Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/3–2654: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State ¹

secret

Paris, March 26, 1954—noon.

3550. With the help of a cryptic remark by Bidault yesterday regarding the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Assembly and certain other information which has come to our attention, I am now clear as to the reasons behind the apparent zig-zagging in French policy on German Constitutional reform during the last few days. It now seems clear that Bidault never swerved from the basic decision to proceed with the approval of the AHC amendments which he announced separately to Harvey and me on Tuesday morning.² However, shortly after he gave us this news he apparently was reminded that he could not properly take action on this subject until he had informed and obtained the tacit approval of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly which necessitated a day or two of delay. The reason for this unusual requirement was that immediately after the Bundestag approved the Constitutional reform measures, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly unanimously (including Schumann) voted a protest against the wording of these texts and warned the government not to approve them. Therefore, in order to avoid an explosion in the Committee, it was necessary for Bidault to inform them in advance of what he proposed to do.

There was a meeting of the full Committee on Wednesday at which they were informed of Quai d’Orsay plans to approve the Constitutional Amendment in accordance with the agreed tripartite text. Bidault was satisfied with the reaction and thereupon authorized Maurice Schumann on Wednesday afternoon to inform Harvey and me that they were now ready to implement the policy which had been outlined to both of us on Tuesday morning. This, Schumann did early Thursday morning.

This explains why Francois-Poncet was originally told on Tuesday that there would be no decision for a day or two. When Conant protested this delay vigorously to me and I passed on our protest to Maurice Schumann by telephone on Tuesday night, it is now evident that the French were embarrassed and that Maurice Schumann’s answer to me was a somewhat clumsy attempt to stall matters for a day or two. His instructions to Francois-Poncet at that time to hold the line firmly were obviously designed to prevent any possible leak from Bonn of the French intention to approve the Constitutional Amendments before the subject had been cleared with the Foreign Affairs Committee here.

I still regret that Bidault and Schumann did not tell me frankly on Tuesday of their political problem with the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Assembly.³

Dillon

1. Repeated to London and Bonn.
2. Regarding this conversation, see telegram 3483 from Paris, Mar. 23, p. 910.
3. In telegram 3012 from Bonn, Mar. 29, Conant reported that he had been informed by the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic “that President Heuss today signed instruments of ratification for Bonn conventions, for EDC treaty and for special agreement between members of EDC and Great Britain. Instruments on Bonn conventions will be deposited Bonn tomorrow, for EDC treaty in Paris tomorrow and for special agreement in London March 31” (740.5/3–2954).