740.5/4–2254
The Secretary of State to the President 1
Ambassador Dillon and I have just finished a conversation with Bidault on EDC and Indochina. Bidault was alone except that General Ely was present during part of the conversation regarding Indochina.
Regarding EDC, Bidault stated that the repudiation of Mollet’s leadership by the Socialist Party last night, when its Executive Committee refused to call Party Congress as recommended by Mollet and had attached additional preconditions relating to EDC, was a grave and perhaps mortal blow to hopes of ratifying EDC treaty. Bidault said he had not yet fully appraised the consequences of this action, and it would require some further study, but his initial impression was that it would now be necessary to think in terms of some new short-form treaty which would gain support from the Right. He felt Socialist support was now so problematical and the party so divided that it would be useless to look to it as a primary source of parliamentary strength. Others at Quai d’Orsay indicated that Bevan’s attacks on EDC had swung the balance in Executive Committee against Mollet.
[Page 941]Regarding Indochina, Bidault said he had just spoken with Laniel and had suggested that Laniel might wish to see me. However, Laniel had preferred that Bidault represent him in this matter. Bidault expressed the opinion, which Ely confirmed, that the situation in Dien Bien Phu was now virtually hopeless. He stated that situation was complicated by disagreements and recriminations as between the generals. Ely expressed the view that break out was impracticable, involving abandonment of wounded and equipment. Bidault and Ely suggested that nothing could save the situation except perhaps “massive” air intervention which the US would have to supply. I said our information was that there were already more planes there than could be handled by crews and technicians, but Ely denied this situation was as bad as I seemed to think. Bidault suggested there should be emergency consultation between Navarre and US military commanders on spot, and indicated that while he had been opposed to internationalizing the war, he would favor it now with US if it would save Dien Bien Phu. He recalled that I had said that I thought US participation was impracticable without UK participation, but Bidault said this would not amount to much anyway and urged that our government should give the most serious consideration to armed intervention promptly as the only way to save the situation.
Ely left at the conclusion of this phase of the conversation, which then turned to organization of defense coalition. Bidault indicated that if Dien Bien Phu fell, he doubted whether there would be any French interest in this. I urged that this was essential to give some cards to work with at Geneva so as to have a chance of obtaining acceptable peace. However, if Dien Bien Phu fell, Bidault doubted that coalition would be looked upon by French nation as designed to accomplish peace at Geneva but rather as designed to keep France in the fighting in southeast Asia. His impression was that if Dien Bien Phu fell, the French would want to pull out entirely from southeast Asia, and assume no continuing commitments and the rest of us would have to get along without France in this area.
My comments and evaluation will follow.2
- Transmitted in telegram Dulte 2, Apr. 22, addressed eyes only for the President, Acting Secretary, Secretary Wilson, and Admiral Radford.↩
- In telegram Dulte 8 from Paris, Apr. 23, Dulles informed Eisenhower inter alia: “The situation here is tragic. France is almost visibly collapsing under our eyes. There is, of course, no military or logical reason why loss of Dien Bien Phu should lead to collapse of French will, in relation both to Indochina and EDC. It seems to me that Dien Bien Phu has become a symbol out of all proportion to its military importance. It does not seem possible to change this situation, although we are not giving up hope and are doing everything possible to keep their spirit up. The position today is a little better as regards EDC, but probably if Dien Bien Phu falls, the government will be taken over by defeatists” (740.5/4–2354). This message is printed in full in vol. xiii, Part 1, p. 1374.↩