Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/6–1554: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom ¹

top secret

Washington, June 17, 1954—9:32 a.m.

6882. Limited distribution. Refs Paris 4857,² Coled 276,³ London’s 5519.⁴

1. Department seriously concerned over effect of British Embassy activities reported in Paris’s 4857. This activity appears entirely at variance with Foreign Office statement (reported London’s 5519) that great care being taken not to give French idea that we would accept anything less than EDC.

2. Suggest therefore that Embassy London, without specific reference reported activities British Embassy Paris, express following to British at this time: (a) We agree with British concern (London’s 5519) over serious consequences in Germany as result French failure ratify EDC and contractuals prior summer recess; (b) we desire discuss with British as soon as possible problems of general strategy for immediate period and means proceeding on contractuals and EDC questions as soon as it becomes clear French will not act before summer; (c) we also feel extremely important during next few weeks to avoid giving any impression French EDC opponents that they can hope for alternatives to EDC through further delay.

3. We will make similar approach British here. Preliminary working level discussion beginning today with British on problems of implementing contractuals. We also believe important that plan for meeting under Article 132 be discussed with British by you as soon as possible after Bruce conversation indicated Coled 276. We also will wish discuss such plan and general strategy regarding EDC and German problem with British here concurrently.

Dulles

1. Drafted by Fessenden, cleared by Jones of WE, Lyon, and Palmer. Repeated to Paris and Bonn.
2. Not printed; it was sent by Dillon on June 15 and reads, in part: “We have recently discovered that British Embassy here is actively covering opponents of EDC apparent[ly] in an attempt to come up with a substitute solution in the event EDC should fail. British Embassy’s present ideas are similar to those expressed in London’s 5519 to Department, and are probably basis of British Foreign Office thinking. This approach may be somewhat unrealistic because it presupposes there will continue to be discrimination against Germany justified principally by ‘strategic considerations’” (740.5/6–1554).
3. Not printed; it was sent by Bruce on June 15 and reported that De Staercke had asked that Bruce meet Spaak in Brussels on June 17. Therefore, “I suggest that Aldrich should not bring possible action by Spaak into his conversations with British on French situation until I am in a position to inform Aldrich of results of my conversation with Spaak.” Moreover, inasmuch as the timing and contents of any Presidential message should be tied into action by Spaak, both Bruce and Dillon expressed the wish to defer comment on the text of the note contained in telegram 4131 to Paris, May 18 (p. 956), until after Bruce’s meeting with Spaak. (740.5/6–1554)
4. Not printed; it was sent by Aldrich on June 3 and reads, in part: “Foreign Office informed us today in strict confidence that it is most anxious about the serious consequences that would ensue within Germany as result of French failure to ratify EDC prior to summer recess of French Parliament and are busy preparing plans to take immediate action and consult with us ‘as soon as it becomes clear that Paris will postpone action beyond summer.’” The Foreign Office had then given an affirmative answer to the query as to whether it was preparing possible alternatives to EDC, adding that the present line of thinking at the working level was along lines of a modified EDC that might be described as “‘combination of EDC and NATO’” and that when the “‘opportune moment’” arrived, the United States would be approached “but that great care was being taken not to give French idea that we would accept anything less than EDC. It was also intimated that considerable thought was being given to full British participation in any modified EDC that might be devised” (740.5/6–354).