Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

762.022/6–954: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State ¹

secret

Paris, June 9, 1954—11 a.m.

4764. I informed Schumann yesterday afternoon following lines of paragraph 2 of US–UK brief² that if French and Germans reached Saar agreement in their present negotiations based on the Nater’s plan, US in conjunction with the UK was prepared to support that agreement in the peace treaty, provided that the EDC had come into being. Schumann raised his eyebrows a little bit at this proviso and referred, as he and Bidault often have, to the US guarantees, as he described them, which were freely given in 1947 and 1951.³

He then said that the matter was of no real importance since there would be no Saar settlement unless EDC was ratified because of the informal link between the two imposed by the German situation. I took this occasion to tell Schumann that while I had no specific instruction on the subject from my government, I felt personally certain that if the worst came to the worst and the US had to reappraise their European policies, that the declarations of 1947 and 1951 on the Saar would very definitely be included in such a reappraisal. Schumann made no particular comment.

He then said that he was very pleased at the news I had brought him about the US willingness to support the Saar settlement in the peace treaty as this was an absolutely essential part of the Saar “prealable” as far as the French Parliament was concerned.

He then observed that our Ambassadors meeting in London was taking place about a week too soon. He said that if the French Government survived the Indochina debate, as he hoped it would, they would move immediately to set a date for the Bidault-Adenauer meeting to finalize agreement on the Saar. He said he hoped this meeting could take place at the end of this week but observed that this might not give enough time to arrange the meeting. It might have to wait until next week. This would certainly be the case, he said, if the Indochina debate turned into a question of confidence which would put off the final vote until Friday.

Dillon

1. Repeated to London and Bonn.
2. Reference is to the Text of Brief agreed by United Kingdom/United States Working Group (May 1954), not printed.
3. For text of the 1947 U.S. guarantee under reference, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. ii, pp. 1082–1083. For information concerning the 1951 guarantee reaffirming U.S. policy that there should be no change in the status of the Saar pending a final peace treaty, see the editorial note, ibid., 1951, vol. iii, Part 2, p. 1979.