740.5/3–1954: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France 1
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3246. For Dillon and Bruce. Limit distribution.
Department deeply disturbed implications Coled 195.2 In our view May one date for opening EDC debate contains dangers which go far beyond mere slippage in present timetable. Specifically we fear that Bidault’s absence in Geneva would further weaken already hesitant leadership in Paris on this problem, and that disposition avoid action regarded as possibly prejudicial to successful negotiation on Indo-China would increase pressures for further delays, possibly extending through summer Parliamentary recess in July. Should this happen, as we fear, there would be no possibility of definitive action until Fall. Problems this would pose in terms Congressional and German pressures and strains on NATO alliance need no emphasis here.
British Embassy today informed us of instructions to British Ambassador, Paris, to see Bidault and press him for statement French Government’s intentions. He will take line that French now know what US prepared to do and that discussions re UK association should be concluded by end of next week. Assuming Saar agreement can be reached when Adenauer returns March 26, French could then make simultaneous announcement by end of month of successful resolution their 3 principle pre-conditions. They could then begin debate within week. Ambassador is to add that if this is to be timetable, tripartite discussions should be held in Paris to work out details. Instructions also state that if Bidault indicates debate cannot start before Easter, Ambassador is to express dismay and press for statement of French plans. If Bidault says debate cannot start until May one, Ambassador is to say that further delay seems very dangerous and ask whether debate would be practicable while Bidault is away. Finally, British Ambassador instructed inform US colleague of foregoing and encourage similar action.
Foregoing instructions are consonant with Department’s concern, with possible exception necessity for simultaneous announcement Saar settlement. In your discretion, you authorized make similar representations to Bidault. In any event, Department would like earliest [Page 901] coordinated analysis by Embassy and Bruce mission re current situation, as well as recommendations for future action.
- Drafted by Palmer. Cleared by Merchant and MacArthur (in substance); repeated to London and Bonn.↩
- Telegram Coled 195 reads as follows: “Alphand told us in strict confidence this morning that in conversation yesterday Bidault had been inclined to agree with his views (1) that date should be fixed for ratification debate before Saar settlement with understanding Saar settlement would have to be reached before debate started and (2) that it is now too late to try to have debate before Geneva Conference opens so date should be set for first part of May. Alphand said that Bidault would now discuss this question with Laniel and then would send letter to the Secretary. He said he would comment on program of French Government to make ratification debate possible when he had something more definite from Bidault” (740.5/3–1954).↩