740.5/8–1254: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State 1
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603. I saw Mendes-France for about 45 minutes this morning in company with Reilly, as Jebb is still on vacation. Mendes opened by saying that the difficulties facing him on EDC had proved even greater than he had expected. He said that his position was personally most difficult as many of those who had been strong and consistent supporters of his govt are strongly opposed to any EDC type of solution. He said that he will have to lose many votes from the right and among the socialists and will have to replace them with votes from parties who have been consistently opposed to him, i.e. MRP. He said this made his task unpleasant and difficult.
He then said that he is submitting preliminary drafts of his ideas to a cabinet meeting scheduled for 11:30 this morning, and he hopes that a definite governmental position will be established in the ministerial meeting scheduled for Friday afternoon. He said it was possible however that an additional meeting wld be required on Saturday Morning.
He said he expected the resignations of some anti-EDC ministers and possibly also some pro-EDC ministers. However, he said his present expectation was that the resignations would be rather limited in number and he mentioned 3, 4 or 5 as an example of his ideas. He said he plans to distribute the responsibility for these ministries on an interim basis among the remaining members of his cabinet. If the government shld survive the EDC debate he would then remake his government on a permanent basis.
[Page 1027]Mendes then said that the pressure on him personally was very strong and that it came from people and parties who had always supported him. He felt he had to take their views into account and it was because of this that he would suggest changes when he went to Brussels. Mendes said he still hoped and expected to circulate his proposals to the EDC countries and to the U.S. and U.K. on Saturday the 14th, but it was possible that this might be delayed for one day. In talking of the Brussels conference he mentioned in passing that the Saar would have to be discussed as well as his ideas for changes in EDC treaty.
Mendes then came to the main point of his interview, which was the following:
He said he felt that the changes which he would suggest in the EDC treaty would not of themselves be sufficient to guarantee passage at this time. He said he felt that he must take account of the Russian proposals for a further meeting on Germany2 and the effect these proposals had had on French public opinion and in parliament. He said he was under no illusions that there would be any chance of a favorable result from a four-power meeting in the situation as it stands today. However, he said he did not know what the Russians would do in the next two weeks.
Mendes said that John’s press interview3 was obviously directed entirely against France and was an attempt to defeat the EDC. He said he did not feel that John’s statements would have any effect but that they were indicative of Russian tactics and, therefore, he wld not be surprised if the Russians made some other move within the next two weeks.
He said that pressure for another meeting with the Russians on Germany was very great. Nevertheless, he was not prepared to accept discussions at this time as they would be of no use. However, he felt that after the national assembly had passed the EDC in first reading, [Page 1028] a position of strength would have been created which might make possible further negotiations. He felt that the reply to the Russian note should be made around the first of September after the EDC had been passed in first reading and that this reply should not accept the Russian offer for negotiations, but neither shld it give the appearance of closing the door to such negotiations. If the Russians should give some proof of willingness to negotiate reasonably on Germany, he felt that the west should be agreeable to holding another four-power conference. He said that if there should be no further meeting with the Russians, it was imperative that the west, particularly France, show that they were not responsible for the failure to meet.
Mendes then said that the time table for EDC ratification fortunately fitted this thesis. He said he had inquired of Rome regarding the length of time that would be required for Italy to ratify the EDC and had been informed that completion of the Italian ratification process could not be expected until some time in December. He said the French Assembly would recess probably the end of the first week in September and this would not in any event allow time for consideration of EDC by the Council of the Republic.
French parliament would reconvene during the latter part of October and at that time EDC would come up before the Council of the Republic. He then said that the Council of the Republic was more strongly anti-EDC than the national assembly, but he seemed far less positive on this point than in any previous discussions I have had with him. Whereas previously he has always stated that there was a constitutional majority against the EDC in the Senate, today he confined himself to saying that the Senate would probably vote against the EDC and might even do so by a constitutional majority.
He then said that the National Assembly would consider the EDC in second reading toward the end of November and would complete the ratification process probably in early December, either at the same time or slightly before the completion of the ratification process in Italy. He pointed out that this would give ample time for another attempt to reach an agreement with the Russians during which time the Russians would clearly be on notice as to what the alternative would be. He said it was most important for French public opinion that it be made very clear that the Russians were solely responsible for any lack of progress.
In answer to a question of mine, he said that the French were completing a draft of a reply to the Russian note embodying these ideas which should be ready for submission to the working group in London tomorrow. He said there was no great hurry in completing the draft as as he would not want to make any reply until around September 1, after EDC debate.
In answer to a further question from me, he said he would want to [Page 1029] make some statement during the course of the EDC debate as to what his position was on the Russian note. This would be necessary to obtain the extra votes which he felt were necessary. He said he realized such a statement would have to be very carefully worded so as neither to indicate acceptance of the Russian request for a conference, nor refusal. It should indicate that the door was being kept open and that the Russians were being encouraged to give some sign of willingness to negotiate. I purposely did not ask him if he wished the US to associate themselves with him in such a statement during the course of EDC debate, and he did not at this time make any such request.
Reilly then observed that while His Majesty’s Government would of course feel that negotiations with the Russians would be facilitated by the passage of EDC in first reading, he was sure that His Majesty’s Government would much prefer not to negotiate again with the Russians until the ratification process had been fully completed. Mendes replied that he felt such a position would be impossible for him as he was sure he did not have the political strength to obtain the completion of the ratification process unless the Russians had been given the opportunity for another conference, and that the holding of such a conference had been made impossible by Russian intransigence, or alternatively that such a conference had been held and had failed to achieve any results.
Mendes then said that in yesterday’s Cabinet meeting two Ministers, who had been consistently anti-EDC, said that if such a course were followed regarding Russian negotiations, they would feel that they would have to change their position to one of support for EDC. Mendes asked that the greatest care be taken to keep these opinions of his in strictest confidence, so as to facilitate his task during the coming days. He said that leak in this morning’s Figaro had been most unfortunate but that in spite of this he wanted to emphasize his desire that these views of his be treated in strictest confidence for the time being.
In closing Mendes said he wanted to re-emphasize that because of the Italian time table for ratification his proposal would not cause any delay in the entry into force of EDC.
- Repeated to London, Bonn, and Moscow.↩
- Reference is presumably to the Soviet note of July 24 to the Western Powers suggesting a meeting to discuss collective security in Europe and an oral presentation along similar lines on Aug. 4; see the editorial note, p. 521. Documentation on the Soviet proposals and the Western response is presented in volume vii .↩
- Reference is to Dr. Otto John, head of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and chief of the Federal Republic’s Intelligence Service who crossed to East Berlin on July 20, 1954, under mysterious circumstances. On Aug. 11, 1954, John publicly denounced what he claimed to be Chancellor Adenauer’s policy of unilateral cooperation with the United States which was leading to the remilitarization and renazification of West Germany with world war an inevitable result. Debate on the “John defection” took place in the Bundestag shortly thereafter and the government was faced with a vote of confidence which it won 223–128 on Sept. 17, 1954. John subsequently “redefected” to the Federal Republic in December 1955 where he was promptly charged with and convicted of “treasonable activities.” John was given a prison term of 4 years but was released in July 1958 under an amnesty granted by President Heuss.↩