examination of situation in case of reunification of Germany with each participant free to determine whether it can continue to participate in EDC treaty (Change in treaty as presently drafted but acceptable presentation possible.)

6. Lisbon decision would be made public and concurred in stating that each nation would keep its present position in NATO institutions (France does not wish to lose position in standing group).³

7. France and Germany would issue resolution stating intention to always have equal representation in EDC institutions.

8. General directive would be issued by Council under Articles 68 and 77 of the treaty permitting integration of forces only in forward areas (Forces de Couverture). (Purpose is to assure that no German units would be stationed on French soil. Presentation without changing treaty might be possible.)

9. General directive would be issued by Council permitting commissariat to place orders for military production net of production taxes. (Military production would be given standing similar to exports.)

10. General directive would be issued by Council stating that common budget expenditures for heavy military items listed in Annex II of Article 107 would not be included within 85%–115% transfer provisions of financial protocol but would be budgeted separately with payments freely transferable. (Change in treaty but different presentation might be acceptable. Purpose is to make placing of new orders for soft military supplies in France easier.)

11. General directive stating that if any Parliament wishes to propose changes in EDC treaty in first three years after ratification, a conference would be held immediately to consider them.

12. General directive stating that any nation a member of NATO can join EDC automatically without requiring action under Article 129. (Presentation without change in treaty should be possible.)

13. The commissariat would be invited not to have recourse to the court against any action of a member state for a period of five years.

14. Provisions of protocol giving France right to decisions on appointment, rank, advancement and personnel generally are to be strengthened. (Discrimination against Germans and change in treaty.)

15. For three to five year period all common regulations on military doctrine, recruitment, discipline, schools, languages, etc. will be held up and national regulations applied except that all changes (or new regulations in Germany) must be in direction of common European regulations in consultation with Commissariat. (Discrimination against Germans.)

16. General directive stating that Commissariat shall not have any licensing action over atomic energy for civilian uses. (Change in treaty but acceptable presentation is possible.)

17. General directive stating explicitly that Federal Republic cannot use option under Article 31 permitting national authorities to confer ranks. (Change in treaty and discrimination against Germans.)

18. General directive stating that, in view of changed circumstances, Article 38 is no longer applicable. Committee of Prime Ministers would be established to survey movement towards Europe and to give instructions on steps to be taken. Direct election of members of EDC Common Assembly would go through as proposed. (Saar settlement would have to come under Council of Europe thus knocking out basic feature of Adenauer-Teitgen “ad referendum” agreement. (Change in treaty).)

19. General directive stating that any one nation by mere announcement that its vital interests are adversely affected can suspend any decision of Commissariat until such time as there is conciliation between Council and Commissariat. This suspension would remain in effect until lifted by unanimous vote of Council. The suggested directive would exist for an eight-year period. (Change in treaty and basic violation of “real but limited” powers to a supra-national executive institution.)

This document is not final. It is still opposed vigorously by both anti-EDC and pro-EDC Ministers. It now appears possible that anti-EDC Ministers will not resign as they threatened to do. In these circumstances it is difficult for pro-EDC Ministers to resign and it may be wise for Bourges-Maunoury to accept invitation of Mendes to go with him to Brussels. Pro-EDC Ministers are still confident that tactics reported in paragraph 5 of Embtel 548 will succeed. They are said to believe that they can obtain approval of Mendes to change number 19 above which they consider most unacceptable of the suggestions. Pro-Europeans would propose that veto of a nation could not apply in cases where treaty makes specific provision giving powers Commissariat or where Council had previously given Commissariat a directive.

Reported attitude of Mendes towards Brussels meeting is encouraging. According to our information, he intends to present texts for negotiation and not a “take it or leave it” basis. Mendes is said to insist that he must reach a final proposal acceptable to the other EDC countries and that he will not insist on any change which would require new parliamentary action in other countries.

Above is for your information only. We are doing what we appropriately can do to influence final outcome. In this internal struggle acceptability or unacceptability of changes in EDC Treaty is less at issue than position of party groups in domestic political situation.

Dillon

1. Repeated to London, Rome, The Hague, Brussels, eyes only for the Ambassadors, to Bonn eyes only for Conant, and to Luxembourg eyes only for the Minister.
2. Not printed; it reported that at that time Mendès-France had not yet made known his intentions regarding EDC but that he had before him two possible approaches. One, embodied in a paper drafted by Parodi, was apparently an elaboration of the “little NATO” concept referred to in telegram 504 from Paris, Aug. 5, p. 1023; the second, embodied in a document drafted by De Seynes, included new suggestions for changes in the existing EDC Treaty text. “Most of the new suggestions would, in fact, change EDC treaty and would probably require new action in Federal Republic and Benelux Parliaments unless other countries stretched interpretation of treaty beyond reason or would go much too far in discrimination against Germany to be acceptable” (740.5/8–954).
3. For documentation on the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council at Lisbon, Feb. 20–25, 1952, see pp. 107 ff.