762.022/1–1354: Circular airgram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1
CA–3634. Embassy should discuss with Foreign Office Dept. Inst. CA–36332 and timing US–UK intervention and substance possible concessions to be urged upon negotiating partners at appropriate time.
Our tentative views re form and hypothetical outline agreement parallel those set forth Paris despatch 16703 with certain modifications.
If Germans willing agree substantial maintenance Economic Union, as transitional regime, French should make concessions on customs and trade matters to extent that Germans can derive some immediate advantage and be assured progressively greater and eventually equal access Saar markets and resources. Since desequestration steel mills and return to owners reportedly important to FDP, which significant for any Saar settlement as Adenauer’s No. 2 coalition partner, we believe French should agree, to desequestration under formulae that would allow participation former owners. Further, Saar should be reopened to some degree German capital investment. Question ownership Saar coal mines can possibly be left in abeyance, but believe management mines might be reorganized to include German participation.
We hope Adenauer not serious in insisting French cede some territory to Saar and trust this purely bargaining point. However, it believed French should, while refusing such concession, offer return those small areas unilaterally detached from what is now Federal Republic and annexed to Saar by French Military Governor. These are only minor value to Saar, being primarily agricultural in nature, and can hardly be regarded as belonging to Saar.
Re permanency solution, we hope French and Germans can agree on [Page 873] emphasizing permanency though settlement naturally subject (in accordance Article 7, para 2 Bonn Convention4) to confirmation by peace treaty, both governments agreeing support settlement at that time. US and UK could do likewise. While emphasis should thus be on permanence, provision perhaps possible for periodic review and possible mutually agreed adjustment in light experience and progress European integration.
Re timing intervention, present thinking is US–UK should not comment further on substance agreement or concessions until Bidault and Adenauer have had “cards on table” meeting or we determine such intervention required to accomplish such a meeting.5
- Drafted by Fisher and Blumberg, cleared by BNA, initialed for the Secretary by Bonbright; sent also to Paris, Bonn, and Strasbourg.↩
- Supra.↩
- Summarized in footnote 6, p. 851.↩
- The text of the Convention on General Relations, signed at Bonn, May 26, 1952, is in volume vii .↩
- Minister Butterworth replied to CA–3633 and 3634 in telegram 3143 from London, Jan. 22, stating that the Foreign Office was “chary of timing and substance of US–UK intervention with Bidault and Adenauer on Saar” because Bidault had little incentive to reopen the question before the end of the Berlin Conference. Butterworth added that the Foreign Office preferred to continue work on the problem through the Council of Europe and therefore “British prefer to postpone any efforts we might make to facilitate Saar agreement until results of February 5 meeting of general affairs committee at Strasbourg are known” (762.022/1–2254). In the course of a conversation with Blumberg on the Saar on Feb. 18, J. H. A. Watson, First Secretary, British Embassy, stated that the Foreign Office continued to feel “that we should not fritter away our influence but to keep it for such time when we have the greatest chance for success. Then we should press both Adenauer and the French to reach an agreement” (762.022/2–1854).↩