Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/3–2454: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State ¹

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Paris, March 24, 1954—noon.

3498. Limited distribution. London eyes only for Ambassador.

Hughes and I dined last night with Laniel and he confirmed fully opinions expressed in Embassy telegram 3467² and Embassy telegram 3497.³ He told me categorically that British and United States assurances were satisfactory and that United Kingdom in particular, would change the views of a considerable number of deputies. He said that the only problem remaining was the settlement of the German problem, i.e., signature of the protocols and a Saar agreement. Once these two requirements had been met he said that he would proceed immediately to submit EDC to ratification debate.

On the Saar he said the only real question was the economic one and here he felt that the Germans were definitely attempting to break up the Franco-Saar economic union. This, he said, France could never accept, although if Franco-Saar union was maintained they were prepared to make broad trade concessions to Germany in the Saar.

I told him that I thought it was vital that agreement should contain a promise of eventual economic equality for Germany in the Saar with adequate safeguards for the French economy. He said he saw no reason why this could not be possible, provided the safeguards were clear and adequate. It seems clear that final settlement must be one which French Government can claim with reason maintains the present Franco Saar Economic Union and which Adenauer can also claim opens the possibility for future equality for Germany in the Saar market.

In view of these statements by Laniel, it seems to me that it is of the utmost importance to get Adenauer and Bidault together immediately after Adenauer’s return and to press for agreement on both the signature of the protocols and the Saar prior to the end of the first week in April. If this should be achieved we could then ask Laniel to live up to his agreement and to take action before the Easter recess to set the date for the opening of debate. The period of the Easter recess could then be used by the Socialist Party in preparing for their congress and debate could begin promptly after the return of Parliament. This would have the advantage of protecting Laniel’s government from being overthrown on a domestic issue during the period the Socialists are getting their house in order.

Dillon

1. Repeated to Bonn and London.
2. Dated Mar. 22, p. 906.
3. Not printed; in it Dillon first reiterated the points made in telegram 3467 from Paris, then added that the pressures Bruce had proposed would be counterproductive. Dillon stated that he refused to believe that Laniel was about to repudiate his commitment to EDC, though he “has proved himself to be a rather weak figure”. Dillon concluded by stressing again Laniel’s “very precarious” political situation (740.5/3–2454).