Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

662A.00/7–1554

Report of Anglo-American Study Group on Germany, Held at London, July 5–12, 1954¹

secret

[London, July 12, 1954.]

A Study Group of officials of the United States and the United Kingdom met in London from July 5 to July 12, 1954. The task of the Study Group was to work out the aspects of the programme set forth in the minute agreed between the President and the Prime Minister in Washington on June 27 (Document 1). The Study Group proceeded as directed in point 9 of that minute.

2. The results of the Study Group’s work are set out in the following documents:—

(a) A chronological programme (Document 2) for the carrying out of Anglo-American policy. This programme is based on the premise that, in the event of a French failure to ratify the E.D.C. Treaty before recessing for the summer, the restoration of sovereignty to the Federal Republic “should be accomplished in a fashion which would as little as possible militate against ratification by France of the E.D.C. in the fall”. (Point 3 of Document 1.) Accordingly the programme provides for an Anglo-American suggestion to the French Government of Four Power Protocols bringing into force the Bonn Conventions less all references therein to the E.D.C. Treaty.

(b) Two Draft Protocols and exchanges of notes^* (Document 3) to carry out the procedure indicated above. These Protocols provide for the entry into force of the Conventions and in addition, make provision, during a period to be determined, for

(i) reserving the position in regard to German rearmament.

(ii) the financial support of the Allied forces in Germany. The Protocols are so drafted as to provide for two different eventualities, viz. either that the French Assembly might debate the E.D.C. Treaty during the present session and reject it or that the session might come to an end without the Treaty having been brought to a decision.

The reason why there are two Protocols is that, so far as procedure in the United States is concerned, it is necessary to submit to the Senate only the proposal to separate the Bonn Conventions from the E.D.C. Treaty. Therefore the first Protocol is designed for this purpose, while the second Protocol, reserving the position in regard to German rearmament and covering support costs, etc., would be put into force as an executive agreement by the United States Government. The two agreements would have the same validity and are to be ratified together by the German Federal Republic.

The Group were agreed that there should be an Article 3 of the second Protocol the object of which would be to preclude its use by a Signatory, viz. France, to maintain disarmament controls in Germany for what might be the considerable period pending the entry into force of the E.D.C. Treaty or the conclusion of a final agreement between the Four Powers about a German defence contribution. The Group were unable in the time at their disposal to agree on how this should best be done. The various drafts which have been under consideration are set out at the Annex to this Covering Report.

(c) A short paper (Document 4) on political concessions by the Three Powers to the Federal Republic failing the conclusion of the Four Power Protocols. This method might be employed in the event of a French refusal to join with the Two Powers as at (b) above.

(d) A paper (Document 5) on action to be taken in respect of the Bonn Conventions in the event of a French refusal to cooperate on the lines suggested in (b) and (c) above. Most of the provisions of the Bonn Conventions could be brought into effect without French agreement insofar as they would be

(i) matters within the competence of each High Commissioner in his own Zone;

(ii) matters which could be dealt with by the Allied High Commission acting by majority vote, the British and American High Commissioners outvoting the French High Commissioner.

The only things which could not be done as above, i.e. by overriding the French without infringing the tripartite agreements, would be to put an end to the Occupation in the U.S. and U.K. Zones of Germany and to deprive of authority the Allied High Commission and its organs including the Military Security Board. The termination of the Occupation is of course the major German requirement. As against this, the consequences of breaking the tripartite agreements would be serious.

The suggestion will be noted that the U.S. and U.K. elements in Bonn should work out the detailed application of the various courses discussed.

As is explained in the paper referred to in (a) above, the German Federal Chancellor would be consulted before action of the sort under consideration, i.e. independent of the French was decided upon.

3. The Study Group did not consider point (10) of the agreed minute (Document 1) because in the view of the U.S. Members the question of alternatives to the E.D.C. was one for study at a later time. The United Kingdom members of the Group however explained the lines of British thinking at the working level on the lines of the attached Document No. 6. The U.S. members took note of these views and undertook to report them to their Government.

4. The Study Group submit their report for approval. The immediate action required is the approach to the French Government, the consequent approaches to the other Governments and the action to be taken in Congress and in Parliament.

Annex

Drafts of Unresolved Article in Second Protocol

(1) For a reasonable time in order to permit the ratification and entry into force of the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community, or other arrangements for comparable objectives regarding the form and manner in which the Federal Republic will make a contribution to Western defence, the Federal Republic undertakes not to establish military forces.

(2) If the Treaty on the establishment of the European Defence Community shall not have entered into force by (90 days from signature of this Protocol), the Signatory States shall, at the request of any of them, review the provisions of Article 2 of the present Protocol with a view to obtaining an immediate contribution by the Federal Republic of Germany to the defence of the free world.

(3) If the Treaty on the establishment of the E.D.C. shall not have entered into force by 90 days from signature of this protocol, the signatory states shall at the request of any of them meet for the purpose of making arrangements for obtaining an immediate contribution by the Federal Republic of Germany to the defence of the free world.

[The above draft would be accompanied by changing paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the Second Protocol to read as follows:

“Until the entry into force of the Treaty on the establishment of the E.D.C. or until 60 days after one of the signatories shall have called for a meeting as provided in Article 3 thereof the following provisions of this Article shall apply”.]²

(4) If the Treaty on the Establishment of the European Defence Community shall not have entered into force by 90 days from the signature of this Protocol the Three Powers shall, at the request of any signatory state, meet with the Federal Republic of Germany for the purpose of agreeing, jointly or severally, with the Federal Republic upon comparable arrangements for obtaining its immediate contribution to the defence of the free world.

[The above draft would be accompanied by changing paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the Second Protocol to read as follows:

“Until the entry into force of the Treaty on the establishment of the European Defence Community or of the comparable arrangements referred to in Article 3, the following provisions of this Article shall apply”.]

(5) If the Treaty on the Establishment of the E.D.C. shall not have entered into force by ninety days from the signature of this protocol, the three Powers shall, at the request of any signatory State, meet with the Federal Republic of Germany for the purpose of agreeing, jointly or severally, with the Federal Republic arrangements for obtaining its immediate contribution to the defence of the free world as part of a system of mutual collective security.

[The above draft would be accompanied by changing paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the Second Protocol to read as follows:

“Until the entry into force of the Treaty on the establishment of the E.D.C. or of the arrangements referred to in Article 3, the following provisions of this Article shall apply”.]

Note: The above drafts are based on the assumption that the French Assembly adjourns without voting on the E.D.C. Treaty. It should, however, be noted that not all the above formulae would be equally applicable to a situation in which the French Assembly had rejected the E.D.C. Treaty.

[Enclosure 1—Document 1]

Minute Agreed Between the President and Prime Minister in Washington on June 27, 1954

[Here follows text as printed on page 988.]

[Enclosure 2—Document 2]

Programme for Carrying Out Anglo-American Policy

The object of Anglo-American policy remains to secure the early ratification of the E.D.C. Treaty and Bonn Conventions. If, however, it becomes clear that French ratification cannot be obtained before the French Assembly rises in August, the two Governments must then endeavour to persuade the French Government to join with them in bringing the Bonn Conventions into force at an early date independently of the E.D.C. Treaty. There are indications that French officials are themselves contemplating a solution on these lines. But the French Government may wish to defer any such action until after the French Assembly reconvenes in October.

Meanwhile we must prepare for a less favourable situation, viz. that the French may not at the end of their present Parliamentary session have ratified the E.D.C. Treaty and that they may have resisted or temporized upon the U.S./U.K. suggestion for bringing the Bonn Conventions into force separately. In that situation the two Governments would have to reveal to the French Government their intention to proceed by themselves if necessary. This could not be done in any detail until the two Governments had first consulted the Federal Chancellor and made sure that he approved.

On the foregoing basis, we might aim at the following timetable:—

(i) As soon as Governments have approved the recommendations of the Anglo-American Study Group, the United States and United Kingdom Ambassadors in Paris would inform the French Government that, while the entry into force of the E.D.C. Treaty and the Bonn Conventions remains their object, they wish, in the event of a French failure to take Parliamentary action upon the E.D.C. Treaty before the summer recess, to separate the Bonn Conventions from the E.D.C. Treaty. This would in effect be a general indication of the action which the two Governments would wish to take in detail at a later stage (see (iv) below). At the same time the French would be informed of the intention of the two Governments to inform their legislatures, so that the two governments would be free to act as necessary during the parliamentary recess. The French Government would not at this stage be shown the draft Protocols or informed of their existence. (All dates approximate)July 12

(ii) Very shortly afterwards a communication would be made to the German Federal Chancellor and to the Benelux Governments in the same sense. A more general communication to the North Atlantic Council would also be appropriate shortly thereafter. July 13

(iii) Action insofar as may be necessary would then have to be taken in Congress and in Parliament. Action in the former might take the form of a Presidential message asking for a resolution advising and consenting to the necessary action on the part of the President. On the British side, so far as Parliament is concerned, it is intended to make a statement in the Foreign Affairs Debate on July 14 on the general lines of the draft Protocols (though without mentioning their existence). The object would be to enable Her Majesty’s Government to sign the Protocols and ratify them during the recess without any presentation to Parliament. July 15

(iv) If (a) it becomes evident about two weeks before the French Assembly is scheduled to recess that no action is likely to be taken on the E.D.C. Treaty or (b) the French Assembly reject the E.D.C. Treaty, we should open formal negotiations with the French Government for the separation of the Bonn Conventions from the E.D.C. by means of the Protocols. We should show them whichever of the Protocols would be appropriate to (a) or (b) above. Aug. 1

(v) The Federal Chancellor, the Benelux Governments and the North Atlantic Council would then be informed. Aug. 2 or Aug. 17

(vi) If the French Government return a favourable reply to our proposal for Four Power Protocols in either form, the necessary Four Power negotiations would take place in Bonn with as little delay as possible. The Protocols as agreed might be signed on behalf of the Western Powers by their High Commissioners. Sept. 1

(vii) The Benelux Governments and the North Atlantic Council would be kept informed.

(viii) If the French Government express agreement in principle with the proposal to separate the Bonn Conventions from the E.D.C. Treaty, but are unwilling, for Parliamentary or other reasons, to do so through the medium of the protocols, it would be necessary to consider how nearly the same result could be achieved by action on the part of the three High Commissioners. We should ascertain from the French whether in practice they would be willing to go far enough on this basis to satisfy the Germans. If not, we should not allow discussion of such a procedure to cause delay. Sept.^† 2

(ix) If the French return either a temporizing or a negative reply to the proposal in (viii), we would convey to them a grave warning that there must be Anglo-United States action to restore German sovereignty independently of France. Consultation would then take place with the Federal Chancellor.^‡ When we had obtained the Chancellor’s views, and if the threat of independent action had meanwhile had no effect upon the French, we would then inform them in somewhat greater detail of our intention to proceed without them and make a public statement of our intentions. Sept. 10

Note: The above timetable is tight and can only be approximate since it endeavours to cover so many hypothetical situations. It will of course be necessary for the two Governments to consult together in the light of the circumstances at each stage.

[Enclosure 3—Document 3]

Protocol to the Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany

The United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic of the one part, and the Federal Republic of Germany of the other part:

Whereas there was signed at Bonn on May 26, 1952, a Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany; a Convention on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany; a Finance Convention; a Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation; and an Agreement on the Tax Treatment of the Forces and their Members;

Whereas the above-mentioned Conventions do not enter into force in accordance with their terms until the entry into force of the Treaty on the Establishment of the European Defense Community;

Whereas it remains the common aim of the Signatory States that the Federal Republic of Germany shall take its place as an equal partner in the community of Western nations where it can make its proper contribution to the defence of the free world;

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Subject only to the provisions of the present Protocol and the related Protocol mentioned in Article 2, the provisions of the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, the Convention on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Finance Convention, the Convention on the Settlement of Matters arising out of the War and the Occupation and the Agreement on the Tax Treatment of the Forces and their Members shall enter into force on the entry into force of this Protocol, except that references to the European Defence Community shall be deemed to be deleted but only until the entry into force of the Treaty on the Establishment of the European Defence Community.

Article 2

The Three Powers and the Federal Republic have concluded a related Protocol which will enter into force simultaneously with the present Protocol.

Article 3

1. The present Protocol and the related Protocol shall be ratified or approved by the Signatory States at the earliest possible date. Instruments of ratification or approval shall be deposited with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany.

2. The present Protocol and the related Protocol shall enter into force immediately upon the deposit of instruments of ratification or approval of both protocols by all the Signatory States.

In Faith Whereof, etc.

Protocol on a Defence Contribution by the Federal Republic of Germany

[Note: The protocol has been drafted to cover two eventualities:—

(a) The French Assembly having adjourned without voting on the E.D.C. Treaty.

(b) The French Assembly having rejected the Treaty. Certain Articles of the Draft which apply in either case are printed across the page. Those in the left-hand column will apply only in case (a) and those in the right-hand column only in case (b).]

The United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic of the one part, and the Federal Republic of Germany of the other part

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

1. The Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany agree on the need for a contribution, at the earliest possible date, by the Federal Republic to the defence of the free world.

2. Negotiations shall commence immediately with a view to concluding an agreement to that end.

Article 2

§ 1. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty on the Establishment of the European Defence Community, the following provisions of this Article shall apply.

§ 1. Pending the entry into force of the agreement mentioned in Article 1, the following provisions of this Article shall apply.

2. The Federal Republic of Germany agrees that the rights and powers of the Federal and Land Authorities under Chapter 1 of the Convention on the Settlement of Matters arising out of the War and the Occupation to repeal, deprive of effect or amend legislation enacted by the Occupation Authorities shall not be exercised in the fields of disarmament and demilitarisation. The production in the Federal Republic of Germany of the war materials listed in Annexes I and II to Article 107 of the Treaty on the Establishment of the European Defence Community, and the manufacture of prototypes of and technical research concerning such materials shall remain prohibited. Exemptions from this prohibition may, however, be granted by a Joint Commission, to be immediately established, in which representatives of each of the Signatory States shall participate on a basis of equality.

3. The Federal Republic shall continue to meet the costs in Deutsche-mark of the support of the Forces of the Three Powers and of other Sending States and the members of such Forces stationed in the Federal territory, provided, however, that such costs shall not exceed a monthly average of DM.600 million. Funds for such costs which have been made available to the Three Powers before the entry into force of the present Protocol and which have not been expended to meet commitments made prior to the effective date of this Protocol shall remain available for twelve/eighteen months^║ thereafter and be used for payment of such commitments.

Article 3

[See Covering Report]

In Faith Whereof the undersigned representatives duly authorised thereto by their respective Governments have signed the present Protocol being the related Protocol mentioned in Article 2 of the Protocol to the Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany.

Draft Exchange of Notes

Federal Chancellor to the three High Commissioners individually

Mr. High Commissioner

In the course of negotiation of the Protocol to the Convention on Relations between the three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany and the related Protocol signed to-day, note was taken of the various letters exchanged in May, 1952 in connexion with the signing of the Convention on Relations and the related Conventions and in connexion with the signing of the Treaty on the Establishment of the European Defence Community. The texts of these letters are set out in the Federal Republic’s Official Gazette (Bundesgesetzblatt) 1954, Number 3, Part II at pages 242 to 320 inclusive and at pages 416 to 418 inclusive.

In the name of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, I have the honour to advise you that the Federal Republic for its part confirms the assurances given and the obligations undertaken by the Federal Republic in these letters and I request confirmation that the Government of the United States of America/United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland/French Republic for their part confirm the assurances given and the obligations undertaken by them in these letters.

The High Commissioner to the Federal Chancellor

Mr. Chancellor

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your note of to-day’s date in which you, in the name of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, confirm the assurances given and the obligations undertaken by the Federal Republic in the various letters referred to in your note.

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America/ United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland/French Republic I confirm the assurances given and the obligations undertaken by the Government of the United States of America/United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland/French Republic in these letters.

Draft Note From the High Commissioners to the Federal Chancellor

Mr. Chancellor: The three Powers advise you that the references to the European Defence Community which “shall be deemed to be deleted pending the entry into force of the Treaty on the Establishment of the European Defence Community”, within the meaning of Article 1 of the Protocol to the Convention on Relations between the three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, signed today, are, in the English [French and German] texts, the following:

Convention on Relations
Article 4, paragraph 4.	Delete whole paragraph.
Article 5, paragraph 2.	Delete the words—“and the European Defence Community”.
Article 11.	Delete whole Article.
Forces Convention
Article 17, paragraph 8.	Delete second sentence.
Article 38, paragraph 1.	Delete the separate clause at end of second sentence.
Article 39, paragraph 2.	Delete second sentence.
Article 44, paragraph 2.	Delete eleventh to thirtieth words, inclusive.
Article 47, paragraph 2. Article 50.	Delete whole paragraph.
Article 49.	Delete whole Article.
Article 50.	Delete whole Article.
Annex B to Forces Convention
Paragraph 3.	Delete second sentence.
	Delete whole Annex.
Annex C to Forces Convention
Finance Convention
Article 1, paragraph 2(b).	Delete from “provided that” to the end.
Article 3, paragraph 4.	Delete “by adhering and contributing to the European Defense Community in accordance with the agreements and arrangements pertaining to the Community and” and “which are not members of the European Defence Community”.
Article 3, paragraph 5(a).	Delete “not members of the European Defence Community”; “the Community”, and “not members of the Community”.
Article 3, paragraph 5(b).	Delete whole sub-paragraph.
Article 4, paragraph 2.	Delete whole paragraph.
Article 4, paragraph 3.	Delete from the beginning of the paragraph to the end of sub-paragraph (c).

It is the understanding of the three Powers that references in subsequent Articles of the Finance Convention to Article 4, paragraphs 2 and 3 thereof are to be understood as references to Article 4, paragraph 3 as amended above and paragraph 3 of Article 2 of the Protocol on a Defence Contribution by the Federal Republic of Germany.

Article 4, paragraph 4.	Delete whole paragraph.
Article 5, paragraph 3.	Delete last sentence.
Article 6, paragraph 1.	Delete “and the arrangements made thereunder for effecting the transit of the funds through the budget of the European Defence Community”.
Article 8, paragraph 18.	Delete whole paragraph.
Article 13, paragraph 3.	Delete “the European Defence Community”.
Article 14.	Delete last sentence.
Article 16.	Delete from “especially” to the end.
Article 18, paragraph 1.	Delete whole paragraph.
Article 18, paragraph 2.	Delete “which are not members of the European Defence Community”.
Article 19, sub-paragraph (a).	Delete “paragraph 4 of Article 4”.
Annex A Section 9.	Delete whole section.

It is the understanding of the three Powers that the Finance Convention shall be applied as if all references to dates therein were references to. . . . . . .^¶ and the Settlement Convention as if references in Chapter 11 thereof to 1st October, 1953 were references to. . . . . . .^¶

We shall be glad to receive your confirmation that you are in agreement with the understandings set out in this letter.

[Enclosure 4—Document 4]

Political Concessions by the Three Powers to the Federal Republic Without Conclusion of Four Power Protocols in the Forms Proposed in Document 3

A possible alternative to proceeding by means of the Protocols (Document 3³) would be for the United States, the United Kingdom and France to conclude agreements with the Federal Government (in the case of the United States they would be “executive agreements”) to bring about substantially the result which the Protocols would achieve. The extent to which this could be done would depend on how far Governments (more especially the French Government) were prepared to go in the absence of parliamentary approval of the Protocols.

2. The French might on the other hand propose Allied High Commission/Federal Government Agreements as the form, rather than strictly intergovernmental Agreements. While this would be legally possible, it would not end the Occupation, which is the major German requirement. Moreover in those circumstances the content of the Agreements might be so small that independent United Kingdom/ United States action on the lines proposed in Document 5 would be the only way of holding the position in Germany.

3. The considerations in paragraph 2 above would apply equally to any French proposal to proceed to put the Bonn Conventions into force by Occupation legislation.

[Enclosure 5—Document 5]

Action to be Taken in Respect of the Bonn Conventions in the Event of French Refusal to Co-operate

I. Introduction

1. If the French Government refuse to be a party to protocols to bring the Bonn Conventions into force (Document 3), and if they likewise refuse to be a party to any similar agreement not requiring Parliamentary action or to Occupation legislation (Document 4), the U.K. and U.S. Governments would nevertheless wish to give effect to the Bonn Conventions to the maximum extent possible.

2. The provisions of the Bonn Conventions may be divided into four classes according to what authorities are competent to act in each case:

(a) Matters which are within the competence of each High Commissioner acting separately in his own Zone. (Revised Charter of the Allied High Commission V (2).) Examples are war criminals, displaced persons and restitution.

(b) Matters which may be dealt with by the Allied High Commission acting by majority vote, either with or without appeal to governments resulting in a thirty days delay. (Revised Charter of the Allied High Commission, Annex A.) This would cover a large number of matters such as civil aviation, external assets, decartelisation, deconcentration, foreign interests in Germany.

(c) Matters outside the competence of the High Commission on which the U.K. and U.S. Governments can agree with the Federal Government without requiring French consent. Examples are some of the political clauses of the Convention on Relations.

(d) Matters which require French agreement before any action can legally be taken (see next paragraph). Any decision to override the French in such cases would entail a clear breach of the Tripartite Agreements relating to the control of Germany. These are the revised Occupation Statute, the revised Charter of the Allied High Commission, the revised Agreement on Industrial Controls with the related governmental instructions and the Charter of the Military Security Board.

3. It will thus be seen that we can put into effect all the provisions of the Bonn Conventions, except for those in (d) above, without the agreement of the French, but equally without breach in our treaty relations with them. The only things which we could not do by this means are unfortunately those to which the Germans attach most importance, that is to put an end to the Occupation in the U.S. and U.K. Zones and to deprive, the Allied High Commission and its organs of authority. The two major results which cannot be avoided would be:—

(i) The Germans would still have to submit amendments to the Basic Law for the unanimous approval of the Allied High Commission.

(ii) The present Military Security Board could not be abolished nor could controls in the disarmament field be restricted to those provided in the E.D.C. Treaty.

Another result would be that international agreements would also have to be submitted to the Allied High Commission but the French alone could not prevent their entry into force at the end of 21 days delay.

4. The question at issue is whether, in order to take these additional steps towards granting Germany her sovereignty, it is worthwhile, in our own or the German interest, to break international agreements with consequent serious risks. Whatever action is taken under the following heads should be so framed as to make it as easy as possible for the French to join with us at the time or later.

II. Action Under the Existing Agreements

5. There are three methods by which we could give effect to provisions of the Bonn Conventions in categories (a), (b) and (c) above, without infringing existing agreements:—

(i) By means of an agreement or agreements between governments reproducing the provisions of the Conventions suitably amended. These agreements would then be approved by the German Parliament and would thus become German law. They would then be submitted to the Allied High Commission which would approve them by a two to one vote, though in some cases an appeal to governments by the French would be expected which would result in thirty days delay. They would then enter into force. Some related Occupation legislation would be necessary in certain cases.

All the provisions of the Bonn Conventions in Categories (a), (b) and (c) could be dealt with in this way, but see (iii) below.

(ii) Many provisions, and particularly those in the Settlement Convention, could be enacted as Occupation legislation. We could simply enact the substance of the Bonn Conventions by ordinances, which would be adopted as appropriate by a two to one vote of the Allied High Commission or by the individual High Commissioners for their respective zones.

(iii) Some matters, such as those concerning the relations between the U.S. and U.K. and the Federal Government and the exercise of Allied powers, could be dealt with in letters to the Federal Government setting out the intentions or assurances of the U.S. and the U.K. towards the Federal Republic and vice versa. An advantage of this would be that although such matters are not subject to the French veto, they do affect the whole status of the Allies in Germany and it would be asking for trouble to submit them to the French in the Allied High Commission.

6. The methods discussed above can be applied as follows. Many of the provisions of the Convention on Relations, the whole of the Forces Convention and some parts of the Settlement Convention can most easily be put into effect as agreements between the Governments of the U.K., the U.S. and the Federal Government (method (i) in paragraph 5 above). With respect to other provisions, however, there is some doubt as to the best method of proceeding:—

(a) Much of the Settlement Convention can be enacted as Occupation legislation (method (ii)). The U.K. element of the Study Group prefer this method because they feel that it has the following advantages:—

(i) Such legislation can be put into effect immediately without awaiting German ratification;

(ii) The French might prefer to submit to, and so might later join in, measures prepared by their Allies rather than measures presented to them by the Germans.

The U.S. element on the other hand prefer method (i) to Occupation legislation because it would doubtless be more acceptable to the Federal Republic to obtain the Bonn Conventions as part of an agreement on a basis of equality.

(b) The U.K. members of the Group attach importance to making full use of method (iii) above, i.e. declarations of intention and assurances which will not be submitted to the Allied High Commission, as they consider this an additional means of avoiding friction with the French. It will also get round the doubtful question as to whether some of the matters in the Convention on Relations are in fact properly within the competence of the High Commission. Here again, the U.S. element prefer the maximum use of method (i).

Both of these differences can only be resolved after eventual consultation with the Chancellor.

7. Whatever may eventually be decided as to the best methods to adopt, the provisions of the Conventions would be followed as closely as possible. Some provisions could be applied throughout the Federal territory (e.g. the provision permitting civil aviation); others would be effective only in the U.K. and U.S. Zones (e.g. Restitution). Some would be omitted, (e.g. the undertaking to disband Civilian Service Organisations—C.S.O.). References to the E.D.C. would have to be deleted, certain dates changed, the composition of the various boards and tribunals adjusted, and so on. It is considered desirable to set up an Arbitration Tribunal similar to that to be established under the Convention on Relations but it would be preferable to do this by a separate agreement, clearly defining the jurisdiction and standing of the Tribunal in relation to the Occupation Authorities.

8. One particularly important matter of substance that will have to be covered is the use of our powers under the Occupation Statute after these arrangements have been put into force. It is considered that we should give an assurance to the Germans that we would not exercise those powers except in the reserved fields set out in Article 2 of the Convention on Relations, in the circumstances of emergency envisaged in Article 5 (2) of the Convention on Relations, in the field of disarmament and demilitarisation, or upon request of the appropriate German authorities.

III. Action entailing a breach of existing Agreements

9. After consultation with the Federal Chancellor we may consider it essential to take additional steps towards re-establishing German sovereignty in the matters listed in Section I, paragraph 3 above. We could then proceed in the following manner. The Bonn Conventions would be re-cast as Agreements between the U.K., the U.S. and the Federal Republic. In particular, Article 1 of the Convention on Relations would have to be re-written to state that the U.K. and the U.S. will no longer regard the Occupation Statute as having any force and that they will not recognise the Allied High Commission as having any authority. At the same time we should take action vis-à-vis the Russians to safeguard our position in Berlin similar to that planned for the entry into force of the Bonn Conventions as signed.

10. It may be doubted whether such action by the U.K. and U.S. alone would be fully effective. For example, it is conceivable that the Federal Constitutional Court would take the view that amendments to the Basic Law could still not enter into force without the unanimous approval of the Allied High Commission.

11. The risks involved in this course of action cannot be accurately appraised in advance, particularly since we cannot know how the French will react. Some indication of the nature of the risks can be given, however:—

(i) Disagreement on policy in so important a matter would place a very severe strain on our relations with the French and on the N.A.T.O. alliance. It might encourage a drift towards neutralism, and possibly even a turning towards Russia, in France.

(ii) One of the most likely results of this course would be that it would tend to set the Germans and French in opposition to each other. The U.S. and U.K. action would, in effect, invite the Germans to disregard any claim by the French to the maintenance of occupation controls and would create a legal situation conducive to the development of clashes between the French and German authorities. This would militate against our objective of promoting Franco-German rapprochement and make settlement of the issues of a German defence contribution and the Saar more difficult.

(iii) If divergent legal regimes develop in the French Zone on the one hand and the U.K. and U.S. Zones on the other, the effect would be that of a further division of Germany. Any such development would detract considerably from the political effectiveness of the move to restore German sovereignty.

(iv) A very serious strain might be imposed on the tripartite front in Berlin.

(v) Large American contingents and two Canadian Air Force Wings are stationed in the French Zone. Their presence there, and some aspects of their maintenance, depend on agreements with the French authorities in Germany made pursuant to the inter-Allied agreements which we would have infringed. While it seems doubtful that the French would, in the absence of a major change in the character of the French Government, question their continued deployment in the French Zone, the French authorities could undoubtedly create difficulties for these forces if they chose. It will be recalled, however, that the deployment of these forces is in accordance with SHAPE plans.

(vi) It might become difficult to take concerted tripartite action in Western Germany in the event of an emergency.

12. On the other hand, it is always possible that the French might acquiesce in the new situation while reserving their rights. The degree to which the Germans displayed moderation in their dealings with the French might well be an important factor.

IV Future Procedure

13. Although the Study Group has surveyed the Conventions sufficiently to conclude that the above methods are practicable, it could not in the time available, work out the detailed application of the alternative solutions discussed in this paper. In any event this course of action would not be initiated for at least two months. Meanwhile the U.K. and U.S. elements in Bonn could draw up a detailed report for further consideration by the two Governments.

[Enclosure 6—Document 6]

British Paper on Restrictions on German Rearmament Which Might be Feasible in the Event of German Admission to N.A.T.O.

Public opinion in France and other N.A.T.O. countries will not readily accept German membership of N.A.T.O. without some restrictions on German rearmament. Those restrictions, if they are to be acceptable to German opinion, must not discriminate too obviously against the Germans and must apply to other countries as well. The ideal solution would be to transplant to N.A.T.O. as many of the essential E.D.C. safeguards as we can persuade the Germans to accept as the price of joining the leading Western “club” as a full member.

We might aim at agreements on the following subjects:—

(a) Germany’s initial contribution.

The size and character of the initial German defence contribution to N.A.T.O. would be agreed with the Federal Republic as part of the negotiations for her admission to N.A.T.O. It would be based on the E.D.C. figures of twelve divisions and 1,300 aircraft. It would comprise neither submarines nor strategic bombers. The agreement might include a clause to the effect that any change in the composition or strength of the German contribution could only be made in consultation with the North Atlantic Council (i.e. through the Annual Review process) and in accordance with agreed N.A.T.O. strategy.

(b) Strategically exposed areas.

A protocol might be added to the North Atlantic Treaty to reproduce the E.D.C. agreement that within “strategic areas” certain types of arms production and research, including atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons, submarines and military aircraft, would only be permitted by decision of the North Atlantic Council. In order to avoid obvious discrimination against the Germans it will probably be necessary to define as “strategic areas” not only the Federal Republic but also parts of the N.A.T.O. area also contiguous or nearly contiguous to the Soviet “empire” such as N. Norway, Denmark, Thrace and Turkey north of the Straits.

(c) A European arms pool.

A European arms pool would have political and psychological value. The six E.D.C. countries might adopt within N.A.T.O.: a plan for an arms pool, incorporating the essential features of the relevant provisions of the E.D.C. Treaty (i.e. control over production, import and export of war material). The drafting of the plan for such an arms pool would have to be left primarily to the E.D.C. countries.

(d) Commitment of forces to N.A.T.O.

In order to prevent Germany from maintaining forces other than those committed to N.A.T.O., an agreement might be concluded between all members of N.A.T.O. on the lines of Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the E.D.C. Treaty. Thus N.A.T.O. members might agree that apart from forces placed under SACEUR no armed forces will be maintained except:

(i) police and gendarmérie intended for the maintenance of internal order;

(ii) troops for the personal protection of the Head of State;

(iii) forces required for international missions (e.g. U.N.O.) or for any other purpose approved by the North Atlantic Council;

(iv) Forces which any member required to fulfill its defence responsibilities in the North Atlantic area other than the European mainland or outside the N.A.T.O. area.

(e) Integration and deployment of N.A.T.O. forces.

(i) Measures might be taken to give effect to what is already agreed to be SACEUR’s first responsibility, namely, the creation of a genuine and effective integrated force, notably in the air, so that all German air units could be grouped with other nationalities in N.A.T.O. air formations.

(ii) The position of Western Germany in the centre of the N.A.T.O. front line, coupled with the obvious temptation for German forces to cross the Zonal frontier to assist their compatriots in the Soviet Zone or even later on to modify the Oder-Neisse frontier, make it essential to establish effective N.A.T.O. control over the location and movement of the German forces. We can reasonably expect the Germans to agree, as the United Kingdom and the United States agreed in the recent Declarations about the E.D.C. that their forces shall be deployed in accordance with agreed N.A.T.O. strategy. In addition, it might be agreed that national forces placed under SACEUR shall not be moved within the N.A.T.O. area nor revert to national control for use within the N.A.T.O. area without the consent of SACEUR and the North Atlantic Council. We could not in the case of Germany allow a repetition of the Italian action in September 1953 in sending troops and ships to the Yugoslav frontier without any consultation with N.A.T.O. The presence of allied forces in Germany would of course be an additional and effective safeguard.

(f) Maintenance of U.S. and U.K. troops in Europe.

To supplement these suggested measures of control probably the most satisfying assurance that could be given to the French (particularly from the phychological point of view) would be some guarantee of the continued presence of United Kingdom and United States forces on the Continent. Their presence would be essential in connexion with, e.g. paragraph (e)(i) above. The United Kingdom and the United States have already stated, in connexion with their proposed links with E.D.C. their intention to keep on the Continent their fair share of forces required for European defence as long as the threat exists. New declarations on similar lines might be made by both Governments.

(g) Extending the duration of the North Atlantic Treaty.

An additional reassurance to the French (which would be particularly effective if guarantees as envisaged in paragraph (f) above were given) would be the addition of a protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty to remove the possibility of denunciation before fifty years. The idea that the Treaty should be considered of indefinite duration has already been ventilated in the North Atlantic Council and in a broad sense approved. A legal life of fifty years might greatly help to reconcile public opinion to German rearmament. This provision might be included in the protocol inviting German accession to N.A.T.O.

(h) German assurance against any attempt to modify existing frontiers by force.

One of the main objections to German admission to N.A.T.O. is undoubtedly the fact that the Federal Republic (and probably a future reunited Germany) would be a territorially dissatisfied Power, under constant temptation to modify its Eastern frontiers by force and to drag the whole of the N.A.T.O. Alliance into war for that purpose. This objection is a real one and cannot be completely met. But we should at least require the German Federal Republic to make the type of declaration (suitably amended to meet the altered circumstances) which Dr. Adenauer last December agreed to make over the proposed security guarantees to be offered to the Russians in connection with the entry into force of the E.D.C. This would be buttressed by a version of the accompanying statement by the three Western Powers amended to take account of the new situation and to include all other N.A.T.O. Powers.

1. A covering memorandum drafted by Reinstein and sent by Elbrick to the Secretary and Murphy, dated July 15, stated that the source text and accompanying annex and documents comprised the report of the Working Group. The covering memorandum added that the source text and accompanying documents printed below “reflect the final form of the report as adopted on July 12.” Two copies of the report were sent to the Department of Defense.
2. The first exchange of notes confirms the assurances and obligations contained in the letters exchanged in connexion with the signing of the Bonn Conventions and the E.D.C. Treaty; the second relates to the specific deletion of references to the E.D.C. in the Bonn Conventions and certain consequential amendments. [Footnote in the source text.]
2. Brackets throughout the document appear in the source text.
3. Dependent on what action is taken on (iv) above, this action might be taken about two weeks earlier, i.e. August 16. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. The German Bundestag reassembles on September 5. [Footnote in the source text.]
5. See annex to covering report. [Footnote in the source text. The annex is printed, p. 999.]
6. See annex to covering report. [Footnote in the source text. The annex is printed, p. 999.]
7. Dependent on what period is agreed upon in current Occupation Costs negotiations in Bonn. [Footnote in the source text.]
8. This will be subject to later negotiation in Bonn. [Footnote in the source text.]
9. This will be subject to later negotiation in Bonn. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. Above.