740.5/2–2152
The Secretary of State to the President 1
Dear Mr. President: The series of meetings between Eden, Schuman, and myself and later on with Adenauer on problems affecting Germany and the Eur Army were concluded in London yesterday just prior to my departure. In addition to various informal meetings, we had one bipartite with the Brit; three tripartite and three quadripartite mtgs. The pace of events and the fluidity of the situation have caused me to delay general reports during the mtgs until I could see more clearly what was being accomplished. I am glad that I can now report what appears to me to be substantial progress out of these meetings.
The meetings were surrounded with considerable confusion at the beginning. There was the question as to whether Schuman cld agree [Page 81] to hold meetings with Adenauer at all in the situation his govt faced at home. The awkwardness of this situation with Adenauer already in London for the funeral was quickly cleared up after Schuman’s arrival. There was also in the background a possibility that at any time the Fr Govt might fall. This situation caused the absence of Schuman from London the day we had planned to initiate our formal discussions.
More importantly we were faced with the necessity of meeting on problems recently debated in the German Bundestag and being currently discussed at length in the French Parliament. In both cases it appeared that restrictions of serious nature were being placed upon their govts which might make compromise and agreement impossible.
The talks with Adenauer and Schuman eased this situation somewhat. In prior discussions with Adenauer we found that he felt he had been able to retain sufficient vagueness and escape clauses in the Bundestag resolutions so as to be able to enter true negotiation. He seemed far more concerned over current and possible future difficulties in the Fr Parliament. Schuman, obviously fatigued and greatly worried, likewise was prepared to proceed in a spirit of compromise to the maximum extent possible, hoping that statements and leaks to the press wld not produce further crisis in France prior to the final vote there. On his return from Paris Sunday, he told us that the points which wld be made in the resolution by the Fr Assembly wld be in the form of recommendations and would not be binding on the govt. They did, he said reflect, however, the state of mind in the Assembly and the more they could be met, the more assurance there would be of the ultimate approval of the agreements.2
In this atmosphere we decided the only course was to tackle the specific problems before us with vigor on the assumption that the underlying difficulties in both France and Germany could be surmounted. Questions that were unsolvable at the moment, such as the status of the Saar and eventual German membership in NATO were not developed to a point of difficulty in the meetings. Our strategy on questions of this sort was to remove them from current discussion until after the treaty on the EDC and the new relationship with Germany cld be signed. As things stand now, it appears this can be done.
Proceeding in this fashion, we were able to settle or to make substantial progress on almost every outstanding issue of real importance in our tripartite negots with Germany. In addition to this we cleared up several matters of relative lesser importance but which were holding up completion of various conventions in Germany. The major issues were as fol: The question of German membership in NATO was by-passed without difficulty. Adenauer made a brief statement for [Page 82] the record indicating that he hoped the interim arrangements to be worked out at Lisbon wld not prejudice a final solution to the problem.3 Schuman helped by not requesting that a negative decision be arrived at this time. The problem, therefore, was to find some means of assuring effective German liaison with NATO and giving her a voice on matters of real importance. The German position was logical as otherwise her troops wld be under command of NATO without her having any voice in their disposition.
We were able to meet this problem to Adenauer’s satisfaction by providing that there cld be joint meetings of the EDC and NATO councils under certain specified conditions.4 This wld in effect add Germany to the Council discussion at appropriate times and we also agreed that under conditions of extreme gravity in which the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the members of the NATO and the EDC is threatened, a combined meeting of the two Councils cld be called at the request of that party. This wld allow any country, including Germany, to call a combined mtg under these conditions. This was meant also indirectly to be a kind of guarantee of consultation in case any country (e.g. Germany) withdraws and thus helped calm Fr anxieties on this score.
We also reached full agreement with Adenauer on the future handling of war criminals in Germany.5 We cannot of course, maintain prisons of our own on her territory after the new arrangements go into effect. The solution here was quite similar to that in the case of Japan whereby custody wld be turned over to the Germans under agreement that they wld carry out the remainder of the sentences. An advisory board of equal Allied and German representation is to be established to handle matters of admin and clemency. The right to terminate or reduce sentences remains exercisable by the power which imposed the sentence but the three govts wld agree to be bound by a unanimous recommendation of the board. On other than a unanimous recommendation the power concerned retains the right of final decision, it being understood that the recommendations of the board wld be given great weight.
The question of continued restriction over the production of armaments or other implements of war in Germany was our most difficult problem. You will recall we had difficulty on this subject in our last mtgs in Paris and Rome. Substantial agreement was obtained but there still remain outstanding questions between the three of us and with Adenauer. We were able to reach full agreement on the [Page 83] method of handling Germany’s commitment to us, but cld not agree upon the list of items to be prohibited. As to the former, it was agreed that the EDC treaty shld contain a provision to the effect that certain articles cld be produced in strategically “forward” areas only by unanimous consent in the EDC. Adenauer agreed with us on the form of ltr to be sent to the Three Occupying Powers stating that Germany wld not, in view of international tensions and of its exposed position, consider it discriminatory against Germany if orders were not placed by the EDC for production in the Federal Republic of items on this list. Adenauer further stated his willingness to give assurances to the US and UK which wld make the commitments she undertakes in this field by treaty obligation in the EDC equally binding as regards our two nations.6
As regards the list, all four of us were able to agree on the inclusion of atomic, biological, and chemical weapons, long-range and guided missiles, naval vessels other than minor defensive rail comm and mil aircraft. We were not able to reach agreement to civil aircraft, gun barrels over 105 millimeters and propellants (e.g. gunpowder). Eden felt strongly as regards civil aircraft. However, as this field cld not be covered under the approach we had adopted, (the EDC will have no control over production for civilian use) we cld see no way to obtain a German commitment that he wld not produce civil aircraft. Adenauer indicated his willingness to furnish a separate statement on this subject indicating that they had neither the intent nor in fact the capacity to produce civil aircraft7 (huge subsidization wld be necessary for civil aircraft manufacture as military aircraft was denied). Eden and I felt we cld accept this but Schuman was unable to agree.
Schuman’s position on the other two disagreed items (gun barrels and propellants) was most awkward as he was apparently under strict instruction not to agree to their deletion from the list. Our feeling, with which the Brit agree, was rather strong on these two items from two points of view. In the first place, we felt that such a restriction indicated such distrust as to shake the whole fabric of continental organization. We likewise felt that as the West is in such short supply of ground armament and powder German resources shld be utilized. This is, of course, particularly of concern to the US as it is we who have to meet the gap in both of these fields. It became clear in the course of the discussion that Eden, Adenauer, and I were in agreement on the deletion of these two items from the list. We therefore, left the matter in suspense and are hoping that Schuman [Page 84] can obtain the necessary authorization from his govt to allow us to finish this subject while we are in Lisbon.
In the meantime, the High Comm will work out with the Germans exact definitions in the fields of the agreed items.
The report of the Three Wise Men, indicating that 11.25 billion marks (approximately 2.6 billion dollars equivalent) would be a fair German contribution, was received just before our meeting began and after Adenauer had arrived in London. He was unable to agree to this figure without consulting his Cabinet. We urged the necessity of agreeing upon a final figure prior to the end of our meetings here in Lisbon so that final action could be taken on use to be made of the total Ger contribution. Adenauer indicated that this wld be possible and promised every effort wld be made to have the matter settled by the end of this week.8
McCloy heard from Bonn just before I left London that the finan negot might be more difficult than Adenauer thought but we are still hopeful of an early agreement.
The three of us agreed upon several additional points in this field which had hitherto been unresolved. We decided that the contemplated and recently reduced 6.8 billion mark budget for the support of occupation forces in Ger was to be the maximum requested of the Gers for the 12-month period after the agrmt goes into effect. This amt shld be further pared down to the maximum consistent with mil effectiveness. We suggested a 10 percent cut but left the exact amts to be determined by the High Comm. We also agreed that in a mechanical sense the entire Ger contribution shld be paid to the EDC with prior agreement that the support costs for our forces wld be automatically returned to us and the Brit. This is purely a matter of procedure but will allow the Gers politically to fuzz up the issue of continued “occupation costs” which wld otherwise cause Adenauer considerable domestic difficulty. We also agreed that in future years Ger wld be submitted the same treatment as other nations in whatever form of equalization of burden sharing exercise under NATO wld succeed the TCC.
Considerable difficulty was encountered over the question of the amt of Ger’s contribution for the support of US and UK forces (Fr’s problem by that time being within the EDC) in subsequent years. We feel that in subsequent years Ger will not be able to meet both the costs of her own def effort and the cost of supporting Allied Forces. The Brit are not willing to agree to this premise as they cannot make a decision at this time ever to go on a “pay-as-you-go-basis” for their troops in Ger. We were able to avoid this sitn by leaving the matter open and at the present time merely deciding the procedure under [Page 85] which the matter wld be agreed later. As a final item we agreed that any funds that might be available after the first year shld be split between us approx in relation to our respective troop strength in Ger.
The question of a so-called guarantee for the continued integrity of the EDC (which I outlined in my previous cable) caused both Eden and me difficulty. We referred to the prob in a preliminary and gen way in our communiqué yesterday,9 in which we emphasized our intention of continuing to seek means of giving the Eur Def Community cooperation and support.
We have also worked out with Eden a statement we each might make at the time of the signing of the EDC treaty and the agreements with Ger. I feel confident that this statement, as now drafted is within the framework of past congressional action. I have, however, told Eden that we wish to continue working on the language and that the whole thing must be submitted to you on my return to Wash. In the meantime, Eden plans to make an early statement in the Commons. As now framed, this will go farther than any previous Brit statement re their ties to the continent and wld be most helpful.10 Finally, I have stated that you are considering what you might say at the time you transmit the Ger agreements to the Senate. This is without commitment and can be worked out subsequently.
Eden and I agreed the best procedure in seeking a solution to the question of the Saar was to encourage Schuman and Adenauer to attempt to work the prob out between themselves after the signing of the EDC treaty and the new arrangements for Ger. We hoped to obtain their agreement and obtain a joint statement from them to the effect when they were in London. This proved impossible. One factor against obtaining agreement was undoubtedly the tight schedule we are faced in London. It proved impossible to allow adequate time for Schuman and Adenauer to meet privately to discuss subjs such as this. I am hopeful this can still be worked out and we will continue to pursue the matter in Paris and Bonn.
I hope that at Lisbon we can proceed to take formal action on the establishment of the EDC. The principles seem worked out in enough detail for us all to give gen approval for NATO with emphasis on getting on with the job. This wld mark real progress and shld do much to dispel pessimism growing out of developments in France and Ger in the past few weeks. This wld mean that, without the delay of waiting for another NATO mtg, the Eurs wld proceed with agreement on and ratification of their def treaty. This document wld, of course, be gone over by the NATO Deps at the time to insure that it was consistent with the principles we wld agree to at Lisbon.
[Page 86]McCloy and his colleagues in the High Comm are already at work with Adenauer in an effort to conclude the many outstanding but relatively minor points left in the agreements to be concluded with Ger. Our hope is that similar and speedy progress can be made in final agreement on the EDC treaty. The task looks possible of completion and we have urged as strongly as possible that it all be finished in about three weeks, but there can, of course, be no certainty of this. It is based on the assumption that the sitn in Fr and Ger can be kept on even keel. In view of all the above and complications, the Fr Govt may soon face again on domestic issues, the sitn in Fr seems to me the more critical of the two.
Your msg of encouragement11 was delivered to me yesterday in one of our mtgs. It cld not have been more appropriately timed nor more appreciated.
I am sorry for the delay in getting off this report to you. Our last day in London was very hectic. We met thru lunch, and I was then slated to call on the Queen, saw the PriMin on a matter I will report to you personally,12 and boarded your airplane for Lisbon in a space of about one hour. I arrived here just in time for a dinner and weariness got the better of me after that.
It appears now that our mtgs here in Lisbon will conclude next Tues or Wed. I hope to return at once—John Snyder and Lovett may have to leave together on Monday. But Harriman and I shld, I think, not impose a deadline if something really possible of conclusion is still open.
- This message was transmitted as niact telegram Actel 4, Feb. 21, noon, from Lisbon.↩
- Regarding the tripartite meeting of Feb. 17 under reference here, see telegram Secto 12, Feb. 18, from Lisbon, p. 55.↩
- Presumably Acheson’s reference here is to Adenauer’s statement at the quadripartite meeting on the morning of Feb. 19; see telegram Secto 30, Feb. 21, from Lisbon, p. 75.↩
- The reference here is to the agreed text of paragraph 9 (b) of document D–D (52) 35 Final, the Deputies Report on relations between NATO and EDC, p. 249.↩
- See the agreed draft article on war criminals, p. 101.↩
- For the texts of the two draft letters to be sent by Adenauer, see the paper agreed upon by the four Foreign Ministers, p. 104.↩
- Regarding the undertaking referred to here, see telegram Secto 30, Feb. 21, from Lisbon, p. 75.↩
- Regarding the discussion summarized here, which took place at the quadripartite meeting on the morning of Feb. 18, see the Laukhuff minutes, p. 60.↩
- For the text of the communiqué, see p. 105.↩
- Presumably the reference here is to the statement quoted in telegram Secto 17, Feb. 18, from London, p. 103.↩
- See footnote 4, supra.↩
- Regarding Acheson’s audience with the Queen and his visit with Churchill on Feb. 19, see the editorial note, p. 77.↩