Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/2–2654: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom ¹

secret
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Washington, February 27, 1954—3:45 p.m.

4432. Limited distribution. Reference Coleds 157, 158, 159,² repeated London 696, 697, 699.

Ambassador requested inform Eden urgently of following:

1. US has come conclusion essential EDC ratification debate be held in French Assembly prior Easter holidays April 16. Debate unlikely take place during Geneva, even if initial discussions confined Korea. Soviets will do best to prolong Geneva and otherwise seek deter French parliamentary action until summer, when prospects ever getting EDC will be very dubious.

2. If pre-Easter deadline to be met, debate must start not later than end March. If this date for beginning debate to be met, French must announce not later than March 10 that Assembly debate will begin end March. Immediate problem is therefore do everything possible induce French Government set date. Our conclusion is that best way do this is give French Government assurance that three main conditions (US assurances, UK association, Saar) will be fulfilled in time for use in end March debate.

3. We for our part are doing everything possible complete difficult intra-governmental clearance on text our assurances re our NATO policy and maintenance troops, and are hopeful have agreement within next ten days. We therefore propose inform Bidault next week to effect that we have every hope having US assurances ready for issuance around March 15; that this assurance from us on timing is dependent on French Government’s firm decision bring EDC to vote prior Easter holidays; and that we are attempting meet time-table on assurances in order make it possible for French Government make decision on debate in time.

4. Strongly urge that British join with us in this program and give French similar assurance with respect timing announcement UK association: i.e., that UK will announce UK association around March 15 in order enable French make firm decision on end March for timing debate.

5. We are making approach Adenauer urging him do same with respect Saar: i.e., urge Adenauer inform Bidault that he is ready to hold meeting on Saar first week in March in order give Bidault assurance Saar settlement will be ready in time for pre-Easter debate. British might also wish consider making similar approach Adenauer.

6. Our concept of tight schedule which must be met, as outlined Coled 158.

FYI Are not in position at present moment discuss substance assurances with British, which we realize has an important bearing on British position with respect UK declaration on duration NAT, which is an essential element in UK association package. We hope in very near future and prior to our announcement assurances inform British of substance of what we propose say, particularly with respect duration NAT. End FYI.³

Dulles

1. Drafted by Fessenden; cleared in substance with Merchant and Raynor. Repeated to Paris and Bonn.
2. None printed; Coled 157 reported Brace’s belief that “To bring EDC ratification to a vote in Assembly prior to our deadline Easter holidays April 16 debate should start not later than end March. In order set in train necessary actions and bring required parliamentary, inter-party and inter-governmental negotiations to completion in time, French Government should announce this time for debate by March 10 at latest.” The balance of the telegram dealt with desired United States strategy to bring about such a result. Coled 158 presented a “hypothetical schedule of required actions involving French Government during March if National Assembly is to ratify EDC Treaty before April 16”. Coled 159 dealt with the subject of a possible United States declaration on the maintenance of forces in Europe in relation to the proposed Tripartite Security Declaration. Bruce reiterated the view of French ignorance “of our constitutional limitations on the exercise of executive discretion and power” adding “If we negotiate with them bilaterally on a subject which lies wholly within the competence of the US Government, they may well use such an opportunity to demand the impossible” in the way of United States security guarantees to the EDC “and thereby to excuse themselves for not proceeding vigorously to implement their own declared policy on EDC” (740.5/2–2654).
3. Ambassador Aldrich replied in telegram 3721 from London, Mar. 1, that he had discussed the subjects raised in the source text with Eden, who while anxious to get action on EDC by France at the earliest possible moment, thought the proposed timetable was probably impossible for the French to fulfill. While promising to give further thought to the problem, Eden suggested as an alternative an immediate conference in Paris between Bruce, Bidault, and British officials to work out a timetable which the French would find satisfactory. Eden then “gave me following information which he said no one outside British Cabinet has at present and which he authorized me to communicate only to you. Since his return from Berlin, he has proposed to Cabinet that British actually commit troops to EDC. He said he had not mentioned this to Secretary in Berlin because he was not then sure Cabinet would even consider it. He has, however, found Cabinet receptive. It will take a short time to work out details but he will advise us of progress earliest possible. He thought sometime within next few days. He is fearful if French should learn of this possibility they would increase their demands on HMG. He wishes, therefore, to withhold this offer until last possible moment” (740.5/3–154). Telegram 3721 was transmitted to Secretary Dulles at Caracas in telegram Tedul 8, Mar. 2 (740.5/3–254), where he was attending the Tenth Inter-American Conference; documentation on the conference is presented in volume iv .