Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 203
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State1
Participants:
- The Secretary of State
- Mr. Merchant
- M. Bidault
- M. Alphand
The four French prerequisites to EDC are:
- 1.
- Accord with the UK.
- 2.
- US undertaking re troops.
- 3.
- Saar settlement.
- 4.
- Question of “democratic control” of EDC Army.
Regarding 1, Bidault felt that the arrangements now practically agreed upon would suffice provided there was a satisfactory understanding under 2. The British would not give adequate undertakings if they thought the US was going to pull out. Bidault expressed the personal view that if they started out with close association with EDC, the UK would end up with membership.
Regarding 2, there should be some undertaking to maintain Anglo-American forces on the Continent; also, some declaration that we did not regard the North Atlantic Treaty as expiring in twenty years, but as an agreement which normally would continue.
There should be agreement on maintenance of the forward strategy rather than peripheral strategy and acceptance of the concept of some contribution by the US to maintaining an appropriate balance of strength on the Continent. Also, it would be desirable that the US would indicate its willingness to sit in on talks which would otherwise confront the French with the Germans so that the French would not be left alone. There was some discussion as to the possible form the US action might take. Alphand suggested a Congressional resolution. I said that this matter of troop disposition was under our Constitution primarily a matter for the President. Even the proposed constitutional amendment would probably expressly reaffirm the authority of the President to make agreements as Commander-in-Chief without the necessity for any Congressional participation. I thought that an appropriate communication from the President, perhaps sent with the knowledge and informal approval of some of the Congressional committees, would give the maximum that could be expected under our constitutional provisions.
With regard to 3, there would have to be a general settlement of the Saar matter, although not every detail would have to be settled. It could be contingent upon the EDC, as obviously you could not Europeanize the Saar unless there was going to be a Europe. Adenauer should realize the importance of this Saar matter and be willing to talk about it seriously and above all soon and quietly. Bidault complained that there had always been too much publicity, even by Adenauer to prior talks with him and with Francois-Poncet.
As to 4, there was long discussion between Bidault and Alphand as to where the most votes could be gotten,—whether by playing to the socialists in favor of establishing democratic control or from the right which feared an all-European political organ. Since this was not a matter on which the US could be helpful, we did not take any part in this discussion. However, Bidault indicated he thought this was the most difficult point of all to solve.
Regarding procedure, Bidault indicated his belief that the present government would probably hold on until the EDC vote. He thought that whatever was done under points 1, 2 and 3 should, as far as possible, [Page 877] be done simultaneously at the moment when they would have the greatest impact. I asked as to whether we could work this out in Washington with Bonnet. Bidault said Bonnet had his full confidence, but that he lacked technical qualifications. Alphand suggested working these things out with Bruce in Paris, but I said I doubted whether this was the best place. It should preferably be done where the President and I could be in personal touch with the matter. Also, Bruce, as former Under Secretary, could not, from a Congressional standpoint, usefully be given too great a role in this matter. Bidault agreed and said that he would send Alphand to Washington, but wanted him to come under some cover which would avoid wide-spread speculation in France.
I said that I wanted Bidault to know that we wanted to do everything possible to help put the EDC through. I saw no acceptable alternative. Some want to proceed at once to arm the Germans to a large extent and to proceed to put the contractuals in force without French concurrence. Others would want to adopt a peripheral strategy based on Britain and Spain primarily. Others would want to return to isolationism. I could not see what the outcome would be, but surely it would not be anything good, and it would almost surely mark the end to the role of France as a great power. Bidault said he fully accepted all of this, and he was dedicated to accomplishment of the EDC. It was not precisely what he would have liked, but it was better than any alternative. I said EDC was not precisely in the form I would have negotiated it, but the President and I either had to elect to go ahead on what was or had to try to make a fresh start, and the first course seemed preferable. Bidault said it was the same with him.2
- The conversation took place at the Secretary’s residence, 66 Miquelstrasse, Berlin, where Dulles was staying during the Berlin Conference; documentation on the conference is presented in volume vii .↩
- At its 186th meeting on Feb. 26, the National Security Council “Noted the President’s directive that the Secretaries of State and Defense each designate a representative to prepare, for Council consideration at its next meeting, recommendations as to assurances which might be given the French, in connection with the European Defense Community, as to the retention of U.S. forces in Europe and continued participation of the United States in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization” (S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, “Record of Actions by the National Security Council”).↩