Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

762.022/4–254: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State ¹

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Paris, April 2, 1954—noon.

3663. I saw Bidault Thursday in accordance with Deptel 3399.² He told me that the Socialists had been unreasonably difficult and had made it impossible for him to carry out his original schedule. Mollet had told him that the Socialists would abstain en bloc in any vote that might take place prior to the Socialist Party Congress. Bidault said that Laniel was willing and ready for his government to fall squarely on EDC issue but was not willing to be defeated on some side issue, such as national education budget, Marshal Juin,³ et cetera, because of Socialist attitude. Therefore, it had become vitally important to hold everything up until Parliament had adjourned.

Bidault said that it would be disastrous if Eden should insist on making public United Kingdom assurances next Monday. This would mean that French Government would probably fall on Wednesday or Thursday. He said he had so informed Harvey and that he now proposed the following schedule which had Laniel’s concurrence.

On the first day after Parliament goes on vacation, i.e., either April 9 or 10, Cabinet would approve United Kingdom agreement which could be signed immediately and Eden could make his announcement on Monday, April 12. This action by French Cabinet would bring about resignation of URAS Ministers, who would then be replaced and Cabinet would promptly announce that it would request steering committee immediately on return of Parliament to set date (most probably May 25) for debate on EDC. After Cabinet had taken this action, Bidault said he would be ready and willing to go to Bonn to meet with Adenauer in order to conclude a Saar settlement.

After publication of United States and United Kingdom assurances, Socialists would issue call for Party Congress which most likely would take place about May 18, immediately following May 16 by-election in Mollet’s district of Pas-de-Calais. Socialist candidate there is campaigning on pro-Europe and pro-EDC platform and should run second in May 2 election, and then with support of other parties should win runoff election on May 16.

When asked about progress on arrangements with Socialists for democratic control Bidault did not mention arrangements described Coleds 215, 218, 222.⁴ He did, however, say that he thought there would not be too much difficulty in making a suitable arrangement and he did say that Laniel had softened his position and was now willing to give Socialists something that should satisfy them.

Bidault then said that after Easter recess government would be ready to pose question of confidence on the question of setting of date for EDC debate. I asked him when he would like United States assurances made public and whether it was necessary that they be made public at same time as United Kingdom assurances. He said there was no necessity for them to be made public on the same day but that he hoped they would follow promptly so that socialists could get on with calling their congress. If all goes as Bidault described, date for publication of United States assurances could well be set some time in week of April 12, after allowing necessary time for Hughes to inform NATO and for text to be shown to Prime Ministers of EDC countries.

Regarding Saar negotiations, Bidault said that Adenauer had informed him that he was in no particular hurry to negotiate with Bidault as he was very busy at the moment putting out political fires that had sprung up in Germany during his absence in the Middle East. Bidault said that Poncet was continuing negotiations in Bonn but that he did not feel that they would result in much as Poncet was frankly not up to negotiating on this subject with the German experts that were available in Bonn. Some time next week Bidault said he intends to look over results of negotiating to date and then invite Hallstein and Blankenhorn to come to Paris to continue negotiations with Maurice Schumann. He said that Grandval would not have anything to do with these negotiations in Paris, which would be handled by Maurice Schumann. He hoped that in this way differences could be reduced to three or four major points on which it would be possible to brief him and Adenauer so that they could decide these final points together. He said that quite frankly when it came to discussing the whole subject, neither he nor Adenauer felt confident enough in their own knowledge to undertake really serious negotiations. He further said that he felt he would need our aid and assistance at some point and I said that we would be prepared to give him our ideas, together with the United Kingdom, prior to his meeting with Adenauer. If Bidault program for negotiation should make progress and if Schumann and Hallstein should be able to reach agreement on a substantial number of points, leaving only a few major points for settlement by Bidault and Adenauer, it would appear to me that present United Kingdom paper would have to be revised, putting less stress on general adhesion to Van Nater’s plan and more stress on solutions for major points still at issue between French and Germans.

I did not press Bidault for a definite commitment on date when he would be willing to meet Adenauer,⁵ as it was obvious that he is for the moment entirely engaged in the effort to obtain public announcement of the commencement of debate by the Cabinet as outlined above. Furthermore, it is clear that controlling item in scheduling EDC debate is now date on which Socialist Party Congress will be held. It may well be that Bidault and Laniel will not wish to arrive at a final solution for the Saar until a week or ten days prior to the opening of debate, so as to avoid a separate debate in the assembly on the Saar. This could be the explanation for the May 15 date given Bruce mission as date for final settlement of the Saar.

Dillon

1. Repeated to London eyes only for the Ambassador and to Bonn eyes only for Conant.
2. Not printed. (762.022/3–3054)
3. Reference is to the incident created by Marshal Juin, commander of the NATO Central sector, who publicly criticized the existing NATO command structure during the spring of 1954. Documentation on this incident is in file 740.5.
4. None printed. (740.5/3–2754, 3–2954, and 3–3154)
5. Telegram 3096 from Bonn, Apr. 6, reported that German officials had stated that Hallstein had been negotiating the Saar problem with French officials (762.022/4–654). Telegram 4552 from London, Apr. 14 reported that the “Foreign Office working level informed us today that it was recommending to higher level that UK and US now begin to intervene in Franco-German negotiations on Saar owing to recent ‘degeneration’ in Franco-German talks” (762.022/4–1454).